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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigated stock market disequilibrium focusing on two topics: the 
impact of multiple market makers on the market disequilibrium at the market 
microstructure level, and the detection of the long-run market disequilibrium in 
the context of bubbles and the changes in transition probabilities. 
The multiple market makers increased the resilience of price rather than 
improving its efficiency when a multiple market maker system (the NASDAQ) 
was compared with a single market maker system (the NYSE) in terms of 
lowering non-stationarity and raising predictability. On the other hand, the 
volatility modelling of intraday data showed that market makerǯs 
under-estimation (higher-than-estimated size of return) increased volatility 
while over-estimation decreased it. Also, intraday seasonality in mean and 
volatility was confirmed, but leverage effects were denied in the 
GJR-GARCH-type models. 
The evidence of price bubbles in the Indian markets (1987-2008) and positive 
duration dependence in negative runs in the Korean market (1990-2008) were 
revealed using the duration dependence tests. The unconditional transition 
probabilities that a positive or negative run continues or ends were mostly 
significantly different from 0.5. On the other hand, the structural break based 
duration dependence test was devised to detect the changes in the transition 
probabilities between the market (dis)equilibrium. The NASDAQ and the Indian 
market showed positive duration dependence in positive runs and the Korean 
market displayed it in negative runs. In other words, the transition probability 
in those markets increases as a price run between structural breaks lengthened.  
  
  
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am deeply grateful for the wise academic guidance of my supervisors, Doctor 
Robert Young and Doctor Rodion Skovoroda. Their constructive advice and 
considerable encouragement were crucial in finalising this research. Also, I owe 
a debt of gratitude to them in being patient with my shortcomings and 
supporting me to develop my skills and knowledge.   
Without the unconditional love of my wife and parents, I would not have dared 
to begin and complete the study for a PhD. They have always been on my side 
and backed me to fulfil my desires in anything I choose to pursue. I am greatly 
indebted to all of the family members.  
If it were not for Professor Shahid Ebrahim, I would not have come to 
Nottingham. I appreciate his advice on the early development of this research. 
Thanks to all of my friends who cheered me up throughout the study and my 
colleagues at NUBS for their support and feedback. I was also grateful to receive 
valuable comments from two examiners. Last of all, thank you to those who are 
not here anymore for the wonderful memories you gave me.   
  
4 
 
List of Contents 
 
1. Introduction 9 
2. The impact of multiple market makers on the market disequilibrium at the 
market microstructure level 12 
2.1. Literature review 13 
2.2. The impact of multiple market makers in the neoclassical market 
making model 28 
2.3. Empirical analysis 32 
2.3.1. Data 35 
2.3.2. Descriptive statistics 37 
2.3.3. The comparison of stationarity with unit roots 39 
2.3.4. The analysis of predictability using variance ratio tests 44 
2.3.5. The analysis of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions and the time series structures 49 
2.3.6. Volatility and GARCH modelling 58 
2.4. Discussion and conclusions 68 
3. Detecting market disequilibrium in the context of bubbles and estimating 
transition probability using duration dependence 75 
3.1. Stock price bubbles and detection 76 
3.1.1. Stock price bubbles 76 
3.1.2. Detection of a price bubble 93 
3.2. The duration dependence test for price bubbles 107 
3.2.1. Methodology 107 
3.2.2. Data 116 
3.2.3. Return models 120 
3.2.4. The estimation of unconditional probabilities that a run continues
 127 
3.2.5. The results of duration dependence tests 132 
3.2.6. Discussion 144 
3.3. The detection of the changes in transition probability using the 
structural break based duration dependence test 147 
3.3.1. Structural breaks 149 
3.3.2. Duration dependence tests based on structural breaks 151 
3.3.3. Empirical analysis 154 
3.3.4. Forecasting duration and direction 161 
3.3.5. Discussion 170 
3.4. Discussion and conclusions 172 
4. Conclusions 176 
5. References 182 
 
  
  
5 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1 The increased resilience hypothesis and the improved efficiency 
hypothesis 33 
Table 2 Empirical properties of market making models 34 
Table 3 The list of the firms in Group A 35 
Table 4 The list of the firms in Group B 36 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the share prices and log returns 38 
Table 6 ADF unit root tests of the prices and log prices of Group A 41 
Table 7 ADF unit root tests of the prices of Group B 42 
Table 8 ADF unit root tests of the log prices of Group B 43 
Table 9 Variance ratio tests: Group A 47 
Table 10 Variance ratio tests: Group B 48 
Table 11 t tests for differences in variance ratios between Group A and B 49 
Table 12 ACF and PACF of Group A 51 
Table 13 ACF and PACF of Group B 52 
Table 14 Ljung-Box Q statistics of Group A and Group B 53 
Table 15 Comparison of autocorrelation between Group A and Group B 54 
Table 16 Time series structure of the return series of Group A 55 
Table 17 Time series structure of the return series of Group B 56 
Table 18 The coefficient of MA term in the simple neoclassical market making 
model: Group A 57 
Table 19 The coefficient of MA term in the simple neoclassical market making 
model: Group B 58 
Table 20 Dummy for mis-estimation of the size of information shocks 64 
Table 21 The averages of coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the 
GARCH models: Group A 65 
Table 22 The averages of coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the 
GARCH models: Group B 67 
Table 23 Example: converting residuals to positive and negative runs 108 
Table 24 Example: positive runs and sample hazard rates 115 
Table 25 Descriptive statistics of five sample indices 120 
Table 26 ACF and PACF of log returns: S&P500 121 
Table 27 Estimation results of the constant return model: S&P500 121 
Table 28 Estimation results of the return models: S&P500 123 
Table 29 Estimation results of the return models: NASDAQ100 124 
Table 30 Estimation results of the return models: FTSE100 125 
Table 31 Estimation results of the return models: BSE100 125 
Table 32 Estimation results of the return models: KOSPI200 126 
Table 33 Duration data - S&P500 with the GJR-GARCH model 127 
Table 34 Estimated probabilities that a run continues and ends 129 
Table 35 The results of binomial tests for significance from 0.5 130 
Table 36 Bubble counts by the rule of thumb and their averages per year 132 
Table 37 The results of duration dependence test: S&P500 and the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 133 
Table 38 The results of duration dependence test: S&P500 and the constant 
return model 134 
  
6 
 
Table 39 The results of duration dependence test: NASDAQ100 and the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 135 
Table 40 The results of duration dependence test: NASDAQ100 and the constant 
return model 135 
Table 41 The results of duration dependence test: FTSE100 and the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 136 
Table 42 The results of duration dependence test: FTSE100 and the constant 
return model 137 
Table 43 The results of duration dependence test: BSE100 and the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 138 
Table 44 The results of duration dependence test: BSE100 and the constant 
return model 138 
Table 45 The results of duration dependence test: KOSPI200 and the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 139 
Table 46 The results of duration dependence test: KOSPI200 and the constant 
return model 140 
Table 47 The results of duration dependence test: monthly S&P500 and the 
constant return model 140 
Table 48 The results of duration dependence test: monthly NASDAQ100 and the 
constant return model 141 
Table 49 The results of duration dependence test: monthly FTSE100 and the 
constant return model 141 
Table 50 The results of duration dependence test: monthly BSE100 and the 
constant return model 142 
Table 51 The results of duration dependence test: monthly KOSPI200 and the 
constant return model 142 
Table 52 Summary: the duration dependence tests on the weekly market indices
 143 
Table 53 BDS independence test for price bubbles 143 
Table 54 Summary: the duration dependence tests on the monthly market 
indices 144 
Table 55 BIC and RSS between 61 to 70 breakpoints 156 
Table 56 Descriptive statistics of the duration data from structural breaks 157 
Table 57 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: 
S&P500 157 
Table 58 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: 
NASDAQ100 158 
Table 59 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: 
FTSE100 159 
Table 60 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: 
BSE100 159 
Table 61 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: 
KOSPI200 160 
Table 62 The summary of structural break based duration dependence tests 161 
Table 63 The ACF and PACF of duration: S&P500 162 
Table 64 The ACF and PACF of the residuals from AR(1) of duration: S&P500163 
Table 65 The estimation results of the mean equation of direction (direct): 
S&P500 168 
Table 66 The estimation results of the standard deviation equation 170 
  
7 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 S&P SmallCap 600 Index from 03/05/2010 to 28/05/2010 37 
Figure 2 S&P 500 Index from 03/05/2010 to 28/05/2010 37 
Figure 3 The histogram of duration series: S&P500 108 
Figure 4 S&P500 from 03/01/1979 to 31/12/2008 117 
Figure 5 NASDAQ100 from 05/01/1983 to 31/12/2008 118 
Figure 6 FTSE100 from 03/01/1979 to 31/12/2008 118 
Figure 7 BSE100 from 07/01/1987 to 31/12/2008 119 
Figure 8 KOSPI200 from 03/01/1990 to 31/12/2008 119 
Figure 9 BIC and RSS at all optimal breakpoints under 70 156 
Figure 10 The actual duration (red) vs. forecasted duration (blue): S&P500 164 
Figure 11 The actual log duration (red) vs. forecasted log duration (blue): 
S&P500 165 
Figure 12 The actual log duration (red) vs. forecasted log duration (blue) with 
added size variable: S&P500 167 
Figure 13 Residual, actual and fitted values of the PCD model of direction 168 
Figure 14 Actual (red) and fitted (blue) values of direction: S&P500 169 
Figure 15 Actual (red) and forecasted (blue) values of direction: S&P500 169 
  
  
8 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
  
  
9 
 
1. Introduction 
Market equilibrium in financial markets occurs where the quantity of financial 
asset demanded is equal to the quantity supplied (Mishkin, 2008), or simply 
where supply equals demand. The price at market equilibrium is called the 
equilibrium price, or the market clearing price as all market participants are 
satisfied (Mankiw, 2006). Although the financial markets tend to move toward 
and stay at the market equilibrium, the market disequilibrium can occur any 
time when there is excess demand or supply. It can be caused by the shift of 
supply or demand for exogenous reasons to the market that may correspond to 
the changes in the long-term fundamental prices. In addition, random market 
fluctuation or market frictions can be responsible for the market disequilibrium.  
The disequilibrium can temporarily exist until the original equilibrium is 
restored or during the transition period from the old to the new equilibrium, 
but can be extended long-term. This may be a natural phenomenon in the 
markets. However, some disequilibrium can significantly affect market 
participants as well as non-participants. For example, long-term market 
disequilibrium due to excess demand in the stock market, like price bubbles, can 
have a severe adverse impact on not only listed firms and stock investors but 
also the wealth of the general public and the overall economy. Note that the 
definition of a price Ǯbubbleǯ in this thesis follows the descriptive pattern of 
Shiller (2005) and the technical definition of Blanchard (1979) as reviewed in 
Section 3.1.1, which is accompanied by a crash. 
This thesis investigates the market disequilibrium in stock markets. However, it 
is a vast area of study in finance and economics that cannot be covered in one 
piece of research. Therefore, the thesis particularly examines two main topics. 
First, the impact of a different market making system on the market 
disequilibrium will be investigated. Market makers in the stock market are 
subject to adverse information against the informed traders and the possibility 
of market failure from excess inventory position due to the uncertainty of 
market orders. However, even symmetric information shocks and the perfect 
knowledge of equilibrium price may not prevent or quickly remove the 
disequilibrium because of market frictions in market making; for example, a 
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market maker's inability or intentional deviation of his prices from the 
equilibrium. Another source of market frictions, which was rarely covered in the 
literature, is the number of market makers in the stock market. In particular, a 
market making system with a multiple market maker may result in different 
outcomes compared with a system with a single market maker in terms of price.  
Second, the detection of market disequilibrium will be examined in the context 
of bubbles. Since there is commonly a high level of fluctuations of supply and 
demand in the financial market, it is usually difficult to distinguish the market 
disequilibrium. However, a stock price bubble is one of the most significant 
examples of market disequilibrium and its detection may be essential to 
mitigate its potential harm. Although many detection methods for price bubbles 
have been devised, their empirical applications are not yet complete. Regarding 
this, transition probabilities between market (dis)equilibrium and their changes 
will be estimated. Although not every transition is related to a bubble, the 
changes between bull-bear markets can be part of a bubble. Also, these 
probabilities may vary depending on the duration of a specific type of market. 
On the other hand, a structural break at which a different price generating 
process arises may be relevant to a life-cycle of bubbles or more generally a 
transition to different market (dis)equilibrium.  
In summary, the thesis will cover two main research questions: 
(1) Whether and what impact the number of market makers has on the market 
disequilibrium at the market microstructure  
(2) How price bubbles are detected and when/where they exist, and how their 
transition probabilities and changes are estimated. 
The structure of the thesis follows the above research topics and questions. 
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of multiple market makers on the market 
disequilibrium and provides empirical evidence. Chapter 3 provides new 
evidence of price bubbles and the duration dependence of price runs, and 
investigates how to estimate transition probability and its changes using 
duration dependence and structural breaks. Chapter 4 summaries all the 
findings and concludes.   
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Chapter 2 
 
The impact of multiple market 
makers on the market 
disequilibrium at the market 
microstructure level 
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2. The impact of multiple market makers on the market disequilibrium 
at the market microstructure level 
At the market microstructure level, market making can be a source of market 
friction that may cause the market disequilibrium. Some examples are: adverse 
information between informed traders and market makers, inventory control of 
market makers and strategic interaction among market participants. Adverse 
information makes a market maker slowly follow the market equilibrium 
because he can only gradually retract information from incoming orders, and 
thus it lengthens the market disequilibrium. Inventory control leads to a market 
makerǯs intentional disequilibrium behaviour to restore his preferred inventory 
level. Strategic interactions can bring various results in terms of the market 
disequilibrium.   
On the other hand, different market microstructures in the stock market can 
affect this. For instance, two hypotheses can be formed depending on the 
different impact of the number of market makers. The increased number of 
market makers may amplify the market disequilibrium since it increases their 
aggregate power of controlling prices and absorbing demand/supply shocks 
than the case of a single market maker. This can be called Ǯthe increased 
resilience hypothesiǯ. Conversely, multiple market makers for one firm may 
decrease the size and time length of the disequilibrium because it increases the 
informational efficiency of the market due to the higher degree of competition. 
It can be defined as Ǯthe improved efficiency hypothesisǯ.  
Despite the earlier research on theories and some more recent evidence, 
extensive empirical research on the impact of multiple market makers has not 
been conducted. This chapter analyses the impact of multiple market makers on 
price to identify a better supported hypothesis, and also investigates different 
theories of market making. It adopts intraday return data for empirical analysis. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the related literature of 
market making. Section 2.2 presents a simple market making model which 
clarifies empirical expectations about the impact of multiple market makers 
under different hypotheses. Section 2.3 provides empirical evidence and Section 
2.4 discusses the findings and concludes.  
  
13 
 
2.1. Literature review 
Market microstructure is the study of the investigation of the economic forces 
affecting trades and prices, and direct implementation of economic theory to the 
actual working of markets (Biais et al., 2005). It also studies how specific 
trading mechanisms affect the price formation process and generate the 
disequilibrium, unlike other asset pricing studies that focus on the properties of 
the equilibrium (O'Hara, 1997). The essential idea of market microstructure is 
that market frictions can impose transaction (or trade) prices not equal to the 
equilibrium prices or the fundamental prices (Bradfield, 1979, Madhavan, 2000) 
that represent all discounted future benefits of owning assets in the efficient 
market. Their empirical study focuses on intraday data.   
One of the widely-researched sources of market frictions in market 
microstructure is market making. Early researchers of market microstructure 
did not consider the price impact of the market making mechanism (Demsetz, 
1968) as market makers are regarded as passive liquidity suppliers against 
order imbalance. However, they soon realised the price impact of market 
makers when they control their inventory, which is generally referred to as 
stock inventory like in Amihud and Mendelson (1980)ǯ , but cash 
inventory can be included as in Garman (1976)ǯs. For example, in one of the first 
literature pieces of such research, Garman (1976) emphasized that a market 
maker must relate his activities to inventory so as not to incur a failure in 
market making. In doing so, the market maker affects prices and causes a 
departure from their equilibrium.  
Later, the focus was to some degree moved on to the impact of adverse 
information between a market maker and traders on price patterns (Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985, Kyle, 1985, Easley and O'Hara, 1987). More recent 
developments such as in Madhavan (2000) and Cao et al. (2006) combine two ǯ
both inventory and adverse information.  
It is essential to depict who market makers are and how they work in real 
markets before moving on to the detailed review of the literature on market 
making. The literature often focuses on the New York Stock Exchange (O'Hara, 
  
14 
 
1997). On the NYSE, each stock is allocated to one market maker (a designated 
market maker or formerly a specialist) who is the contact point between sellers 
and buyers. He is responsible for fairly and orderly market making as well as 
liquidity supply to the market. The market makers are employees of the NYSE 
member firms. There are more than 400 market makers operating in the 
exchange and they may be responsible for more than one listed firm (NYSE, 
2003). They are physically located at a trading post on a trading floor and 
execute more than 95% of orders, mainly electronically via SuperDOT, an order 
routing system (NYSE, 2006).  
In terms of total volume, the designated single market makers participated in 
9.3% of market trades with their inventory, and 78.8% of their trading volume 
stabilised price movement on average between 2001 and 2010 (NYSE, 2010). 
Specialist stabilisation is when specialists provide liquidity in a way to reduce 
market volatility. Conversely, when specialists trade for other reasons such as 
active inventory control, it reduces stabilisation rates (Bacidore and Sofianos, 
2002). Designated market makers do not see incoming orders before setting 
quote prices unlike specialists, and thus they have supposedly utilised only 
public information on orders since 2011 (NYSE, 2009, NYSE, 2011).  
On the other hand, on the NASDAQ, several market makers compete over one 
stock and their entry and exit are relatively easy. The market makers attempt to 
post the best prices for their customers. This keeps transaction costs low and 
makes price discovery easier (Huang, 2002). Their bid-ask prices are on the 
screen of the NASDAQ trading system called SelectNet. All market making is 
electronically conducted without a physical floor.  
On the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the presence of market makers is 
important for providing liquidity to low trading volume stocks (Neal, 1992) and 
is known to raise liquidity compared to stocks without designated market 
makers (Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007). Competing market makers quote 
bid-ask prices using a quotation system called the SEAQ. On the other hand, 
other financial markets such as foreign exchange and government bond markets 
may have dealers that simultaneously function as market makers (Lyons, 1995, 
Bjønnes and Rime, 2000, Gravelle, 2005). 
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Most of the market participants such as private investors who can put limit 
orders for specified prices, dealers and brokers can be regarded as competing 
liquidity suppliers (Cohen et al., 1981, Biais et al., 2005). Then, they can be 
interpreted as broad-term market makers whose main responsibility is to 
supply liquidity. This increases the number of total market makers in a market 
and thus may generalise the results from market microstructure literature. 
A market maker works in financial intermediation and consequently causes the 
cost of immediacy (or intermediary) that impacts prices. The cost of immediacy 
consists of inventory, information and order processing costs (Stoll, 1978), and 
it also represents the costs caused by market frictions. Order processing cost is 
essential in market clearing (O'Hara, 1997), that is, a market maker is 
compensated for his services by this cost. Thus, related research on market 
making on prices is naturally divided into two areas (Hasbrouck, 1988): (1) 
inventory/position control of market makers and (2) adverse information 
between informed traders and uninformed market makers. Although the 
development of the theories began without the existence of the electronic 
trading system, they are relevant in explaining the price change with it at the 
market microstructure level (Freyre-Sanders et al., 2004) 
The inventory control model was originally suggested by Garman (1976). He 
argued that, when a market maker simply processes orders without considering 
the level of his inventory, his inventory is going to be depleted subject to a 
stochastic flow of orders, and thus a market failure is caused. Garmanǯs model 
also showed that the market makerǯs bid-ask spread cannot completely 
eliminate the possible failure. Stoll (1978) further argued that spread can 
accommodate order processing and information cost, but not inventory cost. 
Therefore, the market maker must control inventory by lowering his prices 
after purchase and raising them after sales in order to induce future 
transactions to equilibrate inventory (Stoll, 1989). Otherwise, a larger inventory 
position on aggregate will reduce the total liquidity provided by market makers 
(Comerton-Forde et al., 2010).   
A simple representation of an inventory control model is: 
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*[ ] ( )t t tP E P f I฀  ฀  ǯices as the mid prices of bid-ask prices and 
E[Pt*] is the equilibrium price at time t; f(It) is the function of the market 
makerǯs net inventory (I). In this model, a market maker changes his quotes 
depending on his net inventory. For example, in the case of a long position i.e., 
f(It)>0, he lowers the prices to attract buyers; conversely, he raises them if he is 
in a short position. A market maker cannot have clear knowledge about the 
equilibrium price. He may only guess it since, for example, he can evaluate the 
imbalance of his limit order book (Bradfield, 1979, Bradfield, 1982).  
ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ original net inventory function depends on the cumulative 
number of net orders, in which the arrival rates buy and sell orders are assumed 
to follow Poisson distribution. Prices are set by a market makerǯs balancing 
action to prevent market failure. However, the market maker sets the prices 
only one time in Garmanǯs and also the later Stollǯs models, thus they did not 
consider the cost of conveying inventory over time (O'Hara, 1997).  
When time period is extended over one period, the accumulated net inventory 
position from market opening plays a main role: 
1
0
t
t s
s
I I
฀
฀
฀฀  
where s is a time index. 
In Amihud and Mendelsonǯ (1980) multi-period model, a function of the 
discrepancy between stochastic market demand and supply is used as a net 
inventory function. A profit-maximising market makerǯs pricing depends on 
inventory that is exogenously bound to exclude a possible failure. Ho and Stollǯ 
(1981) utility-maximising market makerǯs pricing also depends on inventory, 
but uncertainty about inventory, wealth variances and transaction size is only 
reflected in spread size not its placement.  
On the other hand, as implied in Bradfield (1979) and Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980), the market maker may have a preferred level of inventory (I*). The 
market maker moves his quote prices away from the equilibrium price as the 
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differential between current inventory level and the target level become larger. 
Then, f(It) can be further ȾȋIt-I* ȌȾ
the deviation from the target level (Hasbrouck, 1988). This target can be a range 
of inventory positions (Bradfield, 1979, Bradfield, 1982).  
O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) further included overnight markets between each 
trading period where all trades settle and a market maker closes his position. 
Their model was extended to infinite horizon by repeating a trading period, 
which resembles real markets more. The market makerǯs price decision is 
affected by uncertainty about carrying-over inventory and trading profits (Ɏ), 
which is partly decided by random prices at overnight market (Pv). A similar 
approach was suggested by Zabel (1981). A brief representation of their model 
is: 
*
1[ ( ) ( )]vt t t tP E P f I P฀฀฀ ฀ ฀  
Other factors suggested in inventory control models are: a market makerǯs base 
wealth (Ho and Stoll, 1981, Stoll, 1978), remaining time before market closure 
(Ho and Stoll, 1981), institutional feature (Calamia, 1999) and trading practices 
(Menyah and Paudyal, 2000), economic factors and cross-listing (Hansch, 2004). 
However, these inventory control models do not explicitly consider the 
fundamental value of the asset (O'Hara, 1997) as it relies on the exogeneity of 
supply and demand. This is subject to criticism by the information models later. 
Inventory models were supported by empirical evidence presented by Barnea 
(1974), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), Ho and Macris 
(1984) and Madhavan and Smidt (1993) among many others. They showed that 
the inventory position affects price determination and the prices are a 
decreasing function of inventory. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and Hansch et 
al. (1998) confirmed the mean reversion of a relative inventory position 
supporting the existence of preferred inventory level.  
Although this departure from the preferred level can be prolonged (Hasbrouck, 
1991, Hasbrouck and Sofianos, 1993), if the possible shift of the preferred level 
is considered, the departure is not as long as previously thought (Madhavan and 
Smidt, 1993). That is because mean reversion becomes stronger as relative 
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inventory position moves farther away from preferred level by inventory 
control (Hansch et al., 1998). Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) also discovered 
that market makers more actively participate in sell (buy) side trading when 
they are deeper in a long (short) position.  
Naik and Yadav (2003) added that inventory affects the pricing decision 
regardless of part of it being hedged within the same intermediary. Hendershott 
(2007) recently presented empirical evidence of inventory control from 
1994-2004 NYSE data. Meanwhile, Snell and Tonks (1998), Hansch and Naik 
(1998) and Hansch (2004) discovered a strong inventory control in the UK data. 
One of the weaknesses of the inventory control model is the assumption of 
stochastic order flows that also represent exogenous supply and demand. It 
disregards the possibility of informed trading, the existence of fundamental 
values and the changes of future asset values. Thus, it creates difficulty in both 
connecting future values to market making decisions and modelling long-term 
market behaviour (Hasbrouck, 1988, O'Hara, 1997). Consequently, 
information-based market making models, namely adverse information models 
emerged. Adverse (or asymmetric) information models were first presented by 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985) and Easley and OǯHara (1987) based ǯ(1971) idea of information cost.  
Adverse information models dropped the assumption that both sides of trading 
have the same set of information and instead supposed that some of the traders 
(the informed traders) have superior private information. Adverse information 
likely incurs gains to informed traders and losses to uninformed traders when 
they trade with each other. A market maker is commonly assumed to be 
uninformed although adverse information can include informational advantage 
to a market maker (Logue, 1975). Being uninformed himself, a market maker 
also loses from trading with the informed traders. This adverse information will 
persist as long as price does not fully reflect private information.  
However, adverse information can lead to possible non-trading as uninformed 
traders do not have strong motives to keep participating in trading. This is 
because they have no chance to revert their losses under adverse information. It 
is called Milgromǯs no trade theorem (Hasbrouck, 2007). To overcome this, it is 
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usually assumed that the uninformed investors trade for liquidity by exogenous 
means (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). This can be also done by asserting the 
unspecified private values like diversification or risk exposure needs for traders, 
which generate trading behaviour (Hasbrouck, 2007). 
On the other hand, whenever the informed traders attempt to exploit their 
information advantages, it is possible for their private information to be 
instantly revealed to the uninformed market maker and other traders. This is 
because trades are informative unlike in typical inventory models (Hasbrouck, 
2007). This instant revelation prevents the informed tradersǯ motives to gather 
any information, which contradicts adverse information itself. Therefore, 
limited transaction size, learning framework or uncertain timing of trades is 
commonly introduced to prevent the instant revelation (Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985). In these models, it is assumed that the market eventually reaches 
full-information prices and clears the market (O'Hara, 1997). 
In terms of market making, he will adjust his price as private information is 
conveyed to him through market transactions like limit orders or block trades. 
He can even win back the loss from trading with the uninformed traders. This 
market making behaviour alone can explain the changes in prices or spreads 
without relying on inventory controlling behaviour regardless of the 
assumption of risk preference or competition of market makers. The impact of 
private information was not explicitly considered in inventory control models 
(Hasbrouck, 1988, O'Hara, 1997).  
In adverse information models, when informed traders observe price 
differentials, they put in corresponding orders. For example, if the informed 
equilibrium price is higher than a market makerǯs quote price, traders put in 
buy orders. Then, as buy orders arrive, the market maker revises his quotes 
upward because he knows the possibility of the order being 
information-motivated (Glosten and Harris, 1988). By doing so, he can win back 
the loss later from trading with the uninformed. 
A simple representation of adverse information is:  
*[ ] ( )t t tP E P g J฀  ฀  
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or equivalently, 
1 *( [ ] )t t tJ g E P P฀฀  ฀  
where g(Jt) is the function of the price impact of net trades (J) by the informed 
traders, which represents information asymmetry. In this model, transaction 
prices can be adverse information prices and the equilibrium prices reflect 
full-information prices (Madhavan, 2002).  
The examples include the Copeland and Calai model (1983), where a 
monopolistic market maker attempts to maximise profits from trading with 
both informed and uninformed traders by working out the optimal bid-ask 
prices. However, one period setup with fixed probabilities of receiving buy or 
sell orders cannot represent a market makerǯs incentive to change the prices 
related to true prices. For this, it is essential that incoming orders in a dynamic 
setup contain informational content (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, O'Hara, 1997), 
which a market maker can use for his own profits. In Glosten and Milgromǯ 
(1985) model, a market maker revising his information set against incoming 
orders creates uncorrelated price changes. It supports a semi-strong form of 
market efficiency, but still maintains the connection between current 
transaction data and future prices. Easley and OǯHara (1987) further considered 
the possibility of non-occurrence of new information. 
Kyle (1985), Easley and OǯHara (1987) and Glosten and Harris (1988) 
considered how the informed traders would act if they can submit an order of 
different size. They showed that the informed would prefer a larger transaction 
size to quickly exploit profit opportunity. They also argued that trading volume 
can be used as a proxy for the amount of private information conveyed to 
market makers, or in other words, the quality of information (Blume et al., 
1994). In a similar context, block trades (Easley and O'Hara, 1987), order 
imbalance, price history, time interval between trades and sequence of trade 
can consist of private information which is able to affect the prices. This is 
because a market maker is able to use one or some of them to revise his quote 
prices and thus past trades have an impact on current market price (O'Hara, 
1997). In the meantime, if the competitive setup is added, the market maker is 
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expected to more fully and immediately adjust the prices (Kyle, 1985), thus 
improve market efficiency. 
One advantage of the information model is that it can model quotes as a market 
makerǯs belief which is separate from transaction prices (O'Hara, 1997). 
However, the information approach has an inherent difficulty of giving enough 
incentives for market participants including market makers to participate in 
trades because any information or belief does not guarantee actual payoffs that 
actually make them stay in the market.  
Subsequently, strategic elements are considered in a market makerǯs revising 
process against adverse information to provide more incentives to market 
participants, particularly the informed. Strategic consideration can provide 
different outcomes from where information alone affects market participants 
pricing decisions. For example, the informed traders can delay order timing and 
change transaction size to fully utilise the information they possess. Kyle (1985) 
focused on the situation that one informed trader strategically and rationally 
exploits both the distribution and realisation of ǯnet orders    ǯ       Ǥ In this 
model, the informed trader can properly hide his information and maximise 
expected profits by changing his trade size according to the variance of 
uninformed trades. The market makerǯs motivation is the responsibility of 
market making and the uninformed participates in trading due to liquidity 
concern. These elements are not commonly modelled in inventory control 
models (Hasbrouck, 2007).  
In the meantime, the market makerǯs linear optimal pricing is represented by:  
* 2[ ] ( ) ( )t t U U tP E P k x J฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
where k is the function of the variances,
2
U฀ , of net trades by the uninformed (U) 
and xU is their realised net trades. Kyle (1984) also argued that when this model 
is extended into multi-periods, information will be gradually revealed onto 
prices, but they are still uninformative to the uninformed traders. A similar 
argument is suggested by Back (1992) in continuous trade setup.  
  
22 
 
The assumption of multiple informed traders enables competition between 
them. If strategic elements are not considered, the competition can reveal the 
information quickly rather than slowly (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992). 
Then, it can drive return to information to zero, and thus removes any incentive 
to collect information (O'Hara, 1997). However, the revelation process can still 
be slow if two informed traders differ in the amount of private information and 
place orders at different times (Foster and Viswanathan, 1994). Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) actually adopted an auction setup and said that weak 
competition between traders increases the time of revealing private 
information. A similar outcome is expected when informed traders are risk 
averse, which reduces overall market liquidity (Subrahmanyam, 1991). In any 
case of strategic elements between multiple informed traders being considered, 
the pay-off to the informed by strategic motivation should be high enough to 
overcome quick information exposure by competition. 
Uninformed traders can adopt trading strategies against the informed or among 
themselves. For example, it is possible that one of two groups of uninformed 
traders strategically infer the timing of trades to minimise possible loss (Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 1988, Foster and Viswanathan, 1990). Uninformed traders facing 
the informed ones may better strategically split orders (Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam, 2004). Competition between uninformed traders as liquidity 
suppliers can direct some of the traders to submit limit orders (Viswanathan 
and Wang, 2002) and possibly to different market makers (Biais et al., 2000). 
Meanwhile, the uninformed can be risk-averse hedgers whose trade decisions 
depend on the number of the informed (Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 1992).  
The adverse information model is also supported by empirical evidence. The 
existence of the informed traders was   ǯ (1992) and 
Cornell and Sirriǯ (1992) evidence of abnormal returns from illegal insider Ǥ ǯ (1988) early empirical model of quotes shows how to 
calculate the amount of private information using the trade innovation over the 
projected demand on public information. He also argued that adverse 
information generates a permanent shift of prices.  
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Huang and Stoll (1994) provided the evidence for the persistent impacts of 
informed transaction. Holthausen (1990) and Keim and Madhavan (1996) 
assumed large block trades were driven by private information and proved that 
the price impacts of these trades were permanent. More recently, Dufour and 
Engle (2000) and Chung et al. (2005) showed that the shorter trade interval, 
which can mean the higher probability of the trades conveying information, had 
the larger price impact. Then, private information would more likely explain 
price volatility than public information (French and Roll, 1986).  
On the other hand, adverse information research did not usually investigate 
public information for its price impacts since public information was supposed 
not to create adverse information among market participants as they 
symmetrically know its existence. Instead, research on public information 
focused on the size of total bid-ask spread and the analysis of its components 
(Krinsky and Jason, 1996, Voetmann, 2008). Public information can be 
separately considered as a case of certain adverse information in the market 
compared with a case of uncertain adverse information caused by private 
information as Easley and OǯHara (1987) briefly argued. When public and 
private information co-exist, it is usually assumed that the increase of public 
information makes the markets more efficient and prices more informative and 
thus the advantages of informed trading decreases (Kyle, 1984). 
In the meantime, it is possible to add back inventory control to adverse 
information models. The added inventory control provides enough incentives of 
active price adjustment to market makers under adverse information 
(Madhavan and Smidt, 1993, Madhavan, 2000, Biais et al., 2005). This is possible 
because inventory can be interpreted as a type of information privately known 
to a market maker (Cao et al., 2006) or non-trade information that causes 
market friction (Hasbrouck, 1991).  
Madhavan and Smidt (1993) was one of the first who devised a model to 
empirically test the importance of two effects. They argued that these types of 
market makers are also active investors who exploit short-term profitable 
opportunities using incoming order imbalance while maintaining their 
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long-term inventory target. They also presented a general representation of a 
combined model (Madhavan, 2000), in which a market maker sets prices as: 
*[ | ] ( )t t t tP E P J f I฀  ฀  
or using a market makerǯs inventory target, I*: 
* *[ | ] ( )t t t tP E P J I I฀฀  ฀  Ⱦ          Ǥ Then, the 
behaviour of prices transaction to transaction can be represented as: 
2
2
t
t t tP I J
฀฀฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀  
where Ƚ is the degree of information asymmetry and ฀t is the standard 
deviation of Pt* as the degree of value uncertainty. It says that, as information 
asymmetry worsens or uncertainty about the true value of the asset goes up, the 
prices rise. In the meantime, as the market maker accumulates a long position, 
the prices decrease. On the other hand, if he always takes the opposite position 
to all orders of customers, ฀It can be simply replaced by ȂJt-1. A similar idea was 
modelled by Stoll (2003) and Biais et al. (2005).  
Inventory control and adverse information cause different price impacts. 
Without the costs related to them, there is only an order processing cost, and 
then the price tends to bounce between bid and ask prices (Roll, 1984). 
However, each inventory and information effect can produce more complicated 
and dissimilar price patterns although they can produce a similar order 
imbalance (Chordia et al., 2002). According to Hasbrouck (1988), trade price 
revisions are negatively correlated in the inventory control model, but impacts 
are only transient because the deviation of inventory is not related to the future 
values of the asset. This can create mean-reversion of prices. Conversely, price 
revisions by adverse information are not serially correlated but impacts are 
persistent because of the changes in future values. However, if a certain 
limitation is put on the reflection of asymmetric information such as transaction 
size, it can lead to positive correlation by adverse information (Calamia, 1999).  
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Madhavan and Smidt (1993) argued that their empirical evidence using quote 
prices revealed that a market makerǯs quote revision is negatively related to his 
transactions and positively related to information delivered through impending 
orders. This result supports their specification above. There are other mixed 
results as well. Hasbrouck (1988) found out that negative autocorrelation exists 
in trade prices of low-volume stocks, but trades have persistent impacts on 
quote revisions for all stocks. That is, inventory control has an impact on 
smaller stocks while asymmetric information shocks are present.  
The empirical evidence was not conclusive and suggests that both may be in 
effect. Manaster and Mann (1996) and Madhavan (2000) reached the same 
conclusion. This mixed result is possibly because lagged effects reside in market 
making (Hasbrouck, 1991). In particular, the total duration of the effects of 
inventory control may be longer than those of adverse information (Hasbrouck 
and Sofianos, 1993). For example, price adjustment caused by large block trades, 
interpreted as private information, completes within as small as three trades 
(Holthausen et al., 1990), which is much faster than price adjustment by 
inventory control that can last several days (Hansch et al., 1998). Also, preferred 
inventory position itself, for which empirical tests aim, may deviate in the 
long-run (Madhavan and Smidt, 1993). Consequently, all of these effects may 
cause difficulties in separating two effects, or both effects may be intrinsically 
difficult to distinguish.  
In the NASDAQ and the LSE, more than one market maker operates for each 
traded stock of a firm unlike the NYSE. For example, the NASDAQ has around 14 
market makers per stock. The impact of multiple market makers on market 
making behaviour and price movement may differ and deliver more 
implications to market microstructure research. For example, in a set up of 
adverse information, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that if perfect     ǡ     ǯ 
information and optimal prices. Their price adjustments will be instant and 
essentially the same. Then, they end up with zero economic profits. That is, 
market making does not affect price patterns. On the other hand, if multiple 
market makers are subject to a certain heterogeneous inventory and 
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information structure or strategically interact with each other as seen later, it is 
expected that different price adjustment patterns and positive profits emerge. 
This type of strategic element was not considered in pure inventory control 
models even with multiple market makers (Hasbrouck, 2007). 
Ho and Stoll (1983) first introduced two market makers trading two different 
stocks with market traders in a one-period inventory control model in which 
inter-dealer trading is allowed. Each market maker attempts to maximise his 
utility based on inventory, cash and initial wealth. The market makers keep 
their prices more strongly than a single market maker because they are ready to 
trade more shares. In this model, each market makerǯs price adjustment does 
not depend on  ǯ   since they do not strategically 
consider what the competitor does although his inventory level consists of two 
stocks. On the other hand, Biais (1993) suggested strategically competing 
market makers where they are able to ǯ and assess 
inventory positions. He anticipates that the market makersǯ differences in risk 
aversion to inventory lead to a positive relationship between the number of 
market makers and the volatility of asset price. This is opposite to Ho and Stollǯs 
expectations.  
Likewise, there are two conflicting lines of study regarding the impact of 
multiple market makers on price and volatility. First, a multiple market maker 
system can limit price adjustment (the increased resilience hypothesis). More 
market makers can increase their ability to keep the price (Ho and Stoll, 1983). 
Also, they are more willing to maintain a profitable price even under adverse 
information. For example, Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) showed that 
informed traders put split orders to more than one market maker to keep their 
advantage longer. However, it enables the market makers to maintain 
less-competitive prices. That may create positive economic profits for them 
unlike where only a single market maker exists. Then, it generates resilience in 
price movement and reduces volatility.  
Also, it is possible that multiple market makersǯ information processing and 
inventory control contain strategic elements that prevent instant price 
adjustment, for example by setting more attractive prices than when they 
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encounter only the problem of adverse information (Ángeles de Frutos and 
Manzano, 2005). This disequilibrium behaviour happens because they attempt 
to infer information by attracting more orders, which also shows their collective 
power of price setting. On the other hand, dealers acting as market makers also 
trade with each other in the interdealer market (Hasbrouck, 2007). This trading 
is used either to control their inventory position (Ho and Stoll, 1983) or to 
increase their profits at other market makerǯ quotes. They would exploit each ǯ  through interdealer trading until it cannot improve their 
inventory positions (Ho and Stoll, 1983). The inter-dealer trading in this case 
possibly slows down price adjustment.  
The possibility that one market maker has superior information to the others 
was investigated in more recent models. For example, Calcagno and Lovo (2006) 
argued if one market maker knows the true value of the asset, he can gain 
positive profits by slowly revealing the information in quotes and trades. They 
also presented interview results arguing that real market makers know the 
existence of leading quote setters.  
Second, if multiple market makers indeed make price discovery easier due to 
competition (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992, O'Hara, 1997, Huang, 2002), 
prices become more informationally efficient (the improved efficiency 
hypothesis). The market makersǯ risk aversion to inventory (Biais, 1993) may 
be responsible for this faster infusion of information shocks into the price 
process. Biais et al. (2000) supposed that both informed traders and 
uninformed multiple market makers were risk averse but to a different degree 
while the market makers still consider inventory level. Then, he showed that the 
market prices in his model depend on informed prices, the degrees of risk 
aversion, inventory level and the number of market makers. In particular, as 
more market makers operate, price deviation caused by adverse information is 
increased. 
Also, strategic games among them (Meyer and Saley, 2003) can produce quick 
price movement to the equilibirum. Similarly, the facilitation of competition 
using electronic communication networks increased market efficiency 
compared with non-computer based market making (Huang, 2002). When 
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inter-dealer trading is permitted, for example conducted via the Inter-Dealer 
Broker (IDB) system in the NASDAQ (Gravelle, 2005), it may bring more 
competitive outcomes.  
Viswanathan and Wang (2004) allowed active inter-trading between market 
makers following a customer order in a multi-stage trading model. Increasing 
competition in their model drives profits to the market makers to zero. Even if 
one of the market makers is informed, one-sided information is able to still 
produce a fair game when two market makers perform the repeated game of 
trading both risk-free and risky assets (Meyer and Saley, 2003). Multiple market 
makers theoretically produced the higher volatility of returns than a single 
marker maker system in a sequential trade model (Biais, 1993). Then, the prices 
of multiple market makers have relatively weaker predictability as uncertainty 
goes up than those with a single market maker. On the other hand, Flood et al.  
(1999) proved improved efficiency in an experiment with multiple market 
makers. This improvement of market efficiency can be represented by reduced 
spread size (Mayhew, 2002). 
The history of market making theories shows that the initial focus of research 
moved from stochastic orders and inventory control to adverse information. 
Then, the subsequent research was combined into a setup which assumed that 
market participantsǯ behaviours including market makers contained strategic 
elements. There were dissimilar expectations regarding the impacts of multiple 
market makers.  
2.2. The impact of multiple market makers in the neoclassical market 
making model 
This section constructs a simple market making model that illustrates two 
hypotheses of the price implication under a multiple market maker system. The 
basic setup of the model is that a representative market maker adjusts his prices 
responding to external shocks while considering excessive inventory position. 
Shocks represent the potential changes in the equilibrium price and they may be 
random shocks or come from the informed traders.  
The market in this model trades one identical type of financial asset which has 
real value. Sellers and buyers submit orders to single or multiple market makers. 
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The market traders are homogenous, that is, their individual variables like 
income and wealth are identical. A market maker has the power of price setting 
but is bound by the responsibility of clearing incoming orders. He is uninformed 
about the changes in the equilibrium price brought by information shocks. 
There is adverse information between market traders and a market maker. The 
market traders are informed in the sense that they can find the equilibrium 
price and its changes collectively. In other words, they possess collective 
knowledge of the market-clearing equilibrium prices where they have no excess 
demand. The shocks to the equilibrium price exogenously arise. Using this 
superiority, they are able to discover any discrepancy between a market 
makerǯs prices and the equilibrium prices, and then place market orders for 
arbitrage profits. In this sense, they are arbitrageurs.  
Market making and trading behaviour are modelled in a discrete time 
framework. This is because quote and trade prices are discrete-valued in nature 
e.g. multiples of tick size (Tsay, 2005) and most series in market microstructure 
consist of discrete events that may randomly happen in continuous time 
(Hasbrouck, 2007) due to non-trading. Therefore, although it may be feasible to 
treat the data series as a continuous variable realised at regular discrete 
intervals for some purposes (O'Hara, 1997, Hasbrouck, 2007), the choice 
between a discrete and continuous time framework is not critical in this study. 
A multiple period model is employed because a one-period model has difficulty 
in approximating a market makerǯs incentive of changing prices (O'Hara, 1997). 
The number of trading periods is finite and a market maker is well aware of the 
possibility that he must close his position at a certain point in the future. Thus, 
he has intention at least to return to his preferred inventory as close as possible. 
It is assumed that his preferred inventory is a squared position. A market 
makerǯs acquired position is carried over to the next trading period, but 
overnight markets (O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986) that can settle transactions and 
accumulate information are not considered.  
The other technical assumptions are: no commission, taxes and other 
transaction costs. Also, a market maker does not pay any explicit cost of holding 
long or short positions although he may incur loss when closing this position.  
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Now, suppose the monopolistic market maker is faced with an information 
shock, his price at time t (Pt) is different from the new unknown equilibrium 
(E[Pt*]) by the amount of mis-estimation of Ƀt that is essentially the error term 
representing price differential from the equilibrium prices.  
Equation 1 
*[ ]t t tP E P ฀฀  ฀  
where Ƀt is a random variable identically and independently distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance. E[Pt*] is uncorrelated, but left as unspecified 
for now.  
Suppose the demand by informed traders follows a simple neoclassic demand 
function at any time. That is, their demand at time t (ct) is proportional to the 
difference (Ƀt) between the market makers price and the new equilibrium. Let Ƚǯ 
be the positive coefficient.  
Equation 2 
*( [ ])t t t tc P E P฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀   ฀ ฀    
or 
*1 [ ]t t tP c E P฀฀ ฀ ฀฀  
It is a linear demand function with the slope of Ȃ(1/Ƚǯ). Subsequently, the 
market makerǯs inventory position at the next period (It+1) changes by the 
demand: 
Equation 3 
1( )t t tI I c฀฀ ฀ ฀ 
As an uninformed market maker processes market orders, his excess inventory 
position is accumulated. 
It can be also assumed that a market makerǯs price adjustment becomes 
stronger as the change in inventory position gets larger. Then, it is represented 
by a simple linear function of inventory control. 
Equation 4 
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1 1( )t t t t tP P I I c฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ 
where Ⱦǯ is another positive coefficient.  
Then, the trader demand and the market makerǯs interim inventory control can 
be combined by substituting the trader demand for ct in the above. 
Equation 5 
*
1 [ ( [ ])]t t t t tP P c P E P฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀    ฀  
or 
Equation 6 
*
1 [ ] (1 )t t tP E P P฀  ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀   
where ɀǯ = ȽǯȾǯ 
This is the market makerǯs adjusted price that is a weighted average between 
the equilibrium price and his current price. The price generating process will be 
a weighted average between the process of the equilibrium price and his past 
price. The randomness of the market makerǯs pricing is generated from the 
uncertainty of the equilibrium price. 
Now, the empirical expectations of the impact of multiple market makers can be 
derived. If a multiple market maker system brings in price resilience (the 
increased resilience hypothesis), their prices will be less dependent on 
customer demand. That is, Ⱦǯ will be close to 0 in a multiple market maker 
system in Equation 4. That will lead to a smaller ɀǯ and larger (1- ɀǯ) in Equation 
6. The market makerǯs price will show less random deviation and stronger 
positive autocorrelation than a single market maker system. Their prices will 
more distantly drift away from the equilibrium price.  
On the other hand, if multiple market makers increase efficiency (the improved 
efficiency hypothesis), Ⱦǯ will be close to 1 as they reflect the changes in 
customer demand more and then ɀǯ will be increased. Consequently, the price 
will show larger random movement but move closer to the equilibrium price 
than a single market maker system. If the equilibrium price follows a random 
walk, the market makerǯs price will change similarly to a random walk.   
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Therefore, by comparing the properties of price movements in two market 
making systems, the more preferred hypothesis can be found. In sum, smaller 
volatility and stronger autocorrelation with multiple market makers prefers the 
increased resilience hypothesis while larger volatility and weaker 
autocorrelation prefers the improved efficiency hypothesis. This is consistent 
with the literature. 
Although the price generating process of market makers depends on how the 
equilibrium price is specified, one simple (and unrealistic) specification can 
provide the time series structure of a market makerǯs prices. That is, it can be 
assumed that E[Pt*] does not change over time i.e. E[Pt*]=P*. Then, Equation 6 
becomes: 
*
1 (1 )t tP P P฀  ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
It is essentially a difference equation and can be solved by forward successive 
substitution as follows: 
*
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where t ฀฀ 
This price pattern is equivalent to the pattern expected from exponential 
smoothing which is known to be regarded as an ARIMA (0,1,1) model with MA 
coefficient (1- ɀǯ) (Brooks, 2008). (1- ɀǯ) will be larger in a multiple market 
maker system under the increased resilience hypothesis and be smaller under 
the improved efficiency hypothesis. This is an interesting property to test, but is 
based on an unrealistic assumption.   
2.3. Empirical analysis 
Theoretical concepts in market microstructure such as adverse information 
cannot be directly observed nor easily quantified. It makes the comparisons of 
empirical expectations between different market making systems inherently 
difficult (Andersen et al., 2001). Therefore, indirect empirical evidence must be 
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used to find support for the hypotheses about the impact of multiple market 
makers and for the theories presented in the literature review.  
This section will look for such evidence by examining empirical data in the 
following three points. First, this section examines which hypothesis better 
matches with empirical data: improved efficiency or increased resilience. The 
related literature was reviewed in Section 2.2 for two hypotheses and the 
simple neoclassical market making model illustrated how those empirical 
expectations are contained in the model. Additionally, based on the increased 
resilience hypothesis, multiple market makers are expected to lower 
non-stationarity because of price resilience. However, the improved efficiency 
increases non-stationarity due to quick and persistent price adjustment 
assuming independent shocks. Predictability is conversely affected. Table 1 
summaries the empirical implications where H is for higher values and L is for 
lower values. Note that these hypotheses are based on adverse information and 
strategic interaction models.  
 
  Increased resilience Improved efficiency 
  Single Multiple Single Multiple 
Volatility H L L H 
Non-stationarity H L L H 
Predictability L H H L 
(+)Autocorrelation L H H L 
Table 1 The increased resilience hypothesis and the improved efficiency hypothesis  
Second, this section also checks which market making theory, inventory control 
or adverse information, is broadly supported by empirical findings. Different 
market making models may expect varying degrees of stationarity. For example, 
the price processes in the inventory control model are likely to be stationary 
due to its mean reversion feature (Hasbrouck, 1988) while those in the 
asymmetric information model will have stronger non-stationarity.  
Also, they may produce different types of autocorrelation in price increments. 
According to Hasbrouck (1988), Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Calamia 
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(1999), common inventory control models argue that inventory control 
produces the negative autocorrelations of increments and the mean reversion of 
prices, but asymmetric information incurs positive or no correlation in 
increments because of slow or instant release of information. These empirical 
properties of two market making models are summarised in Table 2. However, 
these two criteria are only suggestive because two effects may be mixed in the 
data and the use of averaged series over many days probably blurs any 
difference.  
 
 
Inventory control 
model 
Adverse information 
model 
Non-stationarity Weaker stronger 
Sign of autocorrelation (-)  (+) or none  
Table 2 Empirical properties of market making models 
Last, time series structures and volatility models are investigated and compared 
between systems. Therefore, in terms of the areas of investigation, five 
empirical areas are examined to spot the impact of multiple market makers: 
descriptive statistics, stationarity in terms of the existence of unit roots, 
predictability using variance ratio tests, time series structure based on 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, and volatility and GARCH 
modelling.  
The following sub-sections will basically examine the dataset as a whole at the 
same time compare two sample groups in terms of the characteristics of trade 
prices. The two sample datasets of share prices are from different, but similar in 
many aspects, market microstructures: a single market maker system of the 
NYSE and a multiple market maker system of the NASDAQ. The empirical 
analysis in the remainder of the section begins with descriptive statistics, and 
continues to stationarity, general predictability, time series structure, and 
volatility modelling.  
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2.3.1. Data 
For the empirical analysis, 15 firms that have a single designated market maker 
(Group A) and 34 firms that have multiple market makers (Group B) are 
selected. These firms are selected among US S&P SmallCap 600 index because a 
market makerǯs activities are stronger in trading of the shares of small firms. 
This index covers the listed firms in which market capitalisation is between 
$300mil and $1.4bil (Standard&Poor's, 2010). All the selected firms have the 
names beginning with either I or T to give randomness in the selection process. 
All the firms in Group A are listed on the NYSE and all the firms in Group B are 
listed on the NASDAQ. The list of the firms in Group A are in Table 3 and the list 
of the firms in Group B are in Table 4.  
 
 
 
Number Name Code 
1 Ion Geophysical Corporation IO 
2 Inland Real Estate Corporation IRC 
3 Intermec Inc IN 
4 Invacare Corporation IVC  
5 Investment Technology Group Inc. ITG 
6 Tanger Factory Outlet Centers SKT  
7 Teledyne Technologies Inc TDY  
8 Tetra Technologies Inc TTI  
9 The Dolan Company DM  
10 Toro Co TTC  
11 Tredegar Corp TG  
12 TreeHouse Foods Inc THS  
13 Triumph Group Inc TGI  
14 TrueBlue Inc TBI  
15 Tyler Technologies Inc TYL  
Table 3 The list of the firms in Group A 
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The sample period is one month between 1 May 2010 and 31 May 2010. 
Trading days are 20 days from 3 May 2010 to 28 May 2010 that covers 4 weeks 
from Monday to Friday. Trading hours are from 0930 to 1600. The number of 
observations for each firm is 1,560. The original data set of per-transaction 
prices was downloaded from the TAQ database on the Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). This dataset was then converted into 5-minute average prices 
to prevent the non-synchronicity issue with time. The conversion was 
completed on Excel using AVERAGEIFS functions.  
As seen in the following Figure 1 and Figure 2, the overall price pattern of S&P 
SmallCap 600 index in the sample period is not largely different from that of 
S&P 500 index that represent larger firms in the US stock markets in this sample 
period.  
Num. Name Code Num. Name Code 
1 ICU Medical Inc ICUI 18 THQ Inc THQI  
2 II-VI Inc IIVI 19 TTM Technologies Inc TTMI  
3 IPC The Hospitalist Co Inc IPCM 20 Take-Two Interactive 
Software 
TTWO  
4 Iconix Brand Group ICON 21 Taleo Corp A TLEO  
5 Independent Bank Cp (MA) INDB 22 Tekelec Inc TKLC  
6 Infinity Property & Casualty Ins 
Corp 
IPCC 23 Tessera Technologies TSRA  
7 Infospace Inc INSP 24 Tetra Tech Inc TTEK  
8 Insight Enterprises Inc NSIT 25 Texas Capital Bancshares TCBI  
9 Insituform Technologies Inc INSU 26 Texas Industries Inc TXI  
10 Integra Lifesciences Hldg IART   27 Texas Roadhouse TXRH  
11 Integral Systems Inc ISYS 28 Tompkins Financial 
Corporation 
TMP  
12 Interactive Intelligence Inc ININ   29 Tower Group TWGP  
13 Interface Inc A IFSIA 30 Tradestation Group Inc TRAD  
14 Interval Leisure Group IILG 31 Triquint Semiconductor TQNT  
15 Intevac Inc IVAC 32 True Religion Apparel Inc TRLG  
16 Teletech Holdings Inc TTEC  33 Trustco Bank Corp (NY) TRST  
17 The Ensign Group ENSG  34 Tuesday Morning Corp TUES  
Table 4 The list of the firms in Group B 
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Figure 1 S&P SmallCap 600 Index from 03/05/2010 to 28/05/2010 
 
 
Figure 2 S&P 500 Index from 03/05/2010 to 28/05/2010 
2.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
The mean and standard deviation of price, log price (the logarithm of price), and 
log return series of Group A and Group B are presented in Table 5 alongside the 
average skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics of log returns. 
The descriptive statistics are produced using the Excel Analysis Toolpak add-on.  
The average mean of log return is negative as expected from the price pattern in 
Figure 1. Remembering that this is 5-min data, the absolute value of the return 
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is only around 0.005%. NA is the number of Group A firms in the sample and NB 
is that of Group B firms. 
 
 
Group A Group B Difference-of-means t test 
 
NA=15 NB=34  (p-value) 
Price 
   
Mean 26.2298 19.6758 0.2411 
S.D 1.1051 0.8275 0.2899 
Log price 
   
Mean 3.0133 2.8177 0.3752 
S.D 0.04487 0.0471 0.6713 
Log returns 
   
Mean -0.000046 -0.000060 0.3679 
S.D 0.0035 0.0039 0.2070 
Skewness 0.4874 0.4315 0.9204 
Kurtosis 44.5765 60.8539 0.2119 
Jarque-Bera 167190.1447 445191.1915 0.2343 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the share prices and log returns 
Both sample probability distributions of the intraday 5-minute trade returns of 
the firms in Group A and B on average show positive skewness. Only 4 firms in 
Group A and 9 firms in Group B have negative skewness. This is consistent with 
Amihud and Mendelsonǯ (1987) earlier research on the daily returns of the 
NYSE, but different from the returns distributions of typical daily returns (Mills 
and Markellos, 2008) and 15-per-day intraday returns (Markellos et al., 2003). 
In terms of kurtosis, both show leptokurtic distribution which is characterised 
by fat-tailed and highly-peaked distribution that are consistent with daily data 
(Mills and Markellos, 2008).  
The difference between Group A and Group B are analysed using a 
difference-of-means t test (a unpaired t test), which compares the means of two 
groups of samples for difference using t statistic assuming unequal variances 
(Sullivan, 2011): 
2 2Ö Ö
A B
A B
A B
X X
t
N N
฀  ฀ 
฀฀
฀
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where XA is price or log return of Group A and XB is those of Group B. X is the 
sample mean and 
2Ö฀is the estimated variance. NA and NB are the sample sizes 
of each group. The test results between Group A and B are summarised in the 
rightmost column in Table 5.  
It seems that the multiple market maker system brings in the higher volatility, 
thus supports the improved efficiency hypothesis. However, the difference is 
not statistically significant. Meanwhile, none of the individual null hypotheses of 
no difference in two means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis are 
rejected.  
Additionally, the normality of the return series is tested and compared. The 
Jarque-Bera (JB) test is a test for normality. Its statistic is calculated using 
skewness (S) and kurtosis (K) of a series as: 
฀ ฀22 3
6 24i
S KJB N
฀  ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀  
which follows ɖ2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom and Ni is the number of 
firms in the group. All of the individual test results reject the normality of both 
sample and benchmark firms. That is common in financial data due to extreme 
values or volatility clustering (Brooks, 2008). If the non-normality persists in 
the error of the regression models, it possibly affects the validity of the 
statistical tests. A difference-of-means test shows that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the JB statistics of two samples. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that no statistical difference between two groups was found in 
terms of descriptive statistics. 
2.3.3. The comparison of stationarity with unit roots 
The first non-descriptive characteristics that will be compared between Group A 
and Group B are the existence of a unit root in price series. If a series contains a 
unit root, it characterises a non-stationary process which can also defy the 
validity of statistical tests and cause spurious regression, but possibly direct the 
subsequent time series modelling. Then, any shock to a variable of interest can 
be interpreted as a permanent shock (Campbell et al., 1997), which may be due 
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to some shocks coming from adverse information in market making. If the 
market is efficient, it may result in instant and full price adjustment to the new 
equilibrium and thus increase non-stationarity of price. On the other hand, if 
most of the shocks are temporary, the series will be mean-reverting and will not 
contain a unit root. Inventory control may be dominant in this case.  
In this section, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009) is first used for a unit root test. This test can control the effects of 
autocorrelation of the original error terms (i.e. autoregressive structure of the 
increments) on a unit root test that cannot be addressed in the Dickey-Fuller 
test. The specification for ADF tests for price series using ɏ lags (Brooks, 2008) 
is: 
1
1
t t i t i t
i
P P P
฀฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ 
฀
฀  ฀ ฀ ฀฀  
where Ƚ and ɗ are coefficients. The null hypothesis is that ɗ=0. That is, the 
original non-differenced price series has a unit root. The alternative is ɗ<0, 
which is a property of a stationary series. If the null cannot be rejected, the 
original series is: 
1
1
t t i t i t
i
P P P
฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
The proper selection of ɏ is important in testing the unit root of the price series 
of Group A and B. The maximum number of lag (ɏ) is set at 12, which represents 
1 hour lag in real time. Although there is not an obvious choice of ɏ in higher 
frequency financial data (Brooks, 2008) unlike quarterly and monthly economic 
data, the maximum lag of 1 hour seems reasonable in intraday data. Then, for 
each firm data, the optimum number of lags (ɏ) is selected based on the smallest 
Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC, also known as Bayesian Information Criteria) 
as in Gujarati (2009). 
Table 6 shows p-value and the optimal number of ɏ from the ADF tests for the 
price series of each firm. In all cases, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 
the 5% significance level. Thus, all series seem to have a unit root. All the time 
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series analyses in this section are conducted using Eviews statistical software 
unless otherwise stated. Log price series have almost identical results. 
  
 
Price 
 
Log price 
Firms p-value Lag (ɏ) Firms p-value Lag (ɏ) 
IO 0.2371 1 IO 0.2411 1 
IRC 0.5295 4 IRC 0.5436 4 
IN 0.5654 2 IN 0.5561 2 
ITG 0.4749 2 ITG 0.4725 2 
IVC 0.6480 2 IVC 0.6566 2 
DM 0.0531 1 DM 0.0554 1 
SKT 0.1711 0 SKT 0.1584 0 
TDY 0.4573 2 TDY 0.4028 1 
TTI 0.3354 1 TTI 0.3587 1 
TTC 0.1580 0 TTC 0.1627 0 
TG 0.1376 0 TG 0.1318 0 
THS 0.2009 3 THS 0.1962 3 
TGI 0.4640 1 TGI 0.4612 1 
TBI 0.8631 2 TBI 0.8753 2 
TYL 0.5088 1 TYL 0.5112 1 
Table 6 ADF unit root tests of the prices and log prices of Group A 
Meanwhile, the panel unit root test can give an overall idea about the existence 
of a unit root of all the series in each group. First, the Fisher-type unit root test 
(Baltagi, 2005) is conducted using p-values from the individual ADF tests. Its 
test statistic, pPANEL, is known to follow ɖ2 distribution where i is each individual 
time series: 
,
1
2 ln
N
PANEL ADF i
i
p p
฀
฀  ฀   
The results cannot reject the null of all unit root processes with unit roots with a 
test statistic of 34.8446 and p-value of 0.2483. The null hypotheses of the log 
price series are not rejected with a p-value of 0.2420. They support the 
existence of unit roots.  
Next, another panel unit root test, the Im, Pesaran and Shin test (Baltagi, 2005) 
tests the null hypothesis that each series in the panel has a unit root against the 
alternative hypothesis that only some series have unit roots. This test is 
essentially based on the average of individual t statistics of ADF tests.  
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1 N
ADF i
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t t
N
฀ ฀  
where tADF,i is the value of the ADF statistic of firm i. 
The test statistic of the panel of Group A is -1.3687 and its p-value is 0.0850. At 
the 5% significance level, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which further 
supports the finding in the ADF tests. Log price series provided the same results 
with a p-value of 0.0860. 
Table 7 presents the results of ADF tests for the prices of Group B. Compared 
with Group A, a lower number of series contain a unit root. At the 5% 
significance level, 5 are rejected (14.7% of Group A) and this is increased to 9 
cases (26.5%) at the 10% level. In Table 8, the ADF test results of log prices 
show a slightly fewer number of rejections. 4 and 7 series are rejected at the 5% 
and 10% significance level, respectively.  
 
  
Price 
  
Firms p-value Lag Firms p-value Lag 
ENSG 0.0406 2 THQI 0.3117 3 
IART 0.0182 2 TKLC 0.1232 1 
ICON 0.2968 1 TLEO 0.0729 2 
ICUI 0.5997 2 TMP 0.3865 1 
IFSIA 0.4642 2 TQNT 0.0997 2 
IILG 0.2116 2 TRAD 0.5513 2 
IIVI 0.2623 4 TRLG 0.0608 1 
INDB 0.3143 0 TRST 0.7534 3 
ININ 0.3806 0 TSRA 0.3365 3 
INSP 0.1821 1 TTEK 0.3902 2 
INSU 0.6603 2 TTEC 0.7802 2 
IPCC 0.0439 0 TTMI 0.5393 1 
IPCM 0.2444 1 TTWO 0.4358 1 
ISYS 0.6621 0 TUES 0.0358 2 
IVAC 0.7245 4 TXI 0.2103 0 
NSIT 0.1919 1 TWGP 0.3881 0 
TCBI 0.1335 2 TXRH 0.0130 1 
Table 7 ADF unit root tests of the prices of Group B 
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Log price 
  
Firms p-value Lag Firms p-value Lag 
ENSG 0.0941 4 THQI 0.3366 3 
IART 0.0307 2 TKLC 0.1392 1 
ICON 0.2908 1 TLEO 0.0688 2 
ICUI 0.6053 2 TMP 0.3745 1 
IFSIA 0.4705 2 TQNT 0.1029 2 
IILG 0.2199 2 TRAD 0.5723 2 
IIVI 0.2619 4 TRLG 0.0616 1 
INDB 0.3147 0 TRST 0.8258 5 
ININ 0.3750 0 TSRA 0.3601 3 
INSP 0.2124 1 TTEC 0.8278 2 
INSU 0.6671 2 TTEK 0.3924 2 
IPCC 0.0453 0 TTMI 0.5368 1 
IPCM 0.2460 1 TTWO 0.4094 1 
ISYS 0.7063 0 TUES 0.0334 2 
IVAC 0.7378 4 TWGP 0.3858 0 
NSIT 0.1968 1 TXI 0.1950 0 
TCBI 0.1353 2 TXRH 0.0129 1 
Table 8 ADF unit root tests of the log prices of Group B 
The test statistic from the Fisher-type unit root test of panel data is 104.98 and 
the p-value is 0.0027. In the case of log prices, they are 101.175 and 0.0056, 
respectively. These results reject the null hypothesis of all series having a unit 
root for the alternative hypothesis that some of them do not have unit roots. An 
Im, Pesaran and Shin test also rejects the same null hypothesis with a statistic 
value of -3.5227 and p-value of 0.0002 in the price series and -3.2754 and 
0.0005 in the log price series.  
These (panel) unit root tests revealed a clear difference between Group A and 
Group B. The price series of Group A firms have unit roots, so they may be 
subject more strongly to adverse information. Meanwhile, some of the price 
series of Group B firms do not have unit roots, and their difference is 
statistically confirmed. 
Also, it can be concluded that multiple market makers may create price 
stationarity to some degree compared with a single market maker case. In other 
words, the time series of the share price of the firms under multiple market 
makers (Group B) are more likely to be stationary with a mean reverting 
property. This difference supports the increased resilience hypothesis while a 
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generally high level of non-stationarity in both groups may support the 
dominance of adverse information shocks in the sample. 
In the meantime, the above results of the unit root tests give evidence for unit 
roots in most of the price series. The use of the differenced series eliminates the 
unit root (Brooks, 2008) before proceeding with any time series modelling. In 
finance research, the convention is actually to use log return series, that is, the 
differenced series of the natural logarithm of prices. The log return series 
removes unit roots from a unit root series just like simple differencing. Also, it 
has some other advantages over the differenced series since it can approximate 
relative changes well in the given series for small changes (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009), which is also scale-free and easily compounded by addition i.e. additive. 
However, the use of return series may remove some structures in price series 
and introduce others.  
On the other hand, the log return series of all firms in Group A and Group B are 
additionally tested for unit roots using ADF, Fisher-type and Im, Perasan and 
Shin tests. All the test results of individual series and panel data reject the null 
hypothesis with a p-value of 0.000. Thus, it supports that unit roots do not exist 
in the log return series.  
However, it may require further testing for how price or returns are correlated. 
Even if the null hypothesis of the unit root tests for a price series is not rejected, 
it cannot be concluded that the increments, e.g. log returns, do not have 
correlations or predictability in general. The reason for this is that unit root 
tests cannot dispute the predictability of movement (Campbell et al., 1997) 
originating from correlated errors. Note that optimal lag in unit root tests being 
larger than 0 in price series implies the autoregressive structure in the 
differenced series, or equivalently that of log return series. 
2.3.4. The analysis of predictability using variance ratio tests 
When the log price follows a random walk, or equivalently log returns are 
identically and independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance, 
the variance of return increments over a specific time period has a linear 
relationship with the time gap between the first and last observations of the 
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period (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988, Campbell et al., 1997). A variance ratio test is 
based on the following statistics to test for the departure from random walks.   
1 1var( ... )( )
var( )
t t t q
t
r r r
VR q
q r
฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀  
where rt is a log return and q is a time gap. This is equal to one when the 
variable follows a random walk. In practice, the standardised variance ratio 
statistic (Campbell et al., 1997) is used, which is asymptotically normally 
distributed with zero mean and unit variance. Since this test uses a random 
walk as the basis for the null hypothesis, the rejection of the null hypothesis 
implies predictability like an autoregressive structure (except random walk). 
Note that earlier unit root tests focus on the existence of unit roots only, so they 
can contain an autoregressive structure of the increments in the null hypothesis 
of unit roots.  
The original test assumes identically and independently distributed increments. 
However, this linear relationship can hold where the increments are only 
independent or uncorrelated (Campbell et al., 1997). In this sense, this variance 
ratio test is able to detect a general departure from a random walk (Mills and 
Markellos, 2008) and allows for heteroskedasticity which is found in 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) processes (Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1989). Meanwhile, there exists the joint test of the null hypotheses 
for all time gaps of interest. The Chow-Denning max|z| statistic is commonly 
used for this purpose, which utilises the maximum absolute value of individual 
test statistics (Chow and Denning, 1993, Mills and Markellos, 2008, Charles, 
2009) 
The inventory control model inherently has the property of mean reversion, and 
thus the variance ratio tests on the data that are strongly affected by inventory 
control may be more likely to reject the null. On the other hand, if the data series 
experiences a large number of the independent adverse information shocks, the 
variance ratio tests cannot reject the null. Only when external information 
shocks are correlated in some way or price adjustment to new information is 
slow, can the null be rejected. On the other hand, multiple market makers may 
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generate higher predictability under the increased resilience hypothesis and 
lower predictability under the improved efficiency hypothesis assuming 
independent shocks. 
Table 9 presents the variance ratios of the log return series of Group A and 
p-values for the tests for the null hypothesis of random walks. To be precise, the 
variance tests used here allow for heteroskedasticity, so the null hypothesis is 
that a return process follows a random walk with uncorrelated increments. That 
is, the increments can be non-independent and non-identical. 4 different time 
gaps are selected 4 (20 minutes), 12 (1 hour), 24 (2 hours) and 48 (4 hours). 
Additionally, the results of the Chow-Denning test, joint significance test, of all 4 
variance ratios are provided (Chow and Denning, 1993). Note that the 
presented variance ratios are not directly used for the tests. The max |z| 
statistics and p-values need to be calculated using the heteroskedasticity-robust 
variance ratio test statistics by Lo (1989). 
The null hypotheses are rejected in all cases. The results display that all log 
price processes of Group A firms are not random walks. The joint test results 
also confirm them. On the other hand, as the time gap becomes larger, the 
values of variance ratios decrease away from the value of 1. However, in terms 
of p-values of the variance ratio tests, there is a slight tendency of less-likely 
rejection of the null hypothesis although it does not lead to non-rejection of the 
null in any case.  
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 Gap 4 12 24 48 Joint test 
  
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
max|z| 
Statistic 
p value 
IO 0.3278 0.0000 0.0989 0.0000 0.0509 0.0001 0.0270 0.0009 4.7793 0.0000 
IRC 0.3092 0.0000 0.0904 0.0000 0.0485 0.0001 0.0256 0.0009 5.4248 0.0000 
IN 0.2849 0.0001 0.0853 0.0004 0.0451 0.0017 0.0235 0.0062 3.8268 0.0005 
ITG 0.2445 0.0000 0.0710 0.0000 0.0397 0.0000 0.0207 0.0002 5.8241 0.0000 
IVC 0.2808 0.0001 0.0901 0.0004 0.0456 0.0012 0.0245 0.0037 3.9059 0.0004 
DM 0.3368 0.0000 0.1045 0.0000 0.0541 0.0001 0.0293 0.0017 5.6786 0.0000 
SKT 0.2681 0.0000 0.0832 0.0000 0.0454 0.0002 0.0232 0.0013 4.7556 0.0000 
TDY 0.3109 0.0000 0.0907 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0267 0.0005 5.4544 0.0000 
TTI 0.3122 0.0000 0.0972 0.0000 0.0504 0.0000 0.0265 0.0004 4.8915 0.0000 
TTC 0.2748 0.0124 0.0855 0.0122 0.0454 0.0147 0.0238 0.0184 2.5058 0.0480 
TG 0.2844 0.0000 0.0835 0.0000 0.0450 0.0000 0.0235 0.0001 6.5280 0.0000 
THS 0.3070 0.0000 0.0951 0.0000 0.0495 0.0001 0.0259 0.0007 4.8961 0.0000 
TGI 0.2904 0.0000 0.0899 0.0000 0.0463 0.0001 0.0252 0.0007 4.8961 0.0000 
TBI 0.3013 0.0000 0.0972 0.0000 0.0477 0.0001 0.0254 0.0009 4.7553 0.0000 
TYL 0.2920 0.0000 0.0894 0.0000 0.0466 0.0000 0.0241 0.0005 5.1146 0.0000 
Avg. 0.2950 0.0008 0.0901 0.0009 0.0473 0.0012 0.0250 0.0025 4.8824 0.0033 
S.D. 0.02374   0.00806   0.00336   0.00203       
Table 9 Variance ratio tests: Group A 
Seemingly similar results are obtained from the variance ratio tests for Group B. 
Again, the null hypotheses in all individual and joint tests are rejected for 
predictability except 2 firms. In log returns series of TCBI, the null is not 
rejected individually or jointly, and that of TLEO shows insignificance in the 
joint test. Similar to Group A, the values of variance ratios become smaller but 
the p-value increases as the gap between observations goes up.  
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Gap 4 12 24 48 Joint test 
  
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
Variance 
ratio 
p-value 
max|z| 
Statistic 
p value 
ENSG 0.2941 0.0000 0.0899 0.0000 0.0445 0.0000 0.0234 0.0002 7.3493 0.0000 
IART 0.2569 0.0005 0.0902 0.0115 0.0481 0.0243 0.0253 0.0402 3.4974 0.0019 
ICON 0.3250 0.0000 0.0967 0.0000 0.0495 0.0002 0.0260 0.0031 4.8017 0.0000 
ICUI 0.2487 0.0032 0.0791 0.0049 0.0399 0.0074 0.0210 0.0119 2.9483 0.0127 
IFSIA 0.2469 0.0136 0.0830 0.0482 0.0439 0.0632 0.0217 0.0763 2.4681 0.0532 
IILG 0.2755 0.0000 0.0870 0.0000 0.0465 0.0000 0.0241 0.0008 7.0927 0.0000 
IIVI 0.3101 0.0000 0.0911 0.0000 0.0467 0.0000 0.0240 0.0006 6.3588 0.0000 
INDB 0.2747 0.0000 0.0823 0.0000 0.0445 0.0002 0.0229 0.0013 4.7730 0.0000 
ININ 0.2609 0.0000 0.0868 0.0000 0.0447 0.0000 0.0232 0.0002 5.6144 0.0000 
INSP 0.2930 0.0000 0.1033 0.0001 0.0530 0.0005 0.0273 0.0022 4.3484 0.0001 
INSU 0.2580 0.0000 0.0755 0.0009 0.0432 0.0092 0.0214 0.0275 4.7940 0.0000 
IPCC 0.2251 0.0000 0.0752 0.0000 0.0421 0.0000 0.0215 0.0000 4.3558 0.0001 
IPCM 0.2941 0.0000 0.0926 0.0001 0.0492 0.0007 0.0256 0.0023 4.4699 0.0000 
ISYS 0.2511 0.0000 0.0877 0.0000 0.0443 0.0000 0.0219 0.0002 5.6406 0.0000 
IVAC 0.3149 0.0002 0.0965 0.0007 0.0484 0.0020 0.0255 0.0052 3.6982 0.0009 
NSIT 0.2713 0.0000 0.0855 0.0001 0.0478 0.0003 0.0248 0.0013 4.3843 0.0000 
TCBI 0.1967 0.0734 0.0705 0.1321 0.0381 0.1515 0.0191 0.1637 1.7906 0.2627 
THQI 0.2697 0.0006 0.0858 0.0070 0.0488 0.0234 0.0249 0.0548 3.4406 0.0023 
TKLC 0.3185 0.0465 0.0993 0.0364 0.0532 0.0409 0.0276 0.0466 2.0926 0.1378 
TLEO 0.2811 0.0000 0.0904 0.0000 0.0466 0.0006 0.0242 0.0054 4.5640 0.0000 
TMP 0.2863 0.0000 0.0954 0.0000 0.0493 0.0000 0.0252 0.0001 6.7592 0.0000 
TQNT 0.2940 0.0000 0.0890 0.0001 0.0470 0.0004 0.0247 0.0016 4.4304 0.0000 
TRAD 0.2748 0.0001 0.0880 0.0002 0.0460 0.0008 0.0232 0.0033 3.9346 0.0003 
TRLG 0.2881 0.0000 0.0897 0.0000 0.0449 0.0001 0.0241 0.0007 4.6527 0.0000 
TRST 0.2836 0.0000 0.0828 0.0000 0.0448 0.0001 0.0237 0.0008 4.8815 0.0000 
TSRA 0.2877 0.0000 0.0877 0.0000 0.0470 0.0001 0.0251 0.0005 5.3710 0.0000 
TTEC 0.2638 0.0007 0.0871 0.0020 0.0463 0.0041 0.0230 0.0078 3.4069 0.0026 
TTEK 0.2888 0.0000 0.0887 0.0000 0.0467 0.0003 0.0240 0.0022 4.6959 0.0000 
TTMI 0.3275 0.0000 0.1024 0.0001 0.0545 0.0007 0.0285 0.0036 4.1321 0.0001 
TTWO 0.2680 0.0048 0.0884 0.0070 0.0449 0.0106 0.0240 0.0164 2.8188 0.0191 
TUES 0.2904 0.0000 0.0934 0.0000 0.0471 0.0000 0.0259 0.0005 5.8937 0.0000 
TWGP 0.2624 0.0017 0.0897 0.0032 0.0443 0.0062 0.0229 0.0139 3.1364 0.0068 
TXI 0.2664 0.0035 0.0835 0.0041 0.0438 0.0060 0.0233 0.0096 2.9231 0.0138 
TXRH 0.3114 0.0001 0.0905 0.0002 0.0483 0.0005 0.0258 0.0017 3.8366 0.0005 
Avg. 0.2782 0.0044 0.0884 0.0076 0.0464 0.0104 0.0241 0.0149 4.3928 0.0151 
S.D 0.0277   0.0071   0.0034   0.0020   1.3538   
Table 10 Variance ratio tests: Group B 
The increased resilience hypothesis is supported when comparing the variance 
ratios of two groups, which are known to follow normal distribution (Campbell 
et al., 1997), using difference-of-means t tests in Table 11. A statistically 
significant difference at the 5% significance level (**) is found at gap 4. Group B 
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firms have lower variance ratios. It may mean that the returns of Group B have 
higher predictability within a 20 minute gap. However, it is not greatly 
meaningful since the results of individual tests are the same. Meanwhile, the 
return series of Group A have higher variance ratios overall, which means the 
price series are closer to random walks. However, this is not statistically 
significant.   
 
Variance 
ratio 
Gap 4 Gap 12 Gap 24 Gap 48 
Group A 0.2950 0.0901 0.0473 0.0250 
Group B 0.2782 0.0884 0.0464 0.0241 
t statistic 2.0395** 2.0639 2.0518 2.0555 
p-value 0.0382 0.4763 0.3955 0.1593 
Table 11 t tests for differences in variance ratios between Group A and B  
In sum, the variance ratio tests confirm that almost all price series are not 
random walk, thus it implies predictable time series structure in means and 
variances. The earlier results already suggested the presence of unit roots in 
price series. Then, it is probable that mean and variance processes have a 
predictable structure like autocorrelation, an ARMA and a GARCH (generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) structures. Meanwhile, the 
difference between two groups may support the increased resilience hypothesis 
at least for a shorter interval.  
2.3.5. The analysis of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions and the time series structures 
It was expected that inventory control produces negative autocorrelation and 
asymmetric information generates positive autocorrelation (Table 2). In the 
meantime, each market making model may imply a different autoregressive and 
moving average (ARMA) structure in time series data of price or return series. 
For example, inventory control models support the more significant ARMA 
terms in those time series data more than adverse information models do, but 
adverse information models can also explain such a structure when there are 
correlated shocks or the accommodation of shocks is not instant. The results in 
Section 2.3.3 already revealed the general existence of the autoregressive (AR) 
structure in both differenced series. That means the time series models of the 
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differenced series of log prices, i.e. log return series, may be an AR model. 
However, a more formal approach of identifying the time series structures are 
necessary for further discussion.  
This section investigates autocorrelation functions (ACF) and partial 
autocorrelation functions (PACF) to examine the characteristics of the intraday 
return series and to find implications for the market making models. Then, it 
identifies an ARMA structure using information criteria. At the same time, the 
impact of the presence of multiple market makers is also examined to see if any 
hypothesis in Table 1 is particularly supported. The order of the ARMA 
structure of the return series is also identified and compared.  
ACFs and PACFs are essential in identifying a dynamic structure of a time series 
model which is based on the Box-Jenkins method (Hamilton, 1994). For ACFs, 
the estimated autocorrelations at lag ɏ of time series data are calculated by 
solving a system of Yule-Walker equations that are obtained by dividing the 
autocovariance between the non-lagged value and the ɏth lagged value by the 
variance of the series (Brooks, 2008, Mills and Markellos, 2008). The partial 
autocorrelations (PACF) between the current observation and an observation ɏ 
periods ago are obtained by estimating the kth AR coefficient of an AR(k) model 
that controls for correlations at intermediate lags (Mills and Markellos, 2008). 
When they are plotted or tabulated against lags, autocorrelation functions and 
partial autocorrelation functions are obtained.  
Based on the significance of lags in the ADF test results of unit roots in Table 6 
and Table 7, autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations are calculated up to 
4th lags. The calculated values of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelations 
are presented in Table 12. Their significance is indicated by Ǯ*ǯ which is attached 
if the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation values exceed the upper and 
lower bounds. The bounds at the 5% significance level are calculated by: 
1.96
N
฀  
where N is the number of observations. If the autocorrelations and partial 
autocorrelations at a specific lag are larger than this value, they are significantly 
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different from zero at the 5% significance level. When a sample size is 1,559 (e.g. 
lag 1), the bounds are ±0.0496. Meanwhile, ǮȘǯ in the table indicates that the 
autocorrelations are larger than ±0.1 and Ǯșǯ is for the values over ±0.2. They are 
intended to simply clarify the strength of autocorrelations and partial 
autocorrelations.  
 
Log 
returns 
ACF 
 
PACF 
 
lag1 
 
lag2 
 
lag3 
 
lag4 
 
lag1 
 
lag2 
 
lag3 
 
lag4 
 
IO 0.166 Ș -0.011 
 
-0.055 * -0.091 * 0.166 Ș -0.039 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.076 * 
IRC 0.115 Ș -0.055 * -0.089 * -0.091 * 0.115 Ș -0.070 * -0.076 * -0.077 * 
IN 0.075 * -0.065 * -0.020 
 
-0.056 * 0.075 * -0.071 * -0.009 
 
-0.059 * 
ITG -0.066 * -0.068 * 0.001 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.066 * -0.073 * -0.009 
 
-0.048 
 
IVC 0.093 * -0.081 * 0.049 
 
-0.018 
 
0.093 * -0.091 * 0.067 * -0.038 
 
DM 0.215 ș 0.031 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.057 * 0.215 ș -0.015 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.057 * 
SKT 0.030 
 
-0.053 * -0.072 * -0.038 
 
0.030 
 
-0.054 * -0.069 * -0.037 
 
TDY 0.134 Ș -0.053 * -0.057 * -0.076 * 0.134 Ș -0.073 * -0.040 
 
-0.068 * 
TTI 0.149 Ș -0.005 
 
-0.088 * -0.062 * 0.149 Ș -0.028 
 
-0.085 * -0.037 
 
TTC 0.043 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.049 
 
0.043 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.046 
 
TGI 0.102 Ș -0.009 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.040 
 
0.102 Ș -0.020 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.037 
 
THS 0.131 Ș -0.087 * -0.110 Ș -0.063 * 0.131 Ș -0.106 Ș -0.086 * -0.046 
 
TG 0.055 * -0.035 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.073 * 0.055 * -0.038 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.071 * 
TBI 0.130 Ș -0.066 * -0.018 
 
-0.045 
 
0.130 Ș -0.084 * 0.002 
 
-0.050 * 
TYL 0.089 * -0.009 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.062 * 0.089 * -0.017 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.056 * 
5% c.v. 0.0497 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0496 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0497 
 
Average  0.097 * -0.038 
 
-0.040 
 
-0.058 * 0.097 * -0.052 * -0.032 
 
-0.054 * 
Table 12 ACF and PACF of Group A 
Except one firm (TTC), which is 6.67% of all sample firms, all other firms have 
statistically significant autocorrelations at several lags. Although an individual 
correlogram is not presented, which is commonly used for the informal 
identification procedure in Box-Jenkins as a time series modelling (Hamilton, 
1994), the above ACF and PACF show that most of the return series have an 
ARMA structure. The averages of the group are presented in the last row where Ǯ*ǯ indicates significance at the 5% significance level. This average pattern shows 
a significant positive correlation at lag 1 and negative correlation at the 
following lags that are marginally significant or insignificant. Ljung-Box Q 
statistics for lags 1 to 4 are separately reported in Table 14.  
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Log 
returns 
ACF 
 
PACF 
 
 
lag1 
 
lag2 
 
lag3 
 
lag4 
 
lag1 
 
lag2 
 
lag3 
 
lag4 
 
ENSG 0.068 * -0.077 * -0.049 
 
-0.095 * 0.068 * -0.082 * -0.039 
 
-0.096 * 
IART 0.109 Ș -0.199 Ș 0.013 
 
0.087 * 0.109 Ș -0.214 ș 0.067 * 0.036 
 
ICON 0.154 Ș -0.032 
 
-0.077 * -0.098 * 0.154 Ș -0.057 * -0.065 * -0.080 * 
ICUI -0.064 * -0.074 * -0.013 
 
-0.056 * -0.064 * -0.079 * -0.023 
 
-0.065 * 
IFSIA -0.001 
 
-0.242 ș 0.007 
 
0.015 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.242 ș 0.007 
 
-0.046 
 
IILG 0.074 * -0.074 * -0.022 
 
-0.020 
 
0.074 * -0.080 * -0.011 
 
-0.023 
 
IIVI 0.087 * -0.010 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.129 Ș 0.087 * -0.018 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.123 Ș 
INDB 0.037 
 
-0.059 * -0.074 * -0.054 * 0.037 
 
-0.061 * -0.069 * -0.053 * 
ININ 0.044 
 
0.008 
 
-0.037 
 
0.006 
 
0.044 
 
0.006 
 
-0.037 
 
0.009 
 
INSP 0.188 Ș 0.052 * 0.036 
 
0.050 * 0.188 Ș 0.018 
 
0.024 
 
0.040 
 
INSU -0.017 
 
-0.126 Ș 0.040 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.127 Ș 0.036 
 
-0.063 * 
IPCC -0.037 
 
-0.025 
 
0.027 
 
0.068 * -0.037 
 
-0.026 
 
0.025 
 
0.069 * 
IPCM 0.125 Ș -0.042 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.027 
 
0.125 Ș -0.058 * -0.010 
 
-0.025 
 
ISYS 0.023 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.004 
 
0.008 
 
0.023 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.002 
 
0.005 
 
IVAC 0.100 * 0.005 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.130 Ș 0.100 * -0.005 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.122 Ș 
NSIT 0.086 * 0.000 
 
-0.065 * 0.010 
 
0.086 * -0.007 
 
-0.065 * 0.022 
 
TCBI -0.150 Ș -0.245 ș 0.080 * 0.098 * -0.150 Ș -0.273 ș -0.008 
 
0.050 * 
THQI 0.107 Ș -0.104 Ș 0.053 * 0.038 
 
0.107 Ș -0.117 Ș 0.080 * 0.010 
 
TKLC 0.186 Ș 0.076 * -0.034 
 
-0.032 
 
0.186 Ș 0.043 
 
-0.058 * -0.020 
 
TLEO 0.091 * -0.072 * -0.032 
 
-0.019 
 
0.091 * -0.081 * -0.018 
 
-0.020 
 
TMP 0.132 Ș -0.042 
 
-0.055 * 0.010 
 
0.132 Ș -0.060 * -0.042 
 
0.021 
 
TQNT 0.103 Ș -0.083 * -0.042 
 
-0.053 * 0.103 Ș -0.094 * -0.024 
 
-0.054 * 
TRAD 0.061 * -0.079 * -0.043 
 
-0.030 
 
0.061 * -0.083 * -0.033 
 
-0.032 
 
TRLG 0.068 * -0.024 
 
-0.051 * -0.071 * 0.068 * -0.028 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.066 * 
TRST 0.065 * -0.093 * -0.094 * -0.059 * 0.065 * -0.098 * -0.082 * -0.058 * 
TSRA 0.081 * -0.051 * -0.099 * -0.055 * 0.081 * -0.058 * -0.091 * -0.043 
 
TTEC 0.065 * -0.084 * -0.074 * 0.017 
 
0.065 * -0.089 * -0.063 * 0.019 
 
TTEK 0.093 * -0.065 * -0.014 
 
-0.045 
 
0.093 * -0.074 * -0.001 
 
-0.049 
 
TTMI 0.209 ș -0.024 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.035 
 
0.209 ș -0.071 * 0.012 
 
-0.039 
 
TTWO 0.072 * 0.008 
 
0.043 
 
0.008 
 
0.072 * 0.003 
 
0.042 
 
0.002 
 
TUES 0.122 Ș -0.080 * -0.072 * -0.017 
 
0.122 Ș -0.096 * -0.051 * -0.009 
 
TWGP 0.037 
 
0.004 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.009 
 
0.037 
 
0.003 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.006 
 
TXI 0.032 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.029 
 
0.032 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.045 
 
-0.028 
 
TXRH 0.125 Ș -0.023 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.086 * 0.125 Ș -0.039 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.082 * 
5% c.v. 0.0496 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0497 
 
0.04964 
 
0.04966 
 
0.04967 
 
0.04969 
 
Average 0.073 * -0.058 * -0.026 
 
-0.023 
 
0.073 * -0.069 * -0.022 
 
-0.027 
 
Table 13 ACF and PACF of Group B 
The ACF and PACFǯs of Group B (Table 13) present similar results to the case of 
Group A. Only 4 firms (11.76%) do not show any autocorrelation or partial 
autocorrelation at all lags. The remaining firms have potential ARMA structures. 
On the other hand, all of the autocorrelation values at specific lags are 
significant at the 5% significance level.  
Table 14 summarises the values of Q statistics in the Ljuing-Box test for 
autocorrelation up to 4 lags for the firms in Group A and B. The Ljung-Box Q 
statistic, which is actually a modified Box-Pierce statistic, is based on the 
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estimated autocorrelations and is known to follow ɖ2 distribution with ɏ (the 
number of lags) degrees of freedom. It is calculated as: 
2
1
Ö
( 2)LB
k
Q N N
N k
฀ ฀฀
฀
฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀   
where Ö฀฀ is the estimated value of autocorrelation at lag ɏ. The results of 
Ljung-Box tests re-confirm that there are autocorrelations at least up to lag 4 in 
most of the firms in Group A and B.  
 
Group A Group B 
 
 
Q statistic p-value 
  
Q statistic p-value 
  
Q 
statistic 
p-value 
 
DM 78.844* 0.000 
 
ENSG 34.462* 0.000 
 
THQI 41.602* 0.000 
 
IN 20.766* 0.000 
 
IART 92.802* 0.000 
 
TKLC 66.734* 0.000 
 
IO 60.863* 0.000 
 
ICON 63.141* 0.000 
 
TLEO 23.166* 0.000 
 
IRC 50.885* 0.000 
 
ICUI 20.179* 0.000 
 
TMP 34.747* 0.000 
 
ITG 16.793* 0.002 
 
IFSIA 91.601* 0.000 
 
TQNT 34.311* 0.000 
 
IVC 28.048* 0.000 
 
IILG 18.598* 0.001 
 
TRAD 19.834* 0.001 
 
SKT 16.272* 0.003 
 
IIVI 40.972* 0.000 
 
TRLG 20.070* 0.000 
 
TBI 36.779* 0.000 
 
INDB 20.672* 0.000 
 
TRST 39.327* 0.000 
 
TDY 46.652* 0.000 
 
ININ 5.243 0.263 
 
TSRA 34.376* 0.000 
 
TG 17.649* 0.001 
 
INSP 65.453* 0.000 
 
TTEC 26.609* 0.000 
 
TGI 24.396* 0.000 
 
INSU 31.369* 0.000 
 
TTEK 23.505* 0.000 
 
THS 64.297* 0.000 
 
IPCC 11.352* 0.023 
 
TTMI 71.015* 0.000 
 
TTC 8.5756 0.073 
 
IPCM 29.133* 0.000 
 
TTWO 11.221* 0.024 
 
TTI 52.788* 0.000 
 
ISYS 4.559 0.336 
 
TUES 41.503* 0.000 
 
TYL 21.213* 0.000 
 
IVAC 45.338* 0.000 
 
TWGP 4.346 0.361 
 
    
NSIT 18.286* 0.001 
 
TXI 8.658 0.070 
 
    
TCBI 153.940* 0.000 
 
TXRH 38.233* 0.000 
 
Table 14 Ljung-Box Q statistics of Group A and Group B 
On the other hand, the pattern of converting sign of autocorrelations is 
observed in most of the firms. The specific pattern of conversion is similar 
between the two groups in Table 12 and Table 13. At the first lag, the strongest 
positive autocorrelations are observed, and then weaker negative 
autocorrelations appear at the larger lags. The percentage of the firms that show 
this pattern is different. 80% of the Group A firms and 47.06% of the Group B 
firms display the pattern, respectively.  
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In addition, the comparison between the degree of autocorrelation of Group A 
and Group B is made using the data in Table 12 and Table 13. The following 
Table 15) presents the average autocorrelations, and t statistics and p-values of 
difference-of-means t tests for each specific lag. It is discovered that the two 
groups show a significant difference in both ACF and PACF at the 4th lag.  
Positive correlations at lag 1 do not show any difference in strength between 
the two groups, so this does not particularly support either hypothesis. On the 
other hand, the returns of Group A have negative autocorrelations stronger than 
Group B at lag 4. If negative autocorrelations at lag 2, 3 and 4 are caused by 
inventory control, for example, this may show that a single market makerǯs 
inventory control takes a longer time than multiple market makers, which can 
mean a single market makerǯs weaker power. That may support the increased 
resilience hypothesis, but there can be another explanation for this like 
intraday-level overreaction.   
 
ACF Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Group A average 0.097* -0.038 -0.040 -0.058* 
Group B average 0.073* -0.058* -0.026 -0.023 
t statistics 1.167 1.307 -1.063 -3.232* 
p-value 0.253 0.198 0.297 0.002 
PACF Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Group A average 0.095* -0.052* -0.032 -0.054* 
Group B average 0.073* -0.069* -0.022 -0.027 
t statistics 1.167 1.133 -0.861 -3.003* 
p-value 0.253 0.263 0.397 0.004 
Table 15 Comparison of autocorrelation between Group A and Group B 
Finally, the time series structures are identified for both sample and benchmark 
firms. The estimation results of ARMA models up to lag 4 are compared and the 
best fit model is selected based on the lowest value of Schwarz Information 
Criteria (SIC). The results of identification are presented in the following two 
tables where S.D is standard deviation. 
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AR MA 
IO 0 1 
IRC 2 1 
IN 0 1 
ITG 1 1 
IVC 2 2 
DM 1 0 
SKT 2 2 
TDY 0 1 
TTI 0 1 
TTC 0 0 
TGI 0 1 
THS 2 1 
TG 0 0 
TBI 0 1 
TYL 0 1 
Avg. 0.6667 0.9333 
S.D 0.8997 0.5936 
Table 16 Time series structure of the return series of Group A 
Two firms (TTC and TG, 13.3% of all sample firms) in Group A do not contain an 
ARMA structure in their return series in Table 16. The return series of five firms 
(ININ, ISYS, TRLG, TWGP and TXI, 14.7%) in Group B shows no ARMA structure 
in Table 19. The average AR and MA orders are around 1. The results of two 
groups look similar, and the separate difference-of-means t tests do not show 
any statistically significant difference in the number of orders at the 5% level. p 
values for the difference in the order of AR structure is 0.2407 and for MA 
structure 0.6695 in the two-tailed tests. On average, there is no difference in 
ARMA structure between the two groups. 
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AR MA 
ENSG 0 4 
IART 2 0 
ICON 0 1 
ICUI 1 1 
IFSIA 0 2 
IILG 2 0 
IIVI 4 0 
INDB 2 1 
ININ 0 0 
INSP 1 0 
INSU 0 5 
IPCC 0 0 
IPCM 0 1 
ISYS 0 0 
IVAC 4 0 
NSIT 1 0 
TCBI 2 0 
THQI 0 2 
TKLC 1 0 
TLEO 2 0 
TMP 0 1 
TQNT 2 0 
TRAD 2 0 
TRLG 0 0 
TRST 2 1 
TSRA 1 2 
TTEC 2 2 
TTEK 0 1 
TTMI 0 1 
TTWO 1 0 
TUES 1 2 
TWGP 0 0 
TXI 0 0 
TXRH 2 1 
Avg. 1.0294 0.8235 
S.D 1.1411 1.1927 
Table 17 Time series structure of the return series of Group B 
On the other hand, the neo-classical market making model (Section 2.2) can be 
directly estimated and tested for the hypotheses of the impact of a multiple 
market maker. The following model is estimated.  
1t t tP ฀ ฀ ฀฀฀฀    
where Ƚ is constant, ɀ is the coefficient of the MA term and ɀ = (1- ɀǯ) in Section 
2.2. 
The purpose of this estimation is to check the difference in the value of the 
coefficient ɀ of the MA term and to find the support for a specific hypothesis 
only. Thus, the MA(1) model above does not have any importance in the time 
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series structure of the data. The estimation results, in particular the coefficient 
values and standard errors of the MA term only, are presented in Table 18 and 
Table 19. 
 
 
Coefficient  S.E 
IO 0.1843 *** 0.0249 
IRC 0.1351 *** 0.0251 
IN 0.0845 *** 0.0252 
ITG -0.0741 *** 0.0253 
IVC 0.1210 *** 0.0251 
DM 0.2182 *** 0.0247 
SKT 0.0345 0.0253 
TDY 0.1599 *** 0.0250 
TTI 0.1586 *** 0.0250 
TTC 0.0404 0.0253 
TGI 0.1047 *** 0.0252 
THS 0.1539 *** 0.0251 
TG 0.0601 ** 0.0253 
TBI 0.1634 *** 0.0250 
TYL 0.0897 *** 0.0253 
Avg. 0.1089 0.0251 
S.D 0.0735 0.0002 
Table 18 The coefficient of MA term in the simple neoclassical market making model: Group A 
These results may support the improved efficiency hypothesis under multiple 
market makers. The coefficient value of the MA term in a multiple market maker 
system (0.0796) appears to be smaller than that in a single market maker 
system (0.1089). That is, a smaller proportion of past error affects the pricing of 
multiple market makers. However, the difference is not statistically significant 
when tested by the separate difference-of-means t test at the 5% level with a p 
value of 0.2366 in the two tailed test. Thus, no evidence of the difference is 
found. Remember that this model is based on an unrealistic assumption that the 
equilibrium price does not change in intraday data. 
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Coefficient  S.E 
ENSG 0.0826 *** 0.0252 
IART 0.1956 *** 0.0249 
ICON 0.1415 *** 0.0250 
ICUI -0.0778 *** 0.0253 
IFSIA -0.0053 0.0253 
IILG 0.0894 *** 0.0253 
IIVI 0.0925 *** 0.0252 
INDB 0.0423 * 0.0254 
ININ 0.0421 * 0.0253 
INSP 0.1818 *** 0.0249 
INSU -0.0151 0.0253 
IPCC -0.0373 0.0253 
IPCM 0.1357 *** 0.0251 
ISYS 0.0260 0.0253 
IVAC 0.1048 *** 0.0252 
NSIT 0.0925 *** 0.0252 
TCBI -0.2583 *** 0.0244 
THQI 0.1406 *** 0.0251 
TKLC 0.1585 *** 0.0250 
TLEO 0.1108 *** 0.0252 
TMP 0.1397 *** 0.0251 
TQNT 0.1315 *** 0.0251 
TRAD 0.0739 *** 0.0253 
TRLG 0.0851 *** 0.0253 
TRST 0.0826 *** 0.0253 
TSRA 0.0905 *** 0.0252 
TTEC 0.0763 *** 0.0253 
TTEK 0.1149 *** 0.0252 
TTMI 0.2346 *** 0.0247 
TTWO 0.0793 *** 0.0253 
TUES 0.1522 *** 0.0251 
TWGP 0.0346 0.0253 
TXI 0.0329 0.0253 
TXRH 0.1343 *** 0.0251 
Avg. 0.0796 0.0252 
S.D 0.0890 0.0002 
Table 19 The coefficient of MA term in the simple neoclassical market making model: Group B 
In sum, the analysis of autocorrelation and time series structure revealed 
stronger negative autocorrelation in larger lags in a simple market making 
system. This may support the stronger inventory control in a single market 
maker system. On the other hand, no statistically significant evidence was found 
regarding the preference between two hypotheses of the impact of multiple 
market makers. 
2.3.6. Volatility and GARCH modelling 
The implicative evidence provided so far was mostly based on linear structural 
models like a unit root process, a random walk and ARMA processes. However, 
as Campbell et al (1997) and Brooks (2008) argued, these linear models do not 
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capture non-linearity in volatility such as volatility clustering, excessive 
leptokurtosis and leverage effects as asymmetric volatility change between 
positive and negative news (French et al., 1987, Ghysels et al., 2005). GARCH 
(Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) models are the 
most popular choice to address this type of non-linearity (Brooks, 2008).  
In the dataset in this chapter, strong leptokurtosis was revealed in Section 2.3.2 
and possible volatility clustering was implied from the discovered strong 
correlation and predictability of return series in Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5. Also, 
leverage effects (Brooks, 2008) and intraday seasonality in volatility (Mills and 
Markellos, 2008) are known to commonly exist in financial data. Thus, it is 
natural to examine non-linearity and asymmetry in intraday data in the 
identical dataset using GARCH modelling.   
The GARCH models (Bollerslev, 1986) are to represent volatility processes. In 
particular, it models conditional variances ( 2t฀) that are the expected values of 
the squares of the errors ( 2t฀) given the past values of the errors in mean 
processes. This also addresses heteroskedasticity of the errors (non-constant or 
time-varying variances) in mean processes (Mills and Markellos, 2008).  
Two effects, GARCH and ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity), 
are fundamental in the GARCH models. The former allows the effects of own lag 
of the conditional variances (ɐ2t-s) and the latter additionally allows the 
conditional variances of the errors to be affected by a lagged value of the 
squared errors (ɂ2t-s). 
A GARCH(1,1) formulation has one lag of each GARCH and ARCH effect. 
2 2 2
0 1 1 1 1t t t฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
where Ƚ  Ⱦ are coefficients. This specification is generalised into 
GARCH(p,q): 
2 2 2 2 2
0 1 1 1 1... ...t t p t p t q t q฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀   
In essence, the GARCH models are required for empirical regularities like 
volatility clustering in the above. From a theoretical perspective, the market 
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making models for volatility need to support the existence of such regularities. 
However, some of the theoretical structural mean models only provide the 
qualitative patterns of mean price or returns but do not provide the anticipated 
pattern of volatility.  
In the early market microstructure literature, Roll (1984) first adopted the idea 
of intraday price volatility being created by the existence of a bid-ask spread. 
That is, the alternation of the trade prices between bid and ask prices can 
generate excess volatility. However, it does not bring any implications for the 
volatility of the returns or its clustering. On the other hand, the inventory 
control model may generate volatility clustering while market makers adjust 
their prices and adverse information models may rely on the clustering of 
information shocks.  
However, it is more reasonable to separately analyse the empirical volatility 
model of market making in the empirical analysis because the GARCH model can 
be used in conjunction with any mean model that is adopted based on empirical 
analysis or theoretical considerations.  
The objectives in this section are to reveal the characteristics of GARCH and 
ARCH effects in intraday data and to investigate the impact of multiple market 
makers. In addition, the leverage effects and the intraday seasonality are 
estimated for significance. One new factor, a market makerǯs mis-estimation, is 
tested for explaining power for return volatility. For the remaining part of this 
section, the GARCH model for intraday data is built and compared between two 
sub-datasets (Group A and B). 
First of all, it is necessary to check the return series of interest contains general 
non-linearity. The BDS independence tests (Brock et al., 1996) investigate the 
data with the null hypothesis of independent and identical distribution against 
time-varying non-linearity in mean or non-linearity in volatility. This is the most 
commonly used test for general non-linearity and gives support for the use of 
non-linear models (Campbell et al., 1997) like GARCH.  
The BDS independence tests were conducted on the log return series of all firms 
in Group A and Group B in the same dataset in the earlier sections. All results 
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rejected the null hypothesis at the 5% level for the alternative hypothesis of 
non-linearity.  
The choice of a mean model is important. To be precise, each ACF and PACF of 
individual series need to be identified as in Section 2.3.5, but as one of the 
objectives of this analysis is comparison, one general but parsimonious model is 
chosen. On the other hand, the use of absolute or squared returns is common 
practice in GARCH modelling (Markellos et al., 2003) as it avoids some 
non-negativity of coefficients that may lead to negative volatility (Brooks, 2008). 
Absolute returns are occasionally preferred since it provides less sensitive 
volatility measures to outliers (Andersen et al., 2001). For absolute return series, 
the ARMA(1,1) structure is suggested by Engle (2000) and Markellos et al. 
(2003) as a reasonable approximation for GARCH modelling.  
On the other hand, the specifications of non-absolute (nominal) return series 
was investigated in Section 2.3.5. In this case, ACF and PACF up to 4 lags were 
presented and individual ARMA structures were identified. Although a global 
consensus structure was not obtained, the average identified orders of them 
indicate that ARMA(1,1) is a reasonable parsimonious choice. Also, the brief 
investigation of the ACFs and PACFs of absolute return series (not reported) 
supports ARMA(1,1). Thus, this will be used as the mean model throughout the 
rest of the section.  
Subsequently, the specification of the GARCH model is required. The first 
building block of the modelling is a GARCH(1,1) specification since this is a 
popular choice in intraday or daily GARCH modelling (Baillie and Bollerslev, 
1992, Franses and van Dijk, 1996, Andersen et al., 2001). Consequently, an 
ARMA-GARCH specification is:  
t 0 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
2 2 2
t 0 1 t 1 1 t 1
| r | a a | r | b฀  ฀ 
฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ 
where a and b are AR and MA coefficients, respectively, and ɂt~i.i.d.(0,ɐ2t) 
In addition, there are other factors to consider, which are unique in volatility in 
intraday absolute return data. One of the notable findings in the market 
microstructure literature was the intraday seasonality of volatility pattern. 
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Specifically, Wood (1985), McInish (1990), Foster (1990), Andersen (1997) and 
Tsay (2005) showed that a U-shaped pattern emerged during a trading day in 
the NYSE where one market maker operates. Similar patterns were observed in 
dealership markets such as the UK stock market (Abhyankar et al., 1997) and 
the Greek stock market (Markellos et al., 2003). 
Following Frenchǯs finding (1986) that adverse information is the main driver of 
trading-day volatility, Madhavan et al. (1997) argued that the U-shaped pattern 
arises due to information flows during a trading day. Information asymmetry 
and uncertainty about fundamentals decreases over a trading day while 
transaction cost increases. From the perspective of market making, Brock (1992) 
explained that transactional demands are higher at the opening and closing of 
the market, which is supported by a similar pattern in trading volume. In the 
meantime, Kalev (2004) showed the relationship between news and stock 
return volatility. The news has a positive impact on volatility of stock returns 
even after controlling for volume effect and opening volatility. Easley and 
OǯHara (1992) argued that any type of new information affects volatility 
because it causes more frequent trading. Similar results are suggested by Engle 
(2000) and Manganelli (2005).  
To accommodate the empirical intraday volatility pattern into the GARCH 
models, a trading day can be divided into several intraday periods using dummy 
variables i.e. seasonally adjusted. For the analysis in this section, one trading 
day becomes 6 intraday periods: 09:30Ȃ10:35, 10:35-11:40, 11:40-12:45, 
12:45-13:50, 13:50-14:55 and 14:55-16:00. Each period is 65 minutes, that is 13 
observations in 5-minute average data. In a GARCH model, they are represented 
by 5 dummies where the values of all dummies are 0 for the first intraday 
period. Then, D2=1 for the second period and otherwise it is 0, and so on. In the 
meantime, the same 5 dummies (D2, ǥ, D6) are used to check whether there are 
the same patterns in the intraday absolute returns. The use of these dummies 
are supported by the finding of Harris (1986) who discovered excessive positive 
returns within the first 45 minutes after the stock market opens, except Monday 
mornings.   
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On the other hand, the leverage effects are also known to affect intraday return 
volatility (Bollerslev et al., 2006). That is, a negative shock increases volatility. 
However, the literature on daily or long-term data provides contradictory 
evidence regarding the exact relationship: return shocks and volatility are 
either negatively (Nelson, 1991, Glosten et al., 1993) or positively related 
(French et al., 1987, Ghysels et al., 2005). To model these effects, another 
qualitative variable, which represents whether past information shock is 
positive (good news) or negative (bad news), is required. However, the 
residuals from the mean model of absolute returns cannot properly represent 
this since they do not contain information about the signs. Therefore, a separate 
estimation of the auxiliary mean model of non-absolute returns with the same 
specification is necessary to obtain residuals for this purpose.  
The auxiliary regression model of the ARMA(1,1) specification is:  
Equation 7 
t 0 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 tr a a r b c D2 c D3 c D4 c D5 c D6฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
where t฀is the errors in the auxiliary regression model. aǯ, bǯ and cǯ are 
coefficients. 
Subsequently, a new dummy (DNt) is constructed based on the sign of previous 
residuals ( t 1
Ö ฀฀ ) from this auxiliary model. The value of DN is 1 for negative 
residuals and 0 for positive residuals. Then, the dummy is added to the original 
GARCH model after multiplying it by the square of the previous absolute 
residuals ( t t 1
ÖDN ฀฀  ฀ ), which is essentially a slope dummy to accommodate the 
effect of the size and sign of news shocks. This is a similar approach to the 
typical GJR (or threshold) GARCH models (Glosten et al., 1993), but the 
difference is that the residuals from a separate auxiliary mean model are used in 
the absolute return GARCH model.     
In the meantime, this section adds a new variable that is specific in the context 
of market making in intraday data. That is, a market makerǯs mis-estimation of 
information shocks in the previous time period is considered as another factor 
in this analysis. The market makerǯs mis-estimation can be categorised into two 
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scenarios. The first is the over-estimation of both positive and negative shocks. 
The second is the underestimation of them. It means either lower estimation 
than positive shocks or higher estimation than negative shocks. This includes 
wrong-directional estimation cases. For example, a marker maker estimates a 
shock will be negative, which turns out to be positive. An alternative 
interpretation could exist without referring to market making. The first case of a 
market makerǯs over-estimation is equivalent to the case of over-estimated 
shocks in size in terms of investor pricing. Meanwhile, the second case is 
under-estimated in size or adverse-directional shocks. 
Another qualitative variable is necessary for this category. The dummy (DMt) 
for this is constructed as follows using the auxiliary regression model (Equation 
7) that represents a market makerǯs estimation. As the size of the shock was 
considered in the dummy DN, this dummy DM only incorporates whether a 
market makerǯs mis-estimation is over-estimation (when DM=1) or 
under-estimation (when DM=0) in the previous period. It is essentially an 
intercept dummy. The values for the dummy are assigned in Table 20.  
 
  Sign of the returns Sign of the residuals Product DM 
Over-estimation 
+ - - 1 
- + - 1 
Under-estimation  
+ + + 0 
- - + 0 
Table 20 Dummy for mis-estimation of the size of information shocks 
This idea looks similar to the use of the magnitude and sign of errors in the 
EGARCH model (Nelson, 1991, St. Pierre, 1998), but this dummy is constructed 
based on both signs of returns and errors and the EGARCH model cannot 
generally distinguish the type of mis-estimation. Also, this does not require the 
error to be distributed as non-normal distribution (St. Pierre, 1998).  
In total, 7 dummies are constructed to address the asymmetries of information 
shocks in the ARMA-GARCH model: the first five (D2, ǥ, D6) are for intraday 
volatility pattern. The next one (DN) is for the sign and the size of the 
information shock and the last one (DM) is for mis-estimation of information 
shocks. The first five are also used for intraday seasonal adjustment.   
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Finally, the ARCH-GARCH formulation becomes: 
Equation 8 
t 0 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t
2 2 2 2
t 0 1 t 1 1 t 1 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t 6 t 1 t 1 7 t 1
| r | a a | r | b c D2 c D3 c D4 c D5 c D6
d D2 d D3 d D4 d D5 d D6 d DN d DM
฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
where c and d are the coefficients for dummies. 
The maximum likelihood estimation method is used to estimate the values of 
the GARCH model parameters for Group A and B. Table 21 shows the averages 
of individual coefficient values, standard errors (S.E.) and p-values of the firms 
in Group A. These results are only effective in showing the overall pattern of 
significance. Note that lnL is the maximum log likelihood values. One, two and 
three Ǯ*ǯ indicate the significance level at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
Mean model Coefficient S.E. p-value 
 
Constant 0.003430 0.000406 0.0002 *** 
AR(1) 0.314013 1.567686 0.6217 
 
MA(1) -0.252843 1.571894 0.6320 
 
D2 -0.001438 0.000402 0.0417 ** 
D3 -0.001736 0.000431 0.0238 ** 
D4 -0.001939 0.000444 0.0641 * 
D5 -0.001929 0.000466 0.0662 * 
D6 -0.001987 0.000612 0.0312 ** 
Volatility model Coefficient S.E. p-value 
 
Constant 0.000009 0.000001 0.0374 ** 
ARCH(1) 0.130917 0.030882 0.0726 * 
GARCH(1) 0.582856 0.037654 0.0362 ** 
D2 -0.000007 0.000001 0.0068 *** 
D3 -0.000007 0.000001 0.0039 *** 
D4 -0.000007 0.000001 0.0922 * 
D5 -0.000007 0.000001 0.0089 *** 
D6 -0.000003 0.000001 0.4018 
 
DN 0.033979 0.022792 0.5996 
 
DM -0.000003 0.000000 0.0138 ** 
R2 0.0945 lnL 7437.5214 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0905 SIC -9.4687 
 
Table 21 The averages of coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the GARCH models: Group A 
The ARMA structure on average does not explain the variation of mean returns 
well, but dummies are all significant in the mean model. It supports the 
existence of intraday patterns in returns. In particular, absolute returns on the 
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first trading period of the day are significantly higher than the rest. Normality is 
rejected in all residual series.  
In the estimation results of the GARCH model, ARCH and GARCH terms are on 
average significant in explaining the variation of the volatility. Their coefficient 
values are positive which suggests clustering. Meanwhile, the first 4 of the 
dummies (D2, ǥ, D5) are significant and have negative coefficient values. The 
insignificance of D6 means its coefficient value is not significantly different from 
that of the first intraday period. In sum, the first and the last periods have 
significantly higher volatility than the other intraday period. It confirms that the 
intraday U-shaped volatility patterns are in the dataset in this empirical section.  
DN has a positive coefficient value, which may mean negative information shock 
or news increases return volatility. However, the coefficient of DN is not 
statistically different from zero. That is, whether return in the previous period is 
positive or negative does not affect the volatility. This is comparable with the 
insignificance in Campbell and Hentschel (1991), but different from other 
leverage effect literature. 
Instead, the newly added dummy variable, DM, is significant and its coefficient 
value is negative. It indicates that a market makerǯs overestimation in the 
previous period reduces the volatility of (absolute) returns. In the meantime, a 
market makerǯs underestimation (or wrong-directional) estimation increases 
the volatility. There may be a behavioural reason for this. For example, a market 
maker is more likely to be surprised by higher-than-estimated size of return 
movements, and it increases the volatility of his price decision. It should be also 
noted that the impact of mis-estimation can be linked to the leverage effects or 
the separate impact from the sign and magnitude of errors. 
On the other hand, the average values of the same parameters for the firms in 
Group B are presented in the next table (Table 22). The overall results are fairly 
similar to those of the firms in Group A. The individual significance and sign of 
the coefficients of the variables are identical. It seems that the dummies in the 
mean models look more strongly significant than those of Group A while the 
dummies in the volatility models are more weakly significant. However, their 
differences are not statistically significant when the difference-of-means t tests 
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are conducted on the series of individual coefficients of the dummies between 
the two groups.   
 
Mean model Coefficient S.E. p-value 
 
Constant 0.003767 0.000511 0.0000 *** 
AR(1) 0.429143 1.854610 0.4795 
 
MA(1) -0.348651 1.860372 0.5049 
 
D2 -0.001679 0.000491 0.0226 ** 
D3 -0.002063 0.000509 0.0015 *** 
D4 -0.002267 0.000527 0.0029 *** 
D5 -0.002234 0.000554 0.0077 *** 
D6 -0.002111 0.000748 0.0572 * 
Volatility model Coefficient S.E. p-value 
 
Constant 0.000011 0.000001 0.0833 * 
ARCH(1) 0.165160 0.034280 0.0580 * 
GARCH(1) 0.499850 0.030722 0.0218 ** 
D2 -0.000009 0.000001 0.0749 * 
D3 -0.000009 0.000001 0.0347 ** 
D4 -0.000009 0.000001 0.0688 * 
D5 -0.000008 0.000001 0.0551 * 
D6 -0.000005 0.000001 0.2662 
 
DN 0.055773 0.025052 0.4280 
 
DM -0.000003 0.000000 0.0723 * 
R2 0.0987 lnL 7256.1427 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0947 SIC -9.2357 
 
Table 22 The averages of coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the GARCH models: Group B 
In sum, this section confirms the findings in the previous literature that stock 
returns and volatility display specific intraday patterns. In particular, absolute 
returns are higher early on in a trading day and the volatility of absolute returns 
is higher in the first and last period of the day which supports U-shaped 
patterns. However, leverage effects are not present in the current dataset at 
least. In other words, the nature of news does not asymmetrically affect the 
volatility of the following day. On the other hand, a market makerǯs over- or 
under-estimation in the past period affects return volatility. Over-estimation 
reduces the volatility in the next period while under-estimation increases it.  
On the other hand, not much statistically significant difference was observed in 
the estimation results of the return and volatility models between Group A and 
B. Thus, it can be concluded that the GARCH structure and observed empirical 
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regularities do not vary between two market making systems. That is, the 
impact of multiple maker makers is not present when a volatility process is 
considered. 
2.4. Discussion and conclusions 
In summary, the impact of multiple market makers was found to relatively 
support the increased resilience hypothesis rather than the improved efficiency 
hypothesis. In other words, multiple market makers have stronger power than a 
single market maker in keeping their prices against shocks that may come from 
adverse information and maintaining the disequilibrium prices to extract more 
information. Also, the strategic interactions between market makers can slow 
down price adjustment to the equilibrium price. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the increased number of market makers increases the market 
disequilibrium. 
This is supported by lower non-stationarity in price and higher predictability in 
return under a multiple market maker system than a single market maker 
system. However, the investigation of volatility and other descriptive statistics, 
autocorrelation, time series structure and the volatility models did not reveal 
any significant difference.  
There can be an alternative explanation for higher resilience in a multiple 
market maker system regarding causality. The study in this chapter compared 
the NASDAQ with the NYSE and used the small-size sample firms chosen from 
the S&P SmallCap 600 index. The firms listed on the NASDAQ are relatively 
smaller and newer than the ones in the NYSE. That is, they are more likely to be 
subject to higher market inefficiency originating from lack of liquidity, adverse 
information or other market frictions in stock trading. At the same time, these 
may raise resilience in empirical data. Then, multiple market makers may have 
been allowed to increase the market efficiency of the NASDAQ by supplying 
more liquidity in a competitive environment. In other words, expected increase 
in resilience may have caused the assignment of more than one market maker.  
On the other hand, in terms of support for market making models, strong 
presence of unit roots in general may prefer the adverse information models 
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over the inventory models. However, the positive autocorrelation of small lags 
and the negative autocorrelation of large lags may exemplify the co-existence of 
both forces in market making as in Madhavan (2000) and Biais et al. (2005). In 
particular, it may be possible that stronger impact of adverse information 
instantly after a shock is followed by weaker and prolonged effects of inventory 
control afterwards. That may be because   ǯ  
may be not easily distinguishable due to the small size of price adjustment and 
thus hidden within the influence of adverse information. If this is the case, a 
sequential trade model (Hasbrouck, 2007) can be a theoretical alternative. For 
example, Flemingǯ (1999) two-stage adjustment process to public news in the 
bond market can create comparable patterns.  
Otherwise, it can be alternatively explained by a general pattern of Ǯket ǯ(1985) at a market microstructure level: a 
market sometimes irrationally overreacts to news and then prices slowly 
mean-revert over time. In terms of time scale, it seems that initial overreaction 
lasts about 5 minutes and mean-reverting adjustment is for an additional 5 to 
15 minutes. However, this evidence may be due to sampling frequency, if 
shorter frequency data like 1 minute or longer frequency data is used, the 
discovered autocorrelation pattern may disappear.  
The empirical analysis of the GARCH models showed a market makerǯs 
mis-estimation, specifically whether it was over-estimation or under-estimation, 
asymmetrically affecting the volatility in the next period. Specifically, 
over-estimation reduces it, but under-estimation increases it. For example, 
when higher-than-estimated return in absolute size (i.e. under-estimated shocks) 
is revealed in the market, it increases the volatility in the following period. This 
is possibly because a market maker or investors tend to overreact to the 
surprise by excessively adjusting their prices to correct their previous 
under-estimation. Consequently, it raises volatility.  
In the meantime, intraday seasonality existed but the leverage effects did not in 
the dataset. The dummy variable of mis-estimation may have absorbed the 
explaining power of the leverage effects. That is, whether shocks are over- or 
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under-estimated is more significant in explaning volatility than the sign of 
shock. 
The limitations of the empirical analysis in this chapter need to be addressed. 
The first limitation is the non-normality of the return series and the residuals 
from the regression models. As commonly found in finance literature and 
intraday data (Hausmann et al., 1992), the normality tests for the return series 
and the residuals in mean and volatility models mostly rejected the null 
hypothesis of normality (the results were not separately reported). This 
non-normality is caused by strong excess kurtosis as reported in Table 5, which 
may come from outliers (Brooks, 2008). Partly, the kurtosis can be reduced by 
modelling a GARCH structure (Bai et al., 2001) that may be in the return 
volatility series, but this was not the case in this chapter. Also, outliers can be 
removed by introducing dummy variables, but it will delete useful information 
represented by such outliers (Brooks, 2008). It may subsequently invalidate the 
results of normal distribution based statistical tests. However, sample size in the 
intraday analysis is usually large as is the dataset in this analysis (1,560 for each 
firm), therefore non-normality does not cause serious consequences in testing 
because of the Central Limit Theorem (Brooks, 2008). 
Another related limitation is the small number of firms in Group A (15). In 
particular, for the use of the difference-of-mean t test, the sample must be a 
random sample and its population must be normally distributed or the number 
of the sample must be larger than or equal to 30 to satisfy the Central Limit 
Theorem (Sullivan, 2011). The first requirement of random sampling can be met 
by the random choice of the first two letters of the sample firms (letter I and T). 
The second requirement needs to be met by the additional assumption of the 
tested property being normally distributed since the sample size is less than 30.  
In some cases, this assumption is not required. For example, the average log 
return of a group of firms is approximately normally distributed by being a 
linear function of approximately normally distributed average log returns of an 
individual firm; the latter approximation is by the central limit theorem based 
on the large number of observations (1,560) for each firm (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009). Otherwise, normality assumption is required for this t test if non-average 
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values are tested. For instance, when the values of skewness of two groups are 
compared, the distributions of the values can be simply assumed away as 
normal, but not much is known about their exact population distributions.  
The assumption of independent information shocks used in theoretical 
derivation of two hypotheses (increased resilience and improved efficiency) can 
be another limitation in this analysis. The earlier comparisons between the 
expected outcomes of a single market maker and multiple market maker system 
were based on external information shocks being independent of each other. 
Also, the empirical implications of two market making models for the time 
series properties of return series were derived from independent information 
shock. The independence assumption is common practice in modelling market 
making behaviour (Hasbrouck, 2007), but in reality this assumption may not 
hold as the results of empirical analysis like volatility clustering suggest 
(Campbell et al., 1997, Brooks, 2008).  
The GARCH models used in the last sub-section of the empirical analysis have 
some known inherent weaknesses. The parameter values of the GARCH models 
may not stay constant over time (Mills and Markellos, 2008) or they vary 
depending on optimisation options, initial values and the choice of statistical 
packages (Brooks et al., 2003). In terms of GARCH modelling in this chapter, the 
contemporaneous effects from the volatility to mean return are not considered 
unlike some approaches using the GARCH-M models (Cheung and Ng, 1992, 
Blair et al., 2002). Also, the GARCH model in this chapter relied on a GJR GARCH 
type specification with an added dummy for mis-estimation for possible 
asymmetries, but exponential GARCH (EGARCH) can be alternatives.  
There are factors that were not considered in this chapter. First, ǯ 
(1987) research showed that short selling constraint on traders in fact slowed 
the price adjustment process, in particular under a negative information shock. 
Then, in terms of mis-estimation in market making, under-estimation of positive 
shocks and over-estimation of negative shocks are more constrained than the 
other opposite cases. Also, it may lengthen inventory control. This factor was 
not investigated as it may have a symmetric impact to single and multiple 
market makers.  
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Second, trades may not always happen in a specific time period in financial 
markets. No trade itself can inform about the underlying value of the financial 
assets (O'Hara, 1997) or at least about the existence of information (Easley and 
O'Hara, 1992). Also, non-trading can cause a bias in measuring statistics such as 
autocorrelation at a lower frequency (Campbell et al., 1997). The dataset in this 
chapter is based on the highly frequent time interval and does not have 
non-trading periods, so it may not cause an issue. On the other hand, there is a 
different approach that focuses on the property or non-trading period such as in 
the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) (Tsay, 2005).  
Third, the impacts of limit orders and institutional block trades (O'Hara, 1997) 
on market making behaviour were not modelled, but they can be regarded as a 
type of general shock to a market maker. If the limit order book is open to 
market traders or the details about institutional block trades are instantly 
revealed, it is just other public information.  
Last, trading volume was not analysed as it is more likely the consequences of 
adverse information in the market since stronger adverse information and 
public information are known to lead to greater trading volume (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1991). However, trading volume can be another source of 
information to market makers and traders.  
This chapter focused on the level of price and volatility and did not examine the 
size of spread although spread can be variable in market making. The spread 
decomposition issue is one of the important topics in market microstructure 
(Glosten and Harris, 1988): a market maker may attempt to compensate for 
both information and inventory risks by increasing spread size while not 
changing the mid-prices. As a result, spread size is positively related to the 
impact of private information (Hasbrouck, 1991). Multiple market makers can 
generate a different impact on spread size compared with a single market 
maker. This can be considered for future research. 
Another point for future research is a market without designated market 
makers. Without market makers, market traders can behave like market makers 
(Biais et al., 2005). That is, the market makersǯ  as liquidity or immediacy 
suppliers ǯ(O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986) 
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and their other role as inventory-controlling dealers can be imitated by traders 
facing counterparty orders. However, the impact of this market microstructure 
will be probably different from the markets with market makers.  
In addition, the causality between increased resilence and multiple market 
maker can be analysed in the future research. One of the possible approaches 
will be the analysis of the impact of the change in the number of market makers 
allocated for a particular stock. Since the entry and exit to market making is 
relatively easier in the NASDAQ, the number of market makers is expected to 
fluctuate over time. Then, it is possible to investigate its impact on the resilience 
of stock price movement. Moreover, the lead-lag relationship between the 
number of market makers and the change in resilience can be empirically 
analysed.  
On the other hand, the following list of factors can be examined as part of a 
theoretical approach in the future research: the proportion of informed traders, 
the probability of such traders being informed, and the precision of private 
information, the accuracy or ability of the market maker and the liquidity of the 
market for an asset. Meanwhile, an empirical approach using limited dependent 
variable models such as ordered probit models (Tsay, 2005) can be considered. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Detecting market disequilibrium 
in the context of bubbles and 
estimating transition probability 
using duration dependence 
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3. Detecting market disequilibrium in the context of bubbles and 
estimating transition probability using duration dependence 
The market is in disequilibrium if supply and demand does not match. The 
market disequilibrium may be temporal and random, and then it may finish 
within a short spell that does not have any significance. However, if certain 
underlying market forces drive the disequilibrium, fairly one-sided long-term 
price movement to the new equilibrium will be observed. Such a price 
movement can be justified by the changes in price fundamentals or by 
employing a price generating process that represents the underlying forces. 
Otherwise, it can be identified as a bubble. On the other hand, without 
specifying the price fundamental, a run of one-sided price, possibly driven by 
the market disequilibrium, can be simply categorised as a bubble if it is followed 
by relatively short and strong reverse movement (McQueen and Thorley, 1994). 
Then, the detection of long-term market disequilibrium can be regarded as 
empirically equivalent to the detection of price bubbles.  
Despite their long history, stock price bubbles remain among the most poorly 
understood and mysterious of economic phenomena, although bubbles and 
their respective crashes have long been studied (Rosser, 2000). As reviewed 
later, many different theories have been suggested to explain them. However, 
there is substantial disagreement over the reasons for bubble initiation and the 
processes of bubble developments. Even the existence of a bubble itself in a 
particular period is often re-examined and sometimes rejected (Garber, 2001, 
Siegel, 2003). 
Most of the bubble models are related to the present value model (PVM) and 
focus on an investorǯs pricing decisions in the financial markets. In this sense, 
they are more micro-economic. The literature in finance can be further divided 
into two categories. The main difference is the belief in rational expectation and 
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Both predominantly utilise the present 
value model at least as benchmarks, in which the current stock price must be 
equal to the discounted future stream of dividend, cash flow or all future payoffs, 
i.e. Ǯ ǯǤ However, there is a non-PVM based method that does 
not depend on the fundamental price. 
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This chapter investigates bubble theories, and then focuses on the detection of 
stock price bubbles as one type of long-term market disequilibrium and 
continues to the estimation of transition probabilities. This chapter adopts a test 
method that can detect not only bubbles but also some other types of market 
disequilibrium. One of the non-PVM (present value model) based detection 
methods, the duration dependence test, is employed for its ability to detect 
negative bubbles and different market disequilibrium. It is based on the 
concepts of (price) runs and duration. ǮPrice runǯ is defined as a run of 
continuous abnormal returns of the equal sign and Ǯdurationǯ is its time length. 
Another type of price run will be developed later in this chapter.  
In detail, the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 reviews past literature 
on bubble theories in finance in addition to the empirical models and evidence. 
Section 3.2 analyses price runs and presents the results of duration dependence 
tests for price bubbles on a range of market data. This section also estimates the 
unconditional transition probabilities of a run growth. Section 3.3 introduces 
structural breaks as another method of obtaining price runs and investigates its 
implications for duration dependence and transition probability between the 
market (dis)equilibrium. Section 3.4 concludes and discusses the research in 
this chapter. 
3.1. Stock price bubbles and detection 
There is a wide range of bubble theories and empirical methods to detect the 
existence of a bubble. The theories of bubbles vary depending on how each 
theory defines a bubble and explains its generating mechanism and a life-cycle. 
This section reviews the theories about the market-level price bubbles and the 
empirical methods of bubble detection.  
3.1.1. Stock price bubbles 
The stock price bubbles are the price bubbles created by the internal or external 
forces in the stock market. The main force is mostly how the investors price the 
stocks in the market. There are two main theories: rational and irrational 
bubbles. But also theories based on disciplines other than economic and 
financial exist.   
  
77 
 
Strict followers of the EMH, namely standard neoclassical theorists, argued that 
it was not possible for any type of bubble to arise because stock prices always 
reflect fundamentals by instantly incorporating all relevant information. They 
argued a bubble phenomenon may be explained by a non-bubble rational 
expectation model (Meltzer, 2005). From this perspective there is nothing called 
a bubble, as all price movements are explained by the EMH. 
However, Ǯrational bubbleǯ theorists prefer to use a bubble term. They believed 
rational deviation from fundamentals could arise while rational traders still 
quickly assimilated information. In this sense, a rational bubble is defined as ǲ               ǳ (Blanchard, 1979). It 
basically exists because any rational expectation of finding a buyer could push 
the price of even a non-profitable ǯ Ǥ    Ǯ-castle-in-the-ǯ (Malkiel, 2003, Blanchard, 2006). 
The important point in this rational bubble argument is how to define 
fundamentals since rational bubbles usually arise from the same mechanism of 
pricing. Fundamentals are typically determined by the present value of expected 
future dividends or cash flows using a Ǯpresent value model (PVM)ǯ or Ǯrational 
valuation formula (RVF)ǯ (Cuthbertson and Nitzsche, 2004), which is the 
adoption of a two-period Euler equation to infinite time horizon. It was 
generally thought that the fundamental should be the unique discounted value 
(Rosser, 2000) as solved in the following:  
The Euler equation for two periods is 1 1[ ]t t t tP E D P฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀  where P is the price 
of a stock, D is a dividend (or cash flow), expectations (E) are conditional on the ɁɁ é ?Ȁȋ ? ?ɈȌɈ é
return and 0<Ɉ<1. It is usually assumed that all agents are risk-neutral and they 
use the same discount factor and information set. This can be solved by 
repeated forward-looking substitution to infinite horizon as a difference 
equation. Then, the general solution (see also Section 3.1.2) is: 
Equation 9 
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1
[ ] lim(1 ) [ ]i nt t t i t t n
ni
P E D E P฀  ฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀฀฀฀ ฀ ฀฀  
Basically, it has infinite solutions. However, assume the transversality condition 
( lim[(1 ) [ ]] 0n t t n
n
E P฀฀ ฀฀฀ ฀  ฀ ) or a terminal condition for finite horizon (Adam and 
Szafarz, 1992), and the solution will be unique: 
Equation 10 
1
[ ]it t t i
i
P E D฀฀ ฀
฀
฀฀
 
(forward solution)      
It is a well-known stock pricing equation, Ǯthe present value model (PVM)ǯǡ
is commonly regarded to represent the fundamental price (Pf) of the stock.  
However, it is well-known that the Euler equation itself did not rule out the 
possibility that the price may contain an explosive bubble as a part of the 
solution (Blanchard, 1979, Cuthbertson and Nitzsche, 2004). This possibility has 
been discussed in much literature (Gourieroux et al., 1982, Diba and Grossman, 
1987, Adam and Szafarz, 1992, Salge, 1997, LeRoy, 2004) and can be briefed as 
follows.  
Now, suppose the transversality condition does not hold, the last term of 
Equation 9 can be interpreted as the bubble term: 
lim(1 ) [ ]nt t t n
n
B E P฀฀ ฀฀฀฀  ฀  
It can be another solution to the original Euler equation. Precisely, the bubble 
term is a complementary solution and the fundamental is the particular solution 
of the Euler equation. 
To generalise, now suppose that the price has a bubble term Bt such that: 
Equation 11 
1
[ ]it t t i t
i
P E D B฀฀ ฀
฀
฀  ฀ ฀  
At time t+1, it becomes: 
1 1 1 1
1
[ ]it t t i t
i
P E D B฀฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀
฀  ฀ ฀  
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By taking the expectation of time t and using the iterated expectation: 
1 1 1
1
[ ] [ ] [ ]it t t t i t t
i
E P E D E B฀฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀
฀  ฀ ฀  
Substitute this back into the original Euler equation: 
1
1
1
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
i
t t t i t t
i
f
t t t
P E D E B
P E B
฀  ฀ 
฀
฀
฀  ฀ 
฀
฀
฀  ฀ 
฀  ฀ 
฀
       
Then, it can be clearly seen that a bubble solution is allowable.  
In addition, the comparison of this result to Equation 11 shows that
1[ ]t t tB E B฀ ฀฀  or equivalently 1[ ] (1 )t t tE B B฀฀ ฀  ฀ . In other words, in this simple 
model, the bubble process is a martingale and grows at the rate of required 
return (Ɉ). Also, note that, since the bubble term incorporates a deterministic 
and a stochastic part (ɂt, the error term) like 1 1(1 )t t tB B฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀, either or both 
of the parts can be responsible for exploding features. It is also difficult to 
distinguish the exact proportion of the bubble in the prices.  
Therefore, given the rational behaviour of investors, a price bubble can exist. 
The main motive behind the rational bubbles is that the self-fulfilling (rational) 
expectation of price changes drives the actual price changes. However, it must 
be kept in mind that rational bubbles were specifically defined in the context of 
a model (Adam and Szafarz, 1992), and without such a model it was impossible 
to define market fundamentals and a bubble (Flood and Garber, 1980). On the 
other hand, it can be known that rational bubbles only occur in an infinite 
horizon. This is because knowing the bubble is zero at the last date of finite 
horizon, by backward induction, the bubble should be zero at the beginning. 
Moreover, if a firm pays no dividend, the prices of its shares consist of only 
bubbles. Negative bubbles are not possible. 
Some notable rational bubble theories were ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ǡ	ǯ(1991) intrinsic bubble, Friedman and 
Aoki (1986) and Adam and Szafarzǯ (1992) information bubble, and ǯ
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(1985) bubbles from overlapping generations. Evans and Honkapohja (1992) 
generalised the possible rise of rational bubbles from ARMA processes.  
Blanchard (1979) developing Brockǯs (1974) work argued that deterministic 
bubbles were rather counterintuitive, although the bubble term has stochastic 
components. He suggested a Ǯsimple probabilistic modelǯ built on the 
probabilities of continuing and bursting the rational bubble. The bubble term 
Bt+1 in his model is: 
Equation 12 
1 1
1(1 )t t t
B
B B฀  ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ɎB (the bubble continues) 
    with a probability of (1- ɎB) (the bubble bursts) 
In this model, if the bubble sustains, the actual return grows at a higher rate  Ɉ        Ǥ    Ɏ
increases, the bubble term develops at a decreasing exponential rate. The 
average duration of the bubble during i periods is (1-ɎB)-i (Blanchard and Kahn, 
1980, Camerer, 1989). As Gourieroux et al. (1982) pointed out, there could be in 
fact infinite solutions of this type since the probability of bursting could be a 
function of time or have a variety of distribution functions. However, this type of 
bubble may be more likely to exist in inefficient markets (Weil, 1987).  
On the other hand, a simple probabilistic bubble grows independently of 
fundamentals. To address this, Froot and Obstfeld (1991) first developed a 
fundamental (or dividend)-dependent bubble model. In their continuous time 
set up, a solution to the Euler equation is: 
( 1)
1[ ] [ ]s t ft t s t t t t
s t
P e E D e E B P B฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀
฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀  
where s and t are time index. 
Now, suppose that log dividend, lnDt is generated by the geometric martingale:
1 1ln lnt t tD D฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  where Ɋ is a constant and
2(0, )t N฀  ฀ . 
Then, it can be shown that the forward equation on the fundamental is: 
ttB ฀฀฀1
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2 /2 1( )ft tP e e D฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀   
or simply,  
f
t tP D฀฀  
which is proportional to dividends. 
Then, define the bubble function which also depends on the dividends, Dt: 
  ɉ  
2 2 / 2 0฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ 
Note that B(Dt) also satisfies a martingale process. Finally, the final bubble 
solution to the Euler equation is: 
 
It contains a bubble term which is dependent on dividends. Likewise, any 
arbitrary linear stochastic process of dividends can be transformed into a 
non-ǤǮǯǤǡ bubble can additionally depend on time.  
On the other hand, these rational bubble models are met with several challenges. 
One of them was that without such a model it is impossible to both define 
market fundamentals and isolate the trajectories characteristic of a bubble 
(Flood and Garber, 1980). That is, the contribution of hypothetical bubbles to 
asset prices is not directly distinguishable from that of market fundamentals 
(Diba and Grossman, 1988b, Meltzer, 2005). Simply, it is difficult to conclude 
whether a particular price movement contained a bubble due to observational 
equivalence. Moreover, the definitions of the fundamental and a bubble are not 
highly agreeable. For example, with slightly richer specifications, bubble 
equilibriums are technically indistinguishable from fundamentals equilibriums 
(Hamilton and Whiteman, 1985). Then, as Flood and Garber (1980) argued, 
supposedly bubbles may not actually be bubbles since they could be explained 
by changes in the fundamentals or the unobserved fundamentals to researchers. 
฀cDDB t ฀)(
฀฀ cDDDBPP ttftt ฀฀฀฀ )(
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Then, researchers can no longer assert whether a particular event is a bubble or 
not. 
Nonetheless, this ambiguity of the rational bubble theories gave some modelling 
advantages. For example, bubbles can be defined as a deviation of any bubble 
solution from the fundamental solution. Also, either a deterministic or 
stochastic part can be modelled to be consistent with the popular 
understanding of speculative bubbles (Gourieroux et al., 1982, Adam and 
Szafarz, 1992). Therefore, it becomes rather difficult to rule out the possibility 
of rational bubbles because the misspecification of the model can be the likely 
explanation and then alternative market fundamentals or bubbles can be 
suggested (Flood and Hodrick, 1990, van Norden, 1996). 
On the other hand, it was argued that the theoretical foundations of rational 
bubble theories are not sound enough to generate the bubbles. Rosser (2000) 
summarised that a rise of rational bubbles was only possible when some of ǯǮǯǤ Tirole (1982) had argued that it was not 
possible for bubbles to arise when a finite number of risk-averse and 
infinitely-lived agents with common beliefs traded a finite number of assets 
with real returns in discrete time periods, and particularly if they adopted a 
backward induction in their expectation. Thus, the usage of risk neutral, loving 
or infinite finitely-lived agents, failure to respond to common information or 
infinite dimensional commodity was required to induce rational bubbles. Some 
of them do not fit well with the understandings of the EMH. However, it was 
argued that even in the theoretical  ǯ
bubble condition, a bubble could arise if investors are faced with the constraints 
on debt accumulation (Kocherlakota, 1992). 
Meanwhile, Allen et al. (1993) also suggested that the necessary conditions for 
the existence of the bubbles were short-sale constraints, private information or 
no common knowledge on trades. For example, short-sale constraints make the 
market less efficient in reacting to negative news (Bris et al., 2007) and may 
induce a price bubble; although, it is not responsible for some bubbles in the 
stock market since investors could have used options to go short (Temin and 
Voth, 2004, Battalio and Schultz, 2006). Also, infinite patience or technological 
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pathology may need to be assumed for a bubble to arise in the equilibrium in 
the rational expectation framework (Bewley, 1972, Prescott and Lucas, 1972, 
Gilles, 1989, Gilles and LeRoy, 1992). The above factors may not go well with at 
least certain forms of rational investors or market efficiency. ǮIrrational bubbleǯ theories explained stock price bubbles without relying on 
investor rationality and market efficiency. Instead, they considered 
psychological, social, and structural factors as more important causes of bubbles. 
For example, mass psychology of the irrational agents may be behind bubble 
creation (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Otherwise, the traders were assumed to be 
not fully rational, but they did optimise with expectations that were biased in 
some way. Since irrationality can come in many different forms, the irrational 
bubble theories do not share the same model or fundamentals, unlike the Euler 
equation of the rational bubble theories.  
However, their description of a life-cycle of bubbles has common characteristics. 
Investors are irrationally attracted to investment profits by precipitating factors 
and a positive feedback mechanism boosts prices, but finally leads to the final 
crash (Shiller, 2005). Rosser (2000) illustrated the factors for bubble initiation: ǲ
without any specific displacement from any fundamentalsǳ. Similarly, it can be 
initiated by exaggerated expectation about new technology (Meltzer, 2005). 
Shiller (2005) described subsequent bubble development ǲ
of price increase spurs investor enthusiasm, which is spread by psychological  ǥ    ǯ   ǥ ǯ ǳǤ
Essentially, the bubbles are driven by euphoric optimism about the future 
upward movement of price. Wrongly-timed monetary policy such as credit 
expansion or a fraud scheme can add to this movement. Similarly, Eatwell et al. 
(1987) illustrated the reason for bubble development as the expectations of 
further rises attracting more buyers who are interested in speculative profits. 
However, after passing the period of distress, the burst stage finally emerges 
because of tightened credit, disclosed fraud, negative displacement of market 
fundamental or a random shock (Shiller, 2000). 
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On the other hand, irrational bubbles were sometimes defined as excess price 
movement compared to fundamentals. It is similar to rational bubbles but the 
bubble part is explained without the dependence of rational expectation. For 
example, Garber (2001) suggested an irrational bubble as part of a price 
movement that cannot be explained by fundamentals. Rosser (2000) described 
it as prices that do not equal fundamentals for a certain period of time apart 
from their random movements. In sum, irrational bubbles can be described as 
an entire or part of abnormal price movement that cannot be explained by 
ordinary rational (bubble) theories but by psychology and other behaviours of 
traders.  
Researchers of irrational bubbles challenged the rational expectation and the 
EMH, on which the rational bubble theory was Ǥ ǯ (1981) famous Ǯǯa serious challenge to the EMH. The forward 
solution of the EMH implies that the variance of the forecast (the price) should 
be less than (or equal to) the variance of the variable being forecast (Kleidon, 
1986). Empirical data generally showed the opposite. That is, the movement of 
stock price was too volatile to be explained by market fundamentals and new 
information. Thus, it appeared to be quite decisive evidence against the EMH.  
However, Marsh and Merton (1986) and Gilles and LeRoy (1991) showed that 
the above conclusion is not statistically clear and the dispute over excess 
volatility seems to be mainly about statistical issues (Shiller, 2000). Also, the 
supporters of rational bubbles insisted that the same bubble phenomena can be 
rationalised by the decisions of rational investors or by small sample bias 
(Blanchard and Watson, 1982, West, 1988). Likewise, it was argued that many 
irrational theories have the alternatives of rational explanation (Rosser, 2000). 
Meanwhile, there is evidence for the inefficient market and irrationality of 
investors. For instance, market anomalies imply that the EMH did not hold at 
least for a specific time period. Many of them like the January effect, the 
weekend effect, the closed-ǡǯirm effect 
were discovered in the stock market, e.g., Cooper et al. (2006); although, some 
of these anomalies disappear when known to the public (Cuthbertson and 
Nitzsche, 2004). Furthermore, some even argued that belief in rationality is 
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responsible for bubbles and crashes (Ball, 2009). Experiments in a laboratory 
generally supported irrationality (Caginalp et al., 2000). Therefore, it might be 
more reasonable to simply admit the elements of irrationality in explaining 
most large historical bubbles (Blanchard, 1979).  
Subsequently, the researchers further developed irrational bubble theories 
about motivations and processes behind the irrational bubble. Some examples 
of them are: greater fool (Roll, 1986), fads (Camerer, 1989), overreaction (De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985), and underreaction (Bernard and Thomas, 1990), of 
which details follows later. More irrational bubble theories are summarised in a 
detailed survey article by Hirshleifer (2001). These theories relied on mass 
psychology of the irrational agents to explain price movements. Furthermore, 
those mechanisms can be mutually reinforced and combined to generate a 
variety of sub-theories. These theories appeared to be rather more divergent 
than rational bubble theories because they share only a typical psychological 
pattern of a life-cycle of a bubble.  
First, Ǯgreater foolǯ theory was originally     ǡ Ǯǯ, which is also the title of the book on the history of bubbles 
by Chancellor (1999). Roll (1986) developed this idea into modern finance by 
arguing that bidding firms were infected by over-optimism about their decisions 
and simply paid too much for a target firm. Then, Ǯǯwho valued 
the target the unreasonably highest obtained it. The greater fool theory of the 
stock price bubbles explains that investors expect to find other investors 
(greater fools) who believe the bubble will last longer. Even after investors 
discover the presence of the bubble, they try to ride and take advantage of it 
(Fisher and Statman, 2002). Hence, the bubble keeps expanding. However, the 
unluckiest investor will be stuck with the assets with no buyer left in the market. 
Then, the bubble bursts.  
The greater fool theory is Ǯǯǯn 
settings (Thaler, 1988)ǡǮǯis the other name for it. More 
broadly, contrary to the fundamentals-based pricing theory, the greater fool 
theory refers to the other tradition of asset pricing, in which an asset is worth 
whatever another investor will pay for it (Malkiel, 2003). This kind of bubble 
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can be caused by biased optimism among a finite number of traders (Camerer, 
1989, Rosser, 2000). Although bidders are supposed not to participate in this ǯ  if they are rational, there is evidence of the existence of such 
curses in several field surveys and experiments (Cox and Isaac, 1984, Thaler, 
1988).  
On the other hand, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) rationalised this behaviour. 
A price bubble grows until rational arbitrageurs collectively decide to attack it. 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) suggested that the behaviour of hedge funds 
during the dot-com bubble was a good example of this. Conversely, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) insisted that it showed they failed in arbitrage as it was 
conducted by a small number of professionals. Other studies are also mixed in 
their results about rationality (Goeree and Offerman, 2002). 
Second, the Ǯfadsǯ theory emphasised that social or psychological forces create a 
type of contagious fad or fashion in financial markets just like in commodity 
markets or political belief (Shiller et al., 1984, Camerer, 1989). This theory was 
largely developed by  Ǯǯ (Mishkin, 2008). 
Shiller suggested 12 possible factors affecting asset prices, including structural, 
social and psychological factors (Shiller, 2000).  
Similar to the rational bubble theory, fads can be represented in a simple way 
by adding the fads factor to the fundamentals of the present value model (West, 
1988, Camerer, 1989): 
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where F is fads and C is the rate of decay of fads.  ȋ ? ?ɈȌǡst like the rational bubble does. However, when C is    ?ǡ            ɈǤ  ǡ
investors should sell them on this occasion and the fads will disappear. 
Consequently, an equilibrium bubble price is not reached, unlike rational 
bubbles. In particular, Camerer (1989) suggested that there are three possible 
kinds of fads: fads in utility of holding assets, F(Dt), fads in belief about future 
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fundamentals, F(E[Dt+1]), and fads in expected returns, 	ȋɈȌ. Similar theories are ǮǯǮǯtheories in the financial markets (Kirman, 1993, Dass et 
al., 2008). 
Third, Ǯoverreactionǯ theory is also able to explain a price bubble. In a 
psychology study, people are known to overreact to unexpected and dramatic 
events. Using this, Debondt and Thaler (1985) argued that stock markets 
initially overreacted to the change of fundamentals (or the revelation of related 
information) and then slowly reverted to their mean. They also discovered 
empirical evidence that the portfolios of prior losers outperformed the portfolio 
of prior winners over as long as five years. This result attracted supporters like 
Barsky and de Long (1993), Campbell and Kyle (1993), Dreman and Lufkin 
(2000) and Franklin et al. (2006), as well as critics such as Zarowin (1990), 
Clare and Thomas (1995), Zhang (2006), and Daniel and Titman (2006) in 
disputing both theories and evidence.  
Fourth, Ǯunderreactionǯ theory is suggested, which may be responsible for part 
of a bubble life-cycle. Bernard and Thomas (1990), Abarbanell and Bernard 
(1992) and Michaely and Thaler (1995) found out that investors in fact 
underreact to the announcement of earnings or omission of cash dividends. 
That is, investors reacted too slowly and insufficiently, unlike the predictions by 
both the overreaction theory and the EMH. Then, prices continue to drift in the 
same direction for a while (Michaely and Thaler, 1995). Dreman and Lufkin 
(2000) argued that overreaction and underreaction may share the same 
psychological root. 
Fifth, the Ǯoverconfidenceǯ of investors in their own ability or self-deception can 
lead to an irrational bias in stock or general asset pricing. This overconfidence 
theory supposes that financial investors tend to believe that their ability is 
better than that of other human beings in addition to their other psychological 
biases such as heuristic simplification and emotional loss of control (Hirshleifer, 
2001). For instance, their overconfidence makes them put more weight on their 
own information and pay higher than their own valuation of fundamentals, 
expecting to take advantage of the mistakes of others (Scheinkman and Xiong, 
2003)Ǥ  
  ǯ (2001) model, investors learn about their 
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abilities from success and failures, but put too much confidence on their success 
especially in the early stage of their career. 
On the other hand, the overconfident traders are not always losers in the 
market. Since they buy and sell more aggressively than other types of traders, 
they can earn more returns than rational traders (Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001) or 
take benefits from the competition among all types of informed traders (Kyle 
and Wang, 1997). Their overconfidence subsequently affects market price and 
volatility, and produces a price bubble and crash. On the other hand, 
overconfident market participants appear to overinvest in costly information 
acquisition (Ko and Huang, 2007), which can improve market efficiency 
contrary to typical expectations in behavioural finance. 
Sixth, tǯǮmyopiaǯ occurs when traders give only a short-run consideration 
of the future, contrary to the expectation of the EMH and the PVM. It is 
presumably another bias to cause a price bubble. As Ǯno bubble theoremǯ, 
Tirole (1982) argued that a rational expectation with a fully dynamic 
optimisation did not allow a bubble in a sequential trading stock market if 
traders do not have myopia. Costly arbitrage in long-term assets and managerial 
interests in short-term profits drive investors to become myopic (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1990) and they irrationally push up the prices without justification by 
the fundamentals.  
Seventh, t Ǯr ǯ  focuses on the development of bubbles. 
Investors in this theory do not worry about absolute gains or losses, but they 
are concerned about the amount of regret they would have when they choose 
one investment over other alternatives (Hirshleifer, 2001). As a bubble grows 
by any reason, their regret of not buying a stock becomes stronger and it 
amplifies the bubble. Similarly, a bubble can develop from relative wealth 
concern (DeMarzo et al., 2008). It is argued that, even if investors suspect a 
bubble, they do not instantly sell stocks because they do not want to lag behind 
in wealth against the other traders if the bubble continues to grow further.  
Last, there exist other theories that are about the behavioural biases in asset 
pricing which may be responsible for market inefficiency such as momentum 
and a price bubble. TǮhǯ(Thaler and Johnson, 1990) focuses 
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on the effects of prior gains or losses. For example, when investors gain from 
previous trades, they tend to take more risks. In the case of prior losses, they are 
tempted even by the offer of the possibility of breaking even. In the meantime, Ǯǯ 
sensitive to loss than gain. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argued that it is 
responsible for the equity premium. Both theories explain the momentum in the 
growth of stock price bubbles. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) captured another 
psychological bias, Ǯhabit formationǯ: repetition of a stimulus diminishes the 
perception of the stimulus and responses to it. The theory adds the slow-moving 
external habit of utility maximising agents to asset pricing models in the 
explanation of stock price movements.    ǡ ǯ Ǯbeauty 
contestǯ idea (Keynes, 1936), which originally adopted rational agents and was 
later formalised by Angeletos (2010) among others, was employed to support 
irrational bubbles using asymmetric information (Shiller, 2000, Brunnermeier, 
2001).  
In addition, practitioners in the market are also well aware of the irrationality of 
investors causing market disturbance (Thaler, 1999). For instance, a renowned 
trader, George Soros, introduced the concept of Ǯreflexivityǯǡ emphasising that a  ǯ      Ȅparticularly a 
negative feedback loop in fundamentalsȄbetween prices and price perception, 
may lead to dynamic disequilibrium of the market (Soros, 2003). Meanwhile, it 
is even argued that a stock price bubble is only an example of a bubble 
phenomenon discoverable everywhere in human society (Gisler and Sornette, 
2010). 
In reality, however, researchers cannot precisely know whether a price 
movement is driven by rationality or irrationality of the market investors and 
which actual pricing models are used by the market participants (Meltzer, 
2005). Therefore, it may be a more reasonable approach to assume that there 
are both types of rational and irrational investors in the markets. However, the 
price impact of this coexistence may be even more difficult to analyse in theory 
or in practice.    
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Two schools of the bubble theories have different views about the coexistence 
of rational and irrational traders (Cespa and Vives, 2009), although this is partly 
a compromising approach to incorporate both approaches. The main difference 
is in whether this coexistence of rational and irrational investors temporarily or 
permanently reduces the degree of rationality in an overall market.  
For instance, researchers supporting rational expectation and the EMH 
occasionally employed the concept of noise traders to explain an irrational and 
temporary departure from rational prices, which introduced a certain bias into 
the market. This is allowed in the rational expectation framework because the 
EMH only requires a sufficient number of rational investors to recover the 
fundamental prices (Cuthbertson 2004). However, rational bubble theories 
conclude that rational prices will prevail in the end.  
Some irrational bubble theories also used the existence of rational investors in 
their development of argument, e.g., Hirshleifer and Luo (2001). Nonetheless, 
their outcomes from this coexistence were a persistent departure from 
fundamentals. The reason for this is that less-than-rational investors can 
survive in a competitive market with rational investors (Russell and Thaler, 
1985, De Long et al., 1991). Furthermore, Kogan (2006) developed this view by 
showing that the price impact by irrational investors was not relevant to their 
survival. They may earn an abnormal return, even higher than rational investors 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2006). In this context of coexistence, stock price bubbles are 
sometimes defined as the difference between prices as they are and what they 
would be without noise traders (LeRoy, 2004). 
In the meantime, this persistent deviation of prices can be explained by 
assuming biased rational investors who admit the possible existence of noise 
traders. For example, the myopia theory in the above can explain informational 
inefficiency caused by risk averse but myopic rational investors and their 
coexistence with noise traders. The myopic traders respond to noise trader risk 
by incorporating the degree of noise trading into their expected returns (De 
Long et al., 1990, Kogan et al., 2006) or consumption risk (Loewenstein and 
Wallard, 2006). Then, even when the rational short-horizon traders are 
privately informed, they buy an asset only if subsequent arbitrageurs are likely 
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to drive up the price. This leads to herding on the same information (Froot et al., 
1992) and not utilising all the information (Dow and Gorton, 1994). It results in 
market inefficiency and possibly a price bubble and a crash. 
Meanwhile, there are completely different approaches to explain stock price 
bubbles by importing theories from mathematics, physics and other disciplines 
e.g. Rosser (2000) and Arthur (1999). The examples are catastrophe, chaos and 
complexity theories. Technical analysis of asset trading examines price bubbles 
in their own context. Ǯ ǯ    ±    
changing forces (Zeeman, 1977), which can produce sudden effects in natural 
sciences. Zeeman (1977) expanded the theory into financial economics. In his 
application of the theory to stock bubbles, the interaction between 
fundamentalists and chartists in a three-dimensional surface with an additional 
index axis initiates a slow recovering conversion from the bear market to the 
bull market. As encouraged chartists in the earlier bull markets increasingly 
participate in trading, overvaluation eventually occurs and arbitrageursǯ
departures give way to a sudden crash. However, ǯed 
criticism (Rosser, 2000) such that excessive reliance on qualitative methods and 
strong mathematical assumptions restrict the theory better suited for a mode of 
thought.  Ǯǯ - ǮǯǤThe 
little change in initial conditions and parameter values generates extreme 
fluctuation in final outcomes. The chaos theory is better at explaining large 
movements such as stock price bubbles and crashes that occur at greater 
frequency than the expectations in the stochastic theory of normal distributions. 
However, this theory may be just a technique to discover better-fit models, and 
at the same time it requires a large number of samples to acquire predictability 
or to detect chaos (Hsieh, 1991, De Grauwe et al., 1993, Cuthbertson and 
Nitzsche, 2004). Ǯǯ     -linear and process-oriented 
dynamics than the previous two theories (Rosser, 2000). A related theory, ǮCǯ, which is a close relative to complexity theory, 	ǯ
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system dynamics approach (Forrester, 1991) to financial economics. In complex 
or cybernetic systems, multiple elements including human agents with strategy 
and expectations interact with each other. If agents choose a more accurate 
hypothesis among multiple market hypotheses including rational expectations, 
their parameter values are slowly updated and homogenous rational 
expectation dominates. Conversely, when they are updated faster, complex 
regimes, bubbles and crashes and other anomalies are observed (Arthur, 1999). 
In essence, this theory argues that a temporal out-of-equilibrium state can exist 
when a system contains non-linearity of positive feedbacks or increasing 
returns (Arthur, 1995, Arthur, 1999) that resemble bubbles. One disadvantage 
of this approach is its reliance on computer simulation to demonstrate results 
(Rosser, 2000). Ǯ	 ǯ l movement of 
stock prices including bubbles and crashes (Mandelbrot et al., 1997, Mandelbrot, 
1999). In this fractal theory, stock price movements can be decomposed on 
smaller but essentially identical parts. This theory also provides a theoretical 
basis for a certain technical analysis.  
Practitioners in financial markets, mainly chartists among traders, developed 
their own way of distinguishing the phases of price bubbles, that is part of Ǯǯ. They use historical price data to pick up a turning point of 
trends in prices to maximise their payoff from trading (Kirkpatrick and 
Dahlquist, 2006), but they do not consider any finance or economic theories for 
this. Although it is widely used among so-called technicians or chartists, it is not 
strictly accepted as academic research although they can be combined (Brown 
and Jennings, 1989, Bettman et al., 2009).  
For the examples of technical analysis for a pricing bubble and burst, the 
chartists use mathematical techniques such as a simple or exponential moving 
average and stochastic oscillators to tell when the market trend is reversed. 
Without referring to any price fundamental, they sometimes Ǯǯthe 
price and other charts to infer what is behind price movements. For instance, 
they impose certain patterns such as a cup and saucer, a double bottom, a 
head-and-shoulder and a breakaway gap onto the charts and guess the next 
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movement (Kirkpatrick and Dahlquist, 2006). There are various different 
techniques and their main concern is investment decisions, particularly the 
timing of trading.   
3.1.2. Detection of a price bubble 
How to statistically detect a price bubble is another issue different from 
explaining the causes and mechanisms of price bubbles. Market-level and 
economy-level price bubble theories provide either theoretical or descriptive 
patterns of bubble development. In the case of theoretical patterns of both 
bubble and non-bubble prices being presented, those mathematical movements, 
which are commonly based on the PVM, can be used to build empirical tests for 
bubble detection. Otherwise, like in most of the cases of the irrational price 
bubble theories and the economy-level bubble theories, the characteristics of 
descriptive price patterns expected from the models can be tested.  
The basis for many types of bubble detection methods is the PVM. The stock 
prices are presumed to be decided by this, which is derived from the Euler 
equation. The original PVM states that the stock prices are the sum of all 
discounted future expected dividends. Suppose P is the stock price of a firm, 
iterative expectation and successive substitutions transform the Euler equation: 
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where Ɉ is a discount rate or the rate of required return (0<Ɉ<1), D is a dividend 
(or other price fundamentals) and t is a time subscript. All expectations denoted 
by E are rational expectations.  
Unlike rational bubble theories, the terminal price is now supposed to be zero, 
i.e. the transversality condition holds ( lim[(1 ) [ ]] 0n t t n
n
E P฀฀ ฀฀฀ ฀  ฀ ). Additionally 
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suppose both dividends and discount rates are constant over time. Then, the 
price at t is simply: 
21 1 11 ...
1 1 1t
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That is, stock prices do not change as long as dividends and discount rates are 
constant. Meanwhile, depending on how the assumptions are relaxed, there are 
different types of the PVM. For example, when dividends (Dt) and discount rates 
(Ɉt) are time-varying (Barsky and de Long, 1993, Yogo, 2006), the Euler 
equation becomes a more general form of the PVM: 
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฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
฀฀
  
In the meantime, it can be argued that either the assumption of investors using 
constant discount rates and dividends all the time or foreseeing their changes 
up to infinity is fairly unrealistic. Thus, it can be supposed that investors 
anticipate one period ahead of a discount rate and dividend, and calculate the 
stock prices based on them. In this setup, both dividends and discount rates are 
changeable each period subject to external shocks while they are not completely 
time-constant or time-varying. Consequently, the PVM becomes slightly simpler: 
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฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
฀       
This version of the PVM is adopted in the next chapter as well. 
In general, the PVM provides a good starting point to test for bubbles because if 
the PVM holds in efficient markets, an excessive movement of prices can be a 
temporary bubble. In a similar context, a price pattern can be tested against a 
specific type of rational bubble since the rational bubbles can be built on the 
PVM.  
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The first of this type of test are the Ǯvariance bounds testsǯ (Shiller, 1981). They 
were initially designed for verifying the efficient market hypothesis, specifically 
the validity of the present value model (West, 1988, Salge, 1997). The reason for 
this is that violation of the variance bounds is known to support the excess 
volatility of stock prices and dismiss the EMH. The original tests were devised 
by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981). The tests did not specify any 
specific bubble process but emphasised the increased volatility by possible 
presence of bubbles and utilised potential differences in variance between 
ex-ante actual price and ex-post rational price (or perfect foresight price).  
Ex-ante price, or actual market price built on expected dividends assuming 
time-varying dividends and discounted at the constant risk-free rate rf is:  
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฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀  ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
฀  
and ex-post rational price which is calculated after all dividends are realised is: 
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฀  
Since ex-post price includes the summation of forecast error, the relationship 
between two prices is expressed as: 
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Empirically, ex-post price is on average equal to ex-ante price when zero-mean 
error (ɂ) is assumed, but the variance of ex-post prices is: 
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Then, it must be larger than or equal to the variance of ex-ante price. In other 
words, the variance of the forecast (Pt) should be smaller than or equal to the 
variance of the variable being forecasted (Pt*).  
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However, the existence of rational bubbles tends to increase the variances of the 
stock price as Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Tirole (1985) suggested. The 
above variance bound is not likely to hold with bubbles. Note that equality 
instead of inequality in variance bounds is usually adopted for statistical tests 
(LeRoy and Porter, 1981).  
On the other hand, the rejection of the variance bound does not necessarily 
mean the existence of rational bubbles. Mankiw et al. (1985) and Flood and 
Hodrick (1986) showed that the same variance bound can be derived even in 
the presence of bubbles. Moreover, these tests have the joint hypothesis 
problem. Since they combine the assumptions of rational expectation, risk 
neutrality, a constant discount rate and a stationarity of dividend process, it is 
difficult to interpret the results. In addition, Marsh and Merton (1986) showed 
that the tests were highly sensitive to non-stationarity of price and dividend.  
Campbell and Shiller (1988) revised the test using the log linear approximation 
of dividend/price ratio and they showed that an unexplained portion in 
variance remained even after relaxing the assumption of constant discount rate, 
which may be due to bubbles. However, this was not clear evidence of bubbles 
since Cochrane (1992) showed a time-varying discount rate can actually explain 
the remaining variance without resorting to bubbles.  
Therefore, although the variance bounds test may reject the null hypothesis of 
the efficient market (Shiller, 1981, Salge, 1997), this test cannot purposely 
detect bubbles since it is difficult to accept the alternative hypothesis of the 
existence of a bubble due to the joint hypothesis problem. It may be the case 
that the violation of the bounds only reveals that there is something other than 
what the present value model can explain. 
On the other hand, Ǯǯ-step testsǯ are the first of their kind to explicitly 
test a bubble in the alternative hypothesis. His idea is to consider two sets of 
consistent estimates, of which only one set is affected by the existence of a 
bubble (West, 1987); the estimated parameters from the equation can be 
compared to possibly bubble-infected parameters from the actual 
price-dividend relationship. Also, using sequential steps of testing, this test is 
devised to tackle the joint hypothesis problem. 
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In the first step of the test, the Euler equation is estimated by the instrument 
variable (IV) method and the risk-free rate rf is obtained from the results. The rf 
is not affected by the existence of bubbles. In addition, a dividend process is 
specified and estimated by the OLS method to obtain the estimates of necessary 
parameters, for example, ฀ when the dividend follows autoregressive (AR) of 
order one (no constant):  
ttt DD ฀฀ ฀฀ ฀1  
In the second step, using the obtained estimates, the parameters of the 
fundamental price are calculated. For example, the fundamental price (Pf) can 
be calculated when D is generated by the AR(1) process as follows. 
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Simplify this:  
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Then, the value of parameter฀, which is not influenced by bubbles, is obtained.  
On the other hand, actual price process Pt is regressed on Dt such that 
ttt BDP ฀฀฀Ö   
Another estimated value of parameter ฀Ö can be obtained. In the absence of a 
bubble (Bt=0), the value of parameter ฀Ö  should be the same as that of 
parameter ฀. However, since actual price process can be contaminated by 
bubbles, these two parameters are different in the presence of bubbles. In other 
words, ǯthe difference between 
two parameter values. It uses the Hausman coefficient test. Flood and Hodrick 
(1990) incorporated more complex ARIMA processes into the test. ǯ
1871 to 1981 and Meese (1986) also found a bubble in the foreign exchange 
market using the same methods. Casella (1989) identified a macroeconomic 
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price level bubble in Germany after World War I. However, using slightly 
modified test statistics, Dezbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt (1990) did not discover 
any evidence of bubbles using the same data as West.  
To conduct ǯ, the dividend process should be correctly specified based 
on the results of model specification tests. However, Dezbakhsh and 
Demirguc-Kunt (1990) questioned the validity of model specification tests, 
particularly about that of the Hausman test. Casella (1989) discovered the 
sensitivity of the test to the choice of instrument variables. In addition, Flood et 
al. (1994) pointed out that although the Euler equation held for two consecutive 
periods or for any two periods, a statistical error accumulated as the time gap of 
the two periods widened. Then, it consequently reduced the power of the test.   ǮThe cointegration testǯ was invented by Hamilton and Whiteman (1985), and 
developed by Hamilton (1986) and Diba and Grossman (1988a). It is based on 
the effect of rational bubbles on cointegration between the stock price and 
dividend and their individual integration.  
The fundamental price of the PVM in the above using the general discount rate Ɉ 
is: 
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However, the actual price which may include a bubble is: 
t
f
tt BPP ฀฀   
In the case of no bubbles (Bt =0), if dividends follow a stationary process or 
integrated process of order n, the price process (Pt) should be stationary or 
integrated of the same order. However, when a bubble exists (Bt >0), 
cointegration would not hold because the bubble process itself is non-stationary 
by definition. It can be seen as follows: 
Suppose a rational bubble follows an explosive process: 
1[ ] (1 )t t tE B B฀฀ ฀  ฀  or 1 (1 )t t tB B฀  ฀ ฀฀  ฀ 
where ɂ is zero-mean stochastic error.  
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Using a lag operator, L, it becomes at time t: 
(1 (1 ) ) t tL B฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
When the bubble process is differenced at the first order, 
(1 (1 ) )(1 ) (1 )t tL L B L฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ 
It can be noticed that (1-L)Bt is stationary, so original Bt is not generated by a 
stationary ARMA process (Diba and Grossman, 1988b) and this is true for the 
nth differenced bubble process. As a result, the cointegration relationship 
between actual prices and fundamental price based on dividends can be used as 
a bubble test. Any cointegration test under the null hypothesis of cointegration 
of order (1,1) can be used for testing for a rational bubble as most financial data 
are I(1). For example, Diba and Grossman (1988a) adopted the Dickey-Fuller 
test for individual   ǯ (1986) test for cointegration 
between them.  
However, when the integration/cointegration based tests reject the null 
hypothesis, it may merely indicate there is something non-stationary in the 
price process. It may simply be a bubble, but it can be anything else (Gurkaynak, 
2008). Therefore, they argued that the tests would only prove the non-existence 
of a rational bubble when it cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
In addition, as Meese (1986) and Evans (1991) pointed out, cointegration tests 
cannot detect any other kind of bubble than non-stop exploding bubbles. For 
example, a periodically collapsing bubble is rather stationary and not easily 
detected by the cointegration test. Furthermore, Gurkaynak (2008) argued that 
the reliability of cointegration tests is also in question as different tests 
sometimes produced opposite results. ǮPartial sum of residuals testǯ was designed by Wu and Xiao (2002). It is a test 
for rational bubbles to overcome the weakness of the integration and 
cointegration based tests. Their approach is unique in the sense that they 
developed a statistic based on the partial sum of residuals. Their test begins 
from the regression of the logarithm of price on the logarithm of dividend such 
that 
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ln lnt t tP D฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ 
where Ƚ and Ⱦ are intercept and slope coefficients. 
They argued that in the absence of a rational bubble (bt= lnBt, included within ɂt), 
the order of magnitude of the partial sum process up to time k, 
1
k
t
t
฀
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฀   
should be proportional to 
฀฀฀
k
1/ 2  
However, if a bubble does exist, even with a positive probability of collapse, the 
absolute value of a rational bubble by definition will grow since: 
1[ ]t t tE b b฀ ฀   
Also, the variance of bt and consequently that of the error term ɂt will increase 
exponentially with time. Hence, the partial sum diverged to infinity. They 
suggested the following test statistic  
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฀  ฀ ฀  ฀  
where t฀฀is from non-parametric estimation of the residuals and 2.lnÖ Dw฀ is the 
non-parametric long-run variance estimator of ɂt from lnDt. The details of the 
calculation were given in Wu and Xiao (2002). They found weak evidence of the 
US market bubbles, but relatively strong evidence from the Hong Kong market 
from 1974 to 1998.  
Hall et al. (1999) developed Ǯregime switching bubble testsǯ by incorporating the 
collapsing bubbles of Evans (1991) into a regime switching modǤ  ǯ
model, a bubble stochastically grows at the average rate of (1+Ɉ) under one 
regime, but once reaching threshold B , the regime transits and the bubble 
grows faster with a positive probability of burst. Their two regimes are:  
1 1(1) (1 ) ( )t t t tB B v B B฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ 
฀ ฀1 0 1 11(2) (1 ) ( )t t t t tB B B B B฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ 
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where v is a random factor in bubble size, B0 is the initial size of a bubble, Ʌ is a 
binary variable indicating the survival of a bubble, 
1 1 1( 1) , ( 0) 1 ,  and ( ) 1,t B t B t tprob prob E v฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ 
That is, over the threshold value, the bubble survives with a probability of ɎB 
and bursts with a probability of 1-ɎB. After a burst, the bubble term reduces to 
B0. 
This system of regimes is equivalent to ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Then, Markov regime switching Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were 
conducted to detect a bubble. On the other hand, van Norden (1996) applied a     ǯ (1979) probabilistic rational bubble 
model. He assumed regime switching bubbles implied the testable coefficient 
restriction on innovations. By estimating the model and conducting a Wald test, 
he found weak evidence for bubbles. However, the regime-switching-based tests 
sometimes have serious size distortion (van Norden, 1996) and the choice of 
process affected their outcomes (van Norden and Vigfusson, 1998).  
Meanwhile, it is possible to conduct Ǯdirect bubble testsǯ, which are bubble tests 
using the specifications of bubble processes. Previous tests did not directly 
estimate the bubble term and its coefficients. The tests indirectly utilised the 
variances of prices, the coefficients of dividends and residuals, and integration 
and cointegration between them. Flood and Garber (1980) and Flood et al. 
(1984) employed a deterministic bubble process for a direct test for bubbles at 
price level. Although their test is not originally designed for stock price, it gives 
a good implication for similar tests. Their model starts from a monetary 
inflation model. Money demand is: 
1( )t t t tm p INF฀ ฀ ฀฀฀     
where p is price and m is exogenous money stock both in logarithm, INF is 
inflation specified by an autoregressive function of growth rates in the money 
stock, Ƚ and Ⱦ are the coefficients and ɂ is an error term.  
The general solution of the model is: 
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The last term is a deterministic bubble term with an arbitrary constant, A0.  
Their idea was that with proper estimation procedures, A0 can be estimated and 
the test for bubbles can be conducted under the null hypothesis of A0=0. They 
carried out three-step estimation: money stock on past money stock, money 
demand on inflation, and then the final estimation of A0 after the substitution of 
the previous results into the rearranged general solution. They found the 
evidence of a bubble of German hyperinflation in the 1920s, but strong Ƚ, Ⱦ and A0.  	  ǯ (1991) intrinsic bubble theory (Section 3.1.1) is another 
example of deterministic bubbles and can be converted to a bubble test. Their Ǯintrinsic bubble testǯ utilised the PVM in continuous time to derive a price 
process with a deterministic rational bubble: 
t t t tP D cD
฀฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ where is 2 /2 1(e e )฀ ฀฀฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀   
The first term is the fundamental price ( ftP ) and the second term is the bubble 
process  Ɋ  ɐ        ȋɂ). ɉ  
positive root of 2 2 / 2 0฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀.  
Then, divide the equation by Dt to obtain: 
tt
t
t cD
D
P ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀฀ ฀1
   
where Ƀt=ɂt/Dt 
This equation is estimated to test for rational bubbles. If a bubble exists, c must 
be significant since it shows a non-linear relationship between prices and 
dividends. They examined 1900-1988 US S&P index data and concluded that the 
intrinsic bubble existed. However, they admitted their results may give weak 
evidence of bubbles because the rejection of the null hypothesis merely shows a 
non-linear relationship between price and dividend process (Froot and Obstfeld, 
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1991). Moreover, the existence of intrinsic bubbles can be dismissed by 
adopting a Markov regime switching dividend process (Driffill and Sola, 1998).  
Some bubble tests are not dependent on the PVM. They rely solely on residuals 
from any pricing model, so they can be used to test for rational, irrational 
bubbles, and economy-level bubbles. They are more flexible in this sense but 
more ambiguous in specifying the pricing model of the fundamental.  ǯ (1951) Ǯrescaled range testsǯ originally intended to test for long-term 
dependence or persistence were first imported into finance by Mandelbrot 
(1972) and generalised by Lo (1991). The test has a potential for bubble tests 
since a bubble may generate strong persistence in residuals from the 
fundamental pricesǤǯR(n) and scale 
factor S(n,q) from residual series, et , and its mean e  of n samples. 
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where 2Ö฀is the sample variance, i฀Ö is estimated autocorrelation, q is a period 
of short-term dependence.  
When q is assumed to be zero, S(n,p) becomes a scaled standard deviation, 
Ö( )S n n ฀฀  ฀  (Mandelbrot, 1972). Hurst showed that the ratio of R(n)/S(n), ǮȀǯ, is proportional to nH, where H is ½ in the case of a random walk 
and H is larger than ½ when persistence exists in the data. In the case of 
non-zero q (Lo, 1991), the null of short-term dependence can be tested. An 
example of the application in bubble tests comes from Ahmed et al. (2006). They  ǯ      in the 1990s and found some 
evidence of persistence in residuals. However, this test only distinguished the 
existence of persistence not that of specific bubbles.  ǮBDS independence testsǯ are devised to test for long-term dependence and 
non-linearity in residuals. They can be used to find price bubbles in any 
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well-specified pricing model (Brock et al., 1996). They constructed the tests 
ǯ(1983) correlation integral ( c ), which is 
calculated from T observations of residuals e1ǡ ǥǡ eT and n-histories (or 
embedding dimension): et-n+1, et-n+2ǡǥǡet for a chosen tolerance distance k. 
1
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T T
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฀  ฀  
where Kst is a closeness indicator and has a value of 1 if 0,..., 1maxi n i se e k฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
and otherwise 0. 
Then, the BDS test statistic is calculated using two correlation integrals with 
different length of history: 
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n
n T T
n T
c k c k
BDS T
k฀
฀฀  
The statistic follows asymptotically normal under the null of independent and 
identical distribution (i.i.d) since 1( ) ( )nnc k c k฀  for any n. Due to a known small 
sample bias, the sample size is recommended to be over 500. By rejecting the 
null, the residuals are expected to have unexplained long-term dependence and 
non-linearity, but the alternative hypothesis is not specified. For example, it is 
also used to give some indication for ARCH effects (Brooks, 2008). Thus, it could 
simply be the evidence of a time-varying conditional variance (Hsieh, 1991, 
Campbell et al., 1997).   ǮDuration dependence testsǯ are brought by McQueen and Thorley (1994) into 
the study of stock price bubbles. Duration dependence under a bubble is the 
phenomenon of the probability of the end of the run (i.e. a crash) becoming 
lower as abnormal runs (a bubble) extend, but the size of the crash is larger as a 
result. Abnormal runs can be counted using any fundamental pricing model. For 
example, time series based models can be employed for this purpose. 
Meanwhile, McQueen and Thorley (1994) used Fama-French 3 factor model 
(Fama and French, 1989) as a fundamental. The original idea of the tests came 
from Durland and McCurdy (1994)ǯs work. Note that duration used in this 
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chapter is different from bond or equity duration (Leibowitz, 1986), which 
indicates the price sensitivity of bonds or equities to interest rates. 
Let f be the probability distributions of the length of a run I ending at a 
particular length i and its cumulative counterpart (F) is the probability of the 
run not extending over the length of i. 
)(
)(
iIprobF
iIprobf
i
i
฀฀
฀฀
 
Then, a hazard rate is defined as: 
i
i
i F
fh ฀฀1  
This must be decreasing when duration dependence exists possibly due to a 
bubble. 
Using the logistic hazard function, the rate can be specified as: 
)ln(1
1
ii e
h ฀฀฀฀฀  
The coefficients Ƚ and Ⱦ can be estimated using logit estimation. Then, a  
likelihood ratio test can be conducted on the value of Ⱦ. If a price bubble does 
not exist, the hazard function should be constant even if i increases. That is, Ⱦ é ? 
and h=1. Otherwise, if there is negative duration dependence (i.e. Ⱦ<0 and 
0<h<1), a bubble may exist. McQueen and Thorley (1994) found that positive 
runs have negative duration dependence while negative runs do not have such 
dependence using NYSE monthly return data between 1927 and 1991. Recent 
evidence of a bubble was also discovered (Lunde and Timmermann, 2004, Chen 
and Shen, 2007, Zhang, 2008). Further details about this bubble test follow in 
Section 3.2. 
There are also other types of bubble tests. They mostly utilise the statistical 
attributes of bubbles and crashes. ǮRuns and tail testsǯ are similar to the idea of 
the duration dependence tests. Blanchard and Watson (1982) suggested that 
bubbles produce positive runs in innovations, but crashes are responsible for a 
fat tail distribution due to being negative outliers. They used data from the gold 
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market between 1975 and 1981, and discovered evidence of bubbles. However, 
these attributes are not unique in bubbles and are often associated with 
fundamentals (McQueen and Thorley, 1994) as they are quite common in 
financial data (Taylor, 2005). 
Evans (1986) developed a Ǯmedian testǯ for rational speculative bubbles in 
foreign exchange markets. He expected that bubbles may produce non-zero 
median of data and recognised a bubble in US-UK exchange rates in the early 
1980s. Nonetheless, he admitted that his method had difficulties in 
distinguishing speculative bubbles from asymmetric fundamentals or 
irrationality of markets.  
In the business cycle literature, there exists a widely accepted rule to decide the Ǯturning pointsǯ of bull and bear markets, and subsequently bubbles and crashes. 
It is not actually a statistical test but a formal rule devised by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and academics utilise the variants of the 
rule for their research; a peak/trough is identified as a point higher/lower than 
all points six months before and after. A cycle must last 15 months from a peak 
to a trough. Each phase must span at least 5 months (Gonzalez et al., 2005).  
Technical analysts have their own Ǯtechnical testsǯ to attempt to recognise 
deterministic and predictable trends or bubbles in charts. For example, Dow 
theory insists stock markets consist of three main trends: major, intermediate 
and short-run, and each trend has three phases of accumulation, change and 
distribution (Reilly and Brown, 2003). However, the theory depends on 
arbitrary decisions on qualitative price patterns. Meanwhile, Elliot wave theory 
suggests that the basic movement of stock price has identifiable repetition of up 
and down movements similar to Fibonacci series or mathematical fractal 
geometry (Mandelbrot, 1999). For example, there are five ups and three downs 
in a bull market and the opposite in a bear market. However, most academics 
criticise the theory as more like an art form and dependent on subjective 
judgement (Mandelbrot, 1999).  
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3.2. The duration dependence test for price bubbles 
This section aims to discover the evidence for price bubbles in more recent data 
spanning subsets of 1979-2008 from 5 stock markets using mainly one of the 
statistical tests for stock price bubble, the duration dependence test. As briefly 
reviewed in Section 3.1.2, the duration dependence test is a non-PVM based test 
for pricing bubbles. One of the advantages is its independence from the 
PVM-based price fundamentals. Instead, it can adopt any pricing model which is 
frequently used on time series econometric analysis. In other words, this test 
has more generality over the other tests since the test is applicable even without 
the data of the price fundamental like dividend data which are sometimes not 
reliable or available in some countries like China. Although it also means that 
the results of the test rely on the choice of pricing models, as long as the choice 
is reasonable, the findings in the duration dependence tests bring good insights 
into the price movement in the sample data.  
This section utilises several univariate time series models including ARMA or 
ARMA-GARCH models used as price generating processes or proxies for price 
fundamentals following earlier research (McQueen and Thorley, 1994, Chan et 
al., 1998, Lunde and Timmermann, 2004, Zhang, 2008). Then, the duration 
dependence tests are conducted and the test results are investigated for further 
implications for the expansion of the duration dependence test. 
3.2.1. Methodology 
The first step of the duration dependence tests for a bubble on financial data is 
to retrieve the duration data. It first requires estimating the mean model and 
obtaining its residuals. Then, all the duration of runs are recorded based on the Ǯsignǯ of the residuals. In other words, the number with the same sign as them is 
counted until the sign is reverted, and then recorded as a positive or negative 
run. For example, suppose the estimation of the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
provides the following residuals between the 11th and the 20th observations. 
They are converted to the runs where the numbers in the last two rows are 
duration i.e. length of run. 
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week 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
residual ǥ +0.008 +0.006 +0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 +0.001 -0.006 +0.005 +0.002 ǥ 
sign - + + + - - - + - + + - 
(+) run ǥ   3    1   2 ǥ 
(-) run ǥ      3  1   ǥ 
Table 23 Example: converting residuals to positive and negative runs 
These positive and negative runs can be considered as spells of overperfoming 
and underperforming markets, or simply bull and bear markets.  
Using this retrieved duration data, it is actually possible to estimate the Ǯunconditionalǯ probability that a run grows and ends, that is, ɎR and (1-ɎR) by 
supposing a specific probability distribution of a run. This is a different 
proposition from the following duration dependence test that relies on hazard 
rates and the probability that a bubble grows and crashes (ɎB and 1-ɎB).  
The theoretical background of estimation of unconditional ɎR requires the main 
assumption that duration is a random variable with geometric distribution 
which is based on binominal distribution of run continues and ends. The 
histogram of durations from one of the datasets in the study, US S&P500 index 
(1978-2008) displays a typical pattern of geometric distribution.  
 
Figure 3 The histogram of duration series: S&P500 
Now suppose the number of time periods of a run growing before it ends, i.e. the 
duration of a run is d (i in hazard rates). Then, it can be derived from the general 
results of geometric distribution (Jordan and Smith, 2008) that the probability 
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that a run ends after d periods of growth is equivalent to that of having one 
failure after k (=d-1) successes in k+1 trials, which is known to follow geometric 
distribution: 
( ) ( ( -1)) (1 )kR R Rprob X k prob D d ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ where k=0,1,2,3,ǥ 
where X is a random variable representing the number of successes before 
failure and DR is an equivalent random variable representing the duration 
before a run ends. Note that geometric distribution is a generalisation of 
Bernoulli distribution and the special case of negative binomial distribution of 
continuous random variables and Pascal distribution of discrete random 
variable (Jordan and Smith, 2008).  
It is also known that the expected value of the number of successes before 
failure is: 
( )
1
R
R
E X ฀฀฀฀  
Then, the expected duration before the end of a run is: 
( ) ( ) 1RE D E X฀  ฀   
Meanwhile, the variance of the number of successes before failure is equal to 
that of the duration before the end: 
2var( ) var( ) (1 )
R
R
R
X D ฀฀฀  ฀ ฀  
The likelihood function of a failure or a run end is:  
฀ ฀1 2 1( | ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
N
i
N
k
Nkk k
e i e e e e e e e eL p k p p p p p p p p
฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
where pe=(1-ɎR), where N is the total number of runs and k1, ǥ, kN are the 
observed values of k (=d-1) for each of N runs.  
Then, the corresponding log likelihood function is obtained: 
1
ln ( | ) ln(1 ) ln
N
e i i e eL p k k p N p
฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  
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The first order condition is that the first derivative of the above function is zero: 
1ln ( | ) 0(1 )
N
i
e i
e e e
k
L p k N
p p p
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ 
฀
 
Solve this for pe, and the maximum likelihood estimator of pe is obtained. 
1
Ö
e N
i
Np
N k
฀
฀฀
 
This is the estimated probability that a run ends. Also, since pe=1-ɎR, the 
estimator of ɎR, i.e., the probability of run growth, is easily retrieved by: 
1
1 1
Ö Ö1 1
N
i
R e N N
i i
k
Np
N k N k
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀  ฀ 
฀
฀  ฀ 
 
Now, it is represented in terms of durations (d): 
1 1 1
1 1 1
( 1)
Ö
( 1)
N N N
i i i
R N N N
i i i
k d d N
N k N d d
฀
฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀
 
On the other hand, the same analysis can be repeated on the duration of 
negative runs, and then the probabilities of negative run continues or ends are 
obtained. In other words, the unconditional probabilities from 
under-performing markets to over-performing markets are estimated. 
However, it is more realistic to allow for the possibility that these probabilities 
may change, in particular conditional on the length of duration. This is the main 
idea of the duration dependence test that argues that this probability decreases 
as a run grows in length if there is a bubble. Then, it can be thought that the 
unconditional probabilities are the special case of conditional probabilities, 
specifically with the assumption of constant hazard rate. However, two 
approaches use different assumptions about the distribution of duration.  
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The essential idea of the duration dependence test for rational price bubbles is 
supported by the theoretical results using the PVM-based bubble theory 
although the duration dependence test itself does not use the PVM. To be 
precise, the simple probabilistic bubble model of Blanchard and Watson (1982) 
provides the theoretical background to the test. 
The simple probabilistic model in Section 3.1.1 can be slightly more generalised 
by adding a small positive initial bubble term, B0, in a two-period model 
(Bollerslev and Hodrick, 1992, McQueen and Thorley, 1994).  
Suppose a bubble grows at the rate of Ɉ without probabilistic collapse. 
1( ) (1 )t tE B B฀฀ ฀  ฀  
By introducing a simple probabilistic collapse with a probability of (1-ɎB). 
฀ ฀1 1( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 )[0] (1 )t B t B t
B
E B B B฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀  
Although a bubble on average grows at the same rate, the possibility of 
probabilistic collapse is compensated by a faster growth rate when a bubble 
grows.  
Add an initial bubble B0 and rearrange: 
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀1 0 01 1( ) [ (1 ) 1 [ ]] 1 [ ] (1 )t B t B B t
B B
E B B B B B฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
Now it can be seen that: 
(1) If a price bubble continues ɎB., the size of a bubble at 
t+1 is: 
1 0 1
(1 )1 (1 ) Bt t t
B B
B B B฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
฀฀  ฀ ฀
   
(2) If the bubble bursts with a probability of (1-Ɏ), it goes back to its initial 
status:   
1 0 1t tB B ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀  
where ɂ is the unexpected changes or the errors in the bubble process.  
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On the other hand, the unexpected changes in the fundamental price process (Ʉ) 
can be defined as:  
1 1 1 (1 )t t t tP D P฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
where Dt is dividend at time t. 
This is derived from the two-period present value formula or the dividend 
discount model as follows. 
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 ( )
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
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t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
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฀฀
฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀
฀  ฀ 
฀  ฀ 
฀  ฀ 
฀  ฀ 
฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀ ฀฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
 
The errors (ɂ) in the bubble process are stochastically decided.  
(1) The unexpected difference in bubble growth if the bubbles continues, 
฀ ฀
1 1
0
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
t t t
B
t
B
B B
B B
฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀฀
฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀฀  ฀ 
ɎB and 
(2) The unexpected difference between an actually collapsed bubble and an 
expected growing bubble if the bubble ends, 
1 0(1 )t tB B฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
with a probability of (1-ɎB). 
Then, the total unexpected changes (ɂT) are either: 
(1) 
฀ ฀
1 1 1
1 0
(1 ) (1 )
T
t t t
B
t t
B
B B
฀ ฀ ฀
฀฀  ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀
฀
฀  ฀ 
฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
ɎB or 
(2) 
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1 1 0[ (1 ) ]Tt t tB B฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ 
with a probability of (1-ɎB). ɎB is commonly assumed to be larger than 1/2 because of the nature of bubbles, 
and then the errors of the bubble process are negatively skewed even with zero 
mean, unlike symmetric probability of the unexpected changes in the 
fundamental prices. Consequently, the overall process has negative skewness 
from this. 
Now suppose the cumulative distribution function of the errors in the bubble 
process is G and the probability distribution function is g, then the probability of 
the total unexpected changes being negative is (McQueen and Thorley, 1994): 
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀1 0 0(1 )( 0) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )T Bt B t B t
B
prob G B B G B B฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀฀
฀  ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀   ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
 
It can be differentiated with respect to Bt to investigate the effect of the growing 
bubble to the probability of price collapsing.  
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀1 0 0( 0) (1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )Tt BB t t
t B
prob g B B g B B
B
฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀
฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀  ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ 
 
The above derivative is negative as long as ɎB is greater than 1/2. This is due to 
the first term in the square bracket being larger than the second because the 
former is closer to the mean and has a higher probability of happening. Another 
assumption of a bell-shaped probability function is required for this i.e. the 
probability of a specific value happening decreases as it moves farther away 
from the mean.  
These theoretical results support the empirical expectations in Section 3.1.2 by 
showing that there is less chance of bubble bursts as the price bubble grows. 
That is, negative duration dependence may be discovered in the market data 
under the presence of a bubble.  
On the other hand, the empirical test of duration dependence considers whether 
a hazard rate increases or decreases when the runs are extended. The hazard 
rate is the probability of a run ending after lasting a specific time period. This is 
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formally represented as follows: suppose f is the probability distribution 
function of the run (I) ending after the lasting time period i. Then, the 
cumulative distribution function F is the probability the run ends before i. 
)(
)(
iIprobF
iIprobf
i
i
฀฀
฀฀
 
Then, a (population) hazard rate is: 
i
i
i F
fh ฀฀1  
This is expected to decrease if a (positive) bubble exists. That is, there is 
negative duration dependence. For statistical inference of the hazard rate from 
the sample, its functional form needs to be specified; this section utilises the 
logistic hazard functions of McQueen and Thorley (1994)ǯs original study:  
)ln(1
1
ii e
h ฀฀฀฀฀  
The duration dependence tests have been employed in the empirical research to 
detect price bubbles or other types of duration dependence. After McQueen and 
Thorley (1994)ǯs initial development of the test in the field of finance, there was 
a line of following research. For example, Maheu and McCurdy (2000) 
discovered the evidence of bubbles in monthly CRSP (Center for Research in 
Security Prices) value-weighted index on the NYSE between 1802 and 1995. 
Lunde and Timmermann (2004) applied the test on 110 years of daily US 
S&P500 index series (1885-1995). They used the residuals from an 
ARMA-GARCH-based model and revealed that positive duration dependence 
exists in bear markets, but no evidence of bubbles in bull markets. Yuhn (2010) 
discovered a bubble in the US stock market from the data between 2000 and 
2007. 
Mokhtar et al. (2006) used simple return models and found a bubble in the 
Malaysian stock market before and after the 1997 Asian crisis. Chen and Shen 
(2007) extensively examined more recent but less frequent monthly data of 
Asia-Pacific stock markets and AR-based models. They discovered positive 
duration dependence commonly existed in stock indices. For instance, 
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Singaporean and Taiwanese stock markets showed positive duration 
dependences in both bull and bear markets between 1970 and 2004 while 
Korean, Japanese and Hong Kong stock markets displayed positive duration 
dependence in bear markets only. On the other hand, Zhang (2008) discovered 
price bubbles in two weekly indices of Chinese stock markets, Shanghai 
Composite and Shenzhen Composite from 1991 to 2001. Bhaduri (2009) did not 
discover bubbles in the Indian market data between 1990 and 2007 based on 
AR models. 
In this study, the duration dependence test will be conducted in the following 
steps. First, using the duration data retrieved as described above, the number of 
a run with specific duration i (Ni) is recorded, and separated into two groups of 
positive and negative runs. Then, the number of runs with duration greater than 
i is also calculated (Mi). Subsequently, the sample hazard rates for each duration 
i are calculated as:  
Ö i
i
i i
Nh
N M
฀ ฀  
Then, two tables, each representing positive and negative runs, are constructed. 
For instance, the table for positive runs from the above table is:  
 
Duration  Ni Mi Öih  
1 1 2 0.333 
2 1 1 0.500 
3 1 0 1.000 
Table 24 Example: positive runs and sample hazard rates 
Finally, suppose the logistic hazard function is used for the functional form of 
the hazard function:  
)ln(1
1
ii e
h ฀฀฀฀฀  
The coefficients Ƚ and Ⱦ are estimated using logit estimation which maximises 
the log likelihood function (McQueen and Thorley, 1994): 
  
116 
 
1
ln ( , | , , ) ln ln(1 )i i i i i i i
i
L N M h N h M h฀  ฀  ฀
฀
฀ ฀ ฀฀  
Subsequently, a likelihood ratio (LR) test can test for a restriction on the value 
of Ⱦ using the LR statistic (Verbeek, 2004): 
2
(1)2[ln ln ] ~UR RLR L L ฀฀   
where lnLUR is the log likelihood value of the unrestricted model and lnLR is that 
of the restricted model. In particular, the significance of Ⱦ i.e. Ⱦ=0 is tested in the 
duration dependence test for price bubbles. If significant, the sign of Ⱦ is 
essential in interpreting whether the data shows positive or negative duration 
dependence. Price bubbles are expected to display negative duration 
dependence in positive runs.  
3.2.2. Data 
To examine the existence of bubbles, a total of five stock price indices are 
selected and investigated by the duration dependence tests. First, the Standard 
& Poorǯs (S&P) 500 index is selected because of its representativeness of the 
two largest US stock exchanges, the NYSE and the NASDAQ. The index consists 
of 500 large-cap firms in two stock markets. Second, NASDAQ 100 index 
represents relatively smaller firms in the growing industry than the S&P500. It 
may be more strongly subject to overall market sentiment. This index contains 
the largest 100 firms listed on the NASDAQ. Third, another stock index from a 
developed country, FTSE100 of the London Stock Exchange is chosen to reflect a 
possible geographical difference. Fourth, the addition of Indian BSE100 index is 
for developing countries, which characterizes the five regional stock markets in 
India. Last, Korean KOSPI200 index is chosen as Korea experiences dramatic 
economic development as well as crisis. Also, Indian and Korean indices have 
been rarely tested for duration dependence.   
Weekly price data is employed for the analysis. Specifically, Wednesday close- 
indices are chosen instead of average weekly prices not to remove the time 
series properties of the original series. Weekly data can avoid excessive noise in 
daily data. Also, it can more easily maintain enough observations compared 
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with monthly or quarterly datasets since duration dependence tests convert 
price or return observations into the count of positive and negative runs. 
For S&P500, the sample period is 30 years between 03/01/1979 and 
31/12/2008. The total number of observations is 1,566. NASDAQ 100 has 
slightly fewer observations, 1,357 ranging from 05/01/1983 and 31/12/2008 
(26 years). UK FTSE100 has the same sample period as S&P500. The sample of 
BSE100 index contains the data between 07/01/1987 and 31/12/2008 which 
consists of 1,200 observations in 22 years. The sample for the Korean KOSPI200 
has the least number of observations, which is 992 covering 03/01/1990 to 
31/12/2008 (19 years). The difference in the length of the sample periods 
reflects the limited data availability in some markets.  
All data is obtained from Datastream online database. The patterns of log prices 
(natural logarithm of the raw index) are displayed in the following figures 
where the x axis represents year and the y axis is for log prices. The scale of the 
y axis is adjusted for each index. Either log price or log return series will be used 
depending on the nature of the tests or investigations in the following sections. 
 
Figure 4 S&P500 from 03/01/1979 to 31/12/2008 
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Figure 5 NASDAQ100 from 05/01/1983 to 31/12/2008 
 
Figure 6 FTSE100 from 03/01/1979 to 31/12/2008 
The movements of the US and UK indices (Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6) show 
the descriptive patterns of several bubbles and crashes. For example, 1987 
Black Monday, 2000 dotcom bubble and 2007-08 subprime crisis can be all 
observed. Regarding the sample periods of 30 years, the patterns of a bubble 
and crash rarely happened. Thus, it may imply negative duration dependence. 
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Figure 7 BSE100 from 07/01/1987 to 31/12/2008 
 
Figure 8 KOSPI200 from 03/01/1990 to 31/12/2008 
The remaining two indices also display the patterns of bubbles and crashes 
throughout the sample period. Notably, the Korean stock market was severely 
affected by the 1997 East Asian crisis, which was not observed in other stock 
indices. Like the first three indices, negative duration dependence can be 
expected from rarely happened bubbles and crashes in the overall build-up of 
price, but empirical evidence needs to be explored.   
The next table (Table 25) summarises the descriptive statistics of all five stock 
indices and their returns. In those log return series, 4 out of 5 indices show 
negative skewness and all indices display leptokurtosis. They is descriptive 
evidence for the presence of long-term building of price bubbles (positive 
returns) and short-term crashes (negative returns). Their distributions all 
depart from normality as usually observed in financial data, which commonly 
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contain outliers and volatility clustering, as Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics represent. 
Otherwise stated, all the empirical analysis is conducted using Eviews statistical 
package in this section.  
 
Log price 
US 
S&P 500 
US 
NASDAQ100 
UK  
FTSE100 
INDIA 
BSE100 
Korea 
KOSPI200 
observations 1,566 1,357 1,566 1,200 992 
 Mean 651.846 943.038 3693.704 2521.658 105.195 
 Maximum 1562.470 4596.800 6835.910 11449.950 260.420 
 Minimum 96.280 98.960 834.300 207.870 33.260 
 S.D.  469.003 876.472 1773.486 2397.565 46.947 
  
Log return 
US 
S&P 500 
US 
NASDAQ100 
UK 
FTSE100 
INDIA 
BSE100 
Korea 
KOSPI200 
 Mean 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 
 Maximum 0.102 0.184 0.136 0.248 0.196 
 Minimum -0.167 -0.218 -0.178 -0.178 -0.196 
 S.D.  0.022 0.037 0.023 0.041 0.043 
 Skewness -0.752 -0.578 -0.726 -0.072 0.034 
 Kurtosis 8.520 6.954 9.599 5.968 5.297 
Jarque-Bera 2134.131 959.038 2580.010 441.059 218.138 
Table 25 Descriptive statistics of five sample indices 
3.2.3. Return models 
In the duration dependence tests, the focus is on the duration of runs of 
abnormal positive returns and negative returns. Thus, the choice of models for 
returns may be important as the return model provides residuals that are later 
converted to runs for actual duration dependence tests. As reviewed earlier, the 
common choice is ARMA or ARMA-GARCH based time series models. US S&P 
500 index is first employed to obtain general knowledge about the series and 
the procedure is repeated for all the other indices.   
Econometric properties of log return series (rt) are examined first. The ACF and 
PACF of the log return series of S&P500 (Table 26) display that the series is not 
much different from white noises as their values and Q statistics suggest. That is, 
an ARMA structure is not present and the price generating process is a random 
walk. Note that if Ǯ^ǯ is attached in the table, it means the value of ACF or PACF is 
significant at the 5% significance level. Otherwise, it is not significant.  
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Meanwhile, although the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests of 
prices accept the null hypothesis with the t statistic of -1.1037 with 7 lags that is 
selected by the smallest Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), that of the return 
series reject the null hypothesis of unit roots at the 5% significance level with 
the t statistic of -40.202 with no lag. That may indicate the return generating 
process is a white noise (ɂt) or the (log) price generating process is a random 
walk:   
t tr ฀  ฀  
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  ACF   PACF  Q-Stat  p-value 
              
           |               |    1 -0.018 -0.018 0.5037 0.478 
           |               |    2 -0.016 -0.016 0.9034 0.637 
           |               |    3 0.023 0.023 1.7622 0.623 
           |               |    4 -0.010 -0.009 1.9141 0.752 
           |               |    5 0.021 0.021 2.6009 0.761 
           |               |    6 0.037 0.037 4.7249 0.580 
           |               |    7 -0.056 -0.053 9.6048 0.212 
           |               |    8 -0.031 -0.033 11.096 0.196 
           |               |    9 0.039 0.035 13.462 0.143 
           |               |    10 -0.000 0.003 13.462 0.199 
           |               |    11 0.008 0.008 13.565 0.258 
           |               |    12 -0.026 -0.027 14.632 0.262 
       
Table 26 ACF and PACF of log returns: S&P500 
However, mean return values in the descriptive statistics imply that log return 
series may contain at least a constant term. The preliminary regression of the 
constant return model of S&P500 (Table 27) displays the possible presence of a 
trend in price or a constant in return. The ACF and PACF of the residuals from 
the constant return model are the same as Table 26. rt is returns, a0 is constant 
and ɂt is the errors.  
t 0 tr a฀ ฀฀ 
Variable Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
Constant(a0) 0.00142 0.00056 2.5186 0.0119 
 SIC  -4.7633 
  
  
Table 27 Estimation results of the constant return model: S&P500 
However, BDS independence test (Brock et al., 1996) confirms that there exists 
non-linearity in both residuals of the models. The null hypotheses of 
independent and identically distributed residuals are rejected with p-values of 
0.000 for all 2 to 6 dimensions. These results propose a GARCH structure in the 
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volatility of return processes although ARMA structure does not reside in the 
return process. Therefore, GARCH terms (volatility models) are added into the 
return model as follows. Note that, as in Chapter 2, GARCH(1,1) may be a 
reasonable choice in financial data (Baillie and Bollerslev, 1992, Franses and 
van Dijk, 1996, Andersen et al., 2001) as a white noise model is too simple and 
volatility clustering is known to occur in financial data (Lunde and 
Timmermann, 2004). GARCH(1,1) specification is:   
t 0 t
2 2 2
t 0 1 t 1 1 t 1
r a
฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ 
On the other hand, the duration dependence tests in the literature revealed the 
asymmetry in the runs of positive or negative abnormal returns. Thus, if the 
leverage effect is incorporated in the volatility model, it may be able to reduce 
the significance of duration dependence. Then, it is appealing to add a dummy 
variable (DUM), which represents the leverage effect, to the volatility process 
and test for whether it makes a difference in duration dependence. As a result, 
the model specification is:  
t 0 t
2 2 2 2
t 0 1 t 1 1 t 1 1 t 1 t 1
r a
c DUM฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
where c1 is the coefficient of the dummy. The value of DUMt is 1 if ɂt is negative 
and 0 otherwise. This is essentially a GJR-GARCH(1,1) model (Glosten et al., 
1993).  
The return models that have been so far considered are: white noise, constant 
mean return, constant mean GARCH(1,1) and constant mean GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
models. Except for the white noise model, which can be excluded by the BDS test 
results, the remaining 3 models are estimated on the S&P500 return samples. 
The estimation results of the models are in Table 28. In the case of S&P500, the 
leverage effects are present in the data. Possibly for the same reason, the 
GJR-GARCH(1.1) model is preferred in terms of the significance of individual 
coefficients and the Schwartz information criteria (SIC). Although the mean 
model is identical, different a0 estimates can be produced due to the nature of 
the maximum likelihood estimation method that is practically based on a 
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numerical maximisation procedure. This may lead to different p values and 
results of the following duration dependence tests. 
  
Constant return model 
  Coefficient S.D t-statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0014 0.0006 2.5186 0.0119 
SIC -4.7633 
   
GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0021 0.0005 4.1592 0.0000 
constant in variance 0.0000 0.0000 4.4249 0.0000 
ARCH 0.1339 0.0131 10.2152 0.0000 
GARCH 0.8424 0.0184 45.8087 0.0000 
SIC -4.9316 
   
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0013 0.0005 2.6211 0.0088 
constant in variance 0.0000 0.0000 5.5673 0.0000 
ARCH 0.0247 0.0158 1.5592 0.1189 
GARCH 0.8068 0.0216 37.2961 0.0000 
DUM(leverage) 0.2289 0.0228 10.0535 0.0000 
SIC -4.9588       
Table 28 Estimation results of the return models: S&P500 
The next four tables present the estimation results of the remaining four indices. 
Their ARMA structures, which are implied by the ACF and PACF, are quite close 
to those of S&P500 and the BDS independence tests using 2 to 6 dimensions are 
all rejected for non-linearity in these indices just like S&P500. Thus, the 
individual procedure to obtain the return models for each index is not 
separately presented. Instead, the identical three return models are estimated 
for each of four datasets: NASDAQ100, FTSE100, BSE100 and KOSPI200.   
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Constant return model 
  Coefficient S.D t-statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0017 0.0010 1.7470 0.0809 
SIC -3.7736 
   
GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0030 0.0008 3.5961 0.0003 
constant in variance 0.0000 0.0000 5.1501 0.0000 
ARCH 0.1108 0.0134 8.2605 0.0000 
GARCH 0.8656 0.0168 51.5194 0.0000 
SIC -3.9955 
   
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0022 0.0008 2.6940 0.0071 
constant in variance 0.0001 0.0000 6.0494 0.0000 
ARCH 0.0432 0.0190 2.2735 0.0230 
GARCH 0.8295 0.0194 42.7783 0.0000 
DUM(leverage) 0.1777 0.0222 8.0196 0.0000 
SIC -4.0146       
Table 29 Estimation results of the return models: NASDAQ100 
First, the empirical results of the NASDAQ in Table 29 above are not much 
different from S&P500 except that the ARCH term still has significance with the 
added dummy for leverage effects.  
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Constant return model 
  Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0012 0.0006 1.9494 0.0515 
SIC -4.6786 
   GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0021 0.0005 3.9967 0.0001 
constant in variance 0.0000 0.0000 4.7125 0.0000 
ARCH 0.1215 0.0161 7.5406 0.0000 
GARCH 0.8444 0.0163 51.8104 0.0000 
SIC -4.8342 
   GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0014 0.0006 2.5970 0.0094 
constant in variance 0.0000 0.0000 5.2688 0.0000 
ARCH 0.0199 0.0226 0.8796 0.3791 
GARCH 0.8043 0.0244 32.9775 0.0000 
DUM(leverage) 0.1957 0.0346 5.6586 0.0000 
SIC -4.8497       
Table 30 Estimation results of the return models: FTSE100 
Next, in FTSE100 results in Table 30, the significance of the ARCH term drops 
dramatically as the leverage dummy is included in the model although the 
overall results about the fitness of models are similar to S&P500. 
 
Constant return model 
  Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0030 0.0012 2.5500 0.0109 
SIC -3.5596 
   
GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0028 0.0010 2.8976 0.0038 
constant in variance 0.0001 0.0000 4.6722 0.0000 
ARCH 0.1969 0.0219 8.9697 0.0000 
GARCH 0.7465 0.0270 27.6520 0.0000 
SIC -3.6945 
   
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0028 0.0010 2.7524 0.0059 
constant in variance 0.0001 0.0000 4.6675 0.0000 
ARCH 0.1962 0.0223 8.7905 0.0000 
GARCH 0.7459 0.0283 26.3750 0.0000 
DUM(leverage) 0.0022 0.0310 0.0715 0.9430 
SIC -3.7098       
Table 31 Estimation results of the return models: BSE100 
  
126 
 
Next, the main difference of the Indian index data (BSE100) is that the 
coefficient of the leverage effect dummy is not statistically significant. In other 
words, the volatility is not affected by the leverage effects. It may indicate that 
leveraged investors in the Indian market do not need to care about deleverage 
or not own a tool for it. But the GJR-GARCH specification is a slightly better fit 
than the others in terms of the SIC. 
 
Constant return model 
  Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0004 0.0014 0.2811 0.7787 
SIC -3.4473 
   
GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0018 0.0011 1.6955 0.0900 
constant in variance 0.00003 0.00001 2.3682 0.0179 
ARCH 0.1040 0.0177 5.8879 0.0000 
GARCH 0.8850 0.0190 46.5599 0.0000 
SIC -3.6491 
   
GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Coefficient S.D t-Statistic p-value 
constant in mean 0.0010 0.0011 0.9283 0.3532 
constant in variance 0.00003 0.00001 2.7148 0.0066 
ARCH 0.0516 0.0176 2.9343 0.0033 
GARCH 0.9013 0.0174 51.7363 0.0000 
DUM(leverage) 0.0700 0.0216 3.2391 0.0012 
SIC -3.6506       
Table 32 Estimation results of the return models: KOSPI200 
Last, in the Korean data, all ARCH and GARCH terms and the dummy are 
significant in the volatility model similar to NASDAQ200 (Table 32). However, 
one noticeable difference from the other indices data is that the constant in the 
return model tends to be not significant. It also shows that there may not be a 
significant trend in this price series. 
As a whole, the GJR-GARCH(1,1) models performed better than other less 
sophisticated models. Thus, this model is employed as the main return model 
for counting the runs of the residuals. Also, the constant return model chosen as 
a benchmark to check the performance of simpler models is able to meet that of 
more complicated models in the duration dependence tests.  
  
127 
 
3.2.4. The estimation of unconditional probabilities that a run continues 
The unconditional probabilities that a run continues and ends can be estimated 
before investigating the duration dependence tests with conditional 
probabilities. This analysis can be considered as the analysis with constant 
hazard rate in duration dependence, but it actually uses a different assumption 
about the distribution of duration. Meanwhile, the same set of the retrieved 
duration data is employed as in the following duration dependence test. Only 
the constant-mean GJR-GARCH model is used in this analysis unlike the 
following duration dependence tests later.  
The table below shows the duration data from the S&P500 index (1979-2008) 
which contains the only required data for the estimation of unconditional 
probabilities.  
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni  
Duration Ni 
1 187 
 
1 224 
2 108 
 
2 91 
3 45 
 
3 44 
4 23 
 
4 26 
5 20 
 
5 6 
6 9 
 
6 3 
7 3 
 
7 2 
8 1 
 
8 1 
9 1 
 
9 0 
10 1 
 
10 1 
11 1 
 
    
Table 33 Duration data - S&P500 with the GJR-GARCH model 
The probability that a run continues (ɎR) is estimated from the maximum 
likelihood estimator using the duration data from the positive runs:  
1
1
Ö
N
i
R N
i
d N
d
฀
฀
฀
฀
฀
 
N is the count of the observed runs that is equal to the summation of the figures 
in the second column. In this case, it is 399 (=187+108+ǥ+1+1). ȭdi is the 
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summation of all the counted durations. From the above table, it is calculated as 
the sum of the products of duration and Ni. That is 843 (=1x187 + 2x108 +ǥ+ 
10x1 +11x11). Then, the estimated probability of run growth is: 
843 399Ö 0.5267
843R
฀ ฀฀  ฀  
and the estimated probability that a run ends is: 
Ö1 1 0.5267 0.4733R฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
Subsequently, it can be expected that the estimated mean duration of a positive 
run is: 
Ö 1 1Ö 1 2.1128Ö Ö1 1 0.4733
R
R R
D ฀฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀  
In other words, a positive run is likely to last for 2.11 weeks. Although the 
sample standard deviation is not highly meaningful under geometric 
distribution, it is: 
2 2
0.5267Ö ( ) 1.5333(1 ) (1 0.5267)
R
R
D ฀฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀   
On the other hand, the negative runs can be used to estimate the probability 
that a bear market persists. From the rightmost two columns in the above table, 
the estimated ɎR is: 
722 444Ö 0.4488
722R
฀ ฀฀  ฀  
Ö1 1 0.4488 0.5512R฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
1Ö 1.8141
0.5512
D ฀  ฀  
2
0.4488Ö ( ) 1.2152(1 0.4488)D฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  
The negative run in the given US data has the probability of 0.45 to continue, 
and it is likely to persist around 1.81 weeks. 
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In the meantime, all five stock index data are inspected using the same 
estimation method for any difference in the probabilities of run continues and 
ends across different stock markets. Two return models, the constant return 
and the GJR-GARCH model are employed to calculate abnormal returns which 
are subsequently converted into the duration data. The estimation results are 
summarised in the next table where S.D is sample standard deviation (= Ö( )D฀ ) 
 
  
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Index 
 
GJR-GARCH constant return 
 
GJR-GARCH constant return 
US ÖR฀  0.5267 0.5186  0.4488 0.4507 
S&P500 Ö1 R฀฀  0.4733 0.4814  0.5512 0.5493 
 duration  2.1128 2.0771  1.8141 1.8204 
  S.D 1.5333 1.4958 
 
1.2152 1.2221 
US ÖR฀  0.5184 0.5238  0.4753 0.4720 
NASDAQ100 Ö1 R฀฀  0.4816 0.4762  0.5247 0.5280 
 duration  2.0762 2.1000  1.9059 1.8938 
  S.D 1.4948 1.5199 
 
1.3140 1.3010 
UK ÖR฀  0.5273 0.5327  0.4743 0.4741 
FTSE100 Ö1 R฀฀  0.4727 0.4673  0.5257 0.5259 
 duration  2.1154 2.1399  1.9021 1.9015 
  S.D 1.5361 1.5618 
 
1.3099 1.3093 
INDIA ÖR฀  0.5669 0.5633  0.5142 0.5150 
BSE100 Ö1 R฀฀  0.4331 0.4367  0.4858 0.4850 
 duration  2.3091 2.2899  2.0584 2.0618 
  S.D 1.7386 1.7186 
 
1.4760 1.4796 
KOREA ÖR฀  0.5324 0.5430  0.5605 0.5547 
KOSPI200 Ö1 R฀฀  0.4676 0.4570  0.4395 0.4453 
 duration  2.1384 2.1883  2.2756 2.2455 
  S.D 1.5602 1.6126 
 
1.7037 1.6724 
Table 34 Estimated probabilities that a run continues and ends 
The probably of positive run persistence ranges from 0.52 to 0.57, and it is 
almost identical across the five stock indices despite the difference in their 
geographical location, development status and the sample period. Their 
estimated durations are slightly over 2 weeks. The choice of a return model did 
not generate any statistically significant impact by the difference in mean test. 
On the other hand, the negative runs have slightly lower probability of 
continuing which is between 0.45 and 0.56 than positive runs except in the case 
of the Korean stock market data. The difference of mean probability between 
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positive and negative runs is statistically significant only at 10%. The lower 
probability leads to mostly shorter duration of negative runs than positive runs. 
On the other hand, standard deviation of duration ranges from 1.22 to 1.74. 
Binomial tests for significance are conducted on the results with the GJR-GARCH 
models using normal approximation (Siegel, 1956) as the probabilities are close 
to 0.5 and the sample size is large. Under the null hypothesis of the equal 
probability that a run continues and ends (ɎR=0.5), z statistics are calculated by: 
Ö [ , ]0.5
(1 )
R R
R R
n n
z
n
฀  ฀ 
฀  ฀ 
฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀  
where n is the number of observations, [+,-]0.5 is adjustment for normal 
approximation: if ÖRn฀  is larger than nɎR, its value of -0.5 and if ÖRn฀  is smaller 
than nɎR, its value of +0.5. Note that there is one less observation for each index.  
The z statistics and p-values are presented in the following table. The null 
hypothesis is rejected for most of the sample indices at the 5% significance level. 
Positive runs in the UK market show marginal significance at the 10% level. The 
only exception is the negative runs in the Indian market; the probabilities that a 
run continues or ends are not significantly different from 0.5.  
 
Index   Positive runs   Negative runs   
US ÖR฀  0.5267 ** 0.4488 *** 
S&P500 z statistic 2.0865 
 
-4.0244 
 
(n=1,564) p-value 0.0158   0.0000   
US ÖR฀  0.5184 * 0.4753 ** 
NASDAQ100 z statistic 1.3275 
 
-1.7913 
 
(n=1,355) p-value 0.0735   0.0322 
 
UK ÖR฀  0.5273 ** 0.4743 ** 
FTSE100 z statistic 2.1340 
 
-2.0075 
 
(n=1,564) p-value 0.0158   0.0202 
 
INDIA ÖR฀  0.5669 *** 0.5142  
BSE100 z statistic 4.6022 
 
0.9541 
 
(n=1,198) p-value 0.0000   0.1469   
KOREA ÖR฀  0.5324 ** 0.5605 *** 
KOSPI200 z statistic 2.0071 
 
3.7754 
 
(n=990) p-value 0.0202   0.0000   
Table 35 The results of binomial tests for significance from 0.5 
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In summary, using the duration data, the probabilities of positive runs of 
abnormal returns reverting to negative runs or vice versa have been empirically 
estimated and compared across five indices with two return models. Those 
probabilities are relatively similar across different market samples, but positive 
runs have slightly higher probability to continue than negative runs. The 
estimation method in this section may provide another perspective of 
investigating a return series. Instead of relying on logistic hazard function or 
other related functions like Weibull, the geometric distribution of duration can 
be directly employed to estimate the underlying probabilities that a run 
continues and ends. All estimated probabilities are different from 0.5 except 
that of negative runs in the Indian market index.  
It should be noted that the estimated probabilities in this section are 
unconditional probabilities which are based on the geometric distribution of 
duration as a random variable. They were implicitly assumed to be constant in a 
specific market over the sample period. However, they may change as the 
duration of the run increases as assumed in the duration dependence tests.  
On the other hand, the result may provide a rule of thumb for detecting a price 
bubble. As the estimated mean duration suggests, any type of a run of abnormal 
returns that is greater than 2 weeks is less likely to happen. Then, considering 2 
standard deviations, a run of positive abnormal returns over 5 weeks can be 
employed as criteria to distinguish a possible market price bubble or an 
imminent crash. That is, when the duration of a run is larger than 5 i.e. equal to 
6 weeks or greater, the run can be categorised as a price bubble. Out of 30 years 
of S&P500 data, 16 occasions of positive price bubble and 7 occasions of 
negative bubbles are identified with this rule. The number of occurrences of 
positive and negative bubbles of all five market indices is presented in the 
following table along with per year occurrence. 
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Index Positive bubbles Negative bubbles 
US 16 7 
S&P500 0.53/year 0.23/year 
US 20 7 
NASDAQ100 0.77/year 0.27/year 
UK 16 7 
FTSE100 0.53/year 0.23/year 
INDIA 24 6 
BSE100 1.09/year 0.27/year 
KOREA 10 8 
KOSPI200 0.53/year 0.42/year 
Table 36 Bubble counts by the rule of thumb and their averages per year  
In all cases, the number of positive bubbles is much larger than negative ones. It 
is not highly consistent with the findings that the probability that the runs of 
positive abnormal returns continues is only slightly greater than that of the runs 
of negative abnormal returns. Specifically, NASDAQ and BSE indices are subject 
to larger occurrence of positive bubbles, which may indicate market inefficiency 
while KOSPI seems to show only a little difference. Note that this counting only 
depends on the length of run. 
3.2.5. The results of duration dependence tests 
Two return models, constant return and GJR-GARCH(1,1) are estimated on the 
five sample market indices, and then the runs and their duration are counted. 
The next table presents the run counts and the sample hazard rates based on 
the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model on US S&P 500 index. They are calculated on an 
Excel spreadsheet using the residuals from Eviews software. Also, the table 
contains the values of the coefficients Ƚ and Ⱦ, their standard deviation (S.D) 
and the p-values of Wald tests along with the LR statistics and its p-values, 
which are calculated on Eviews. 
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Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 187 212 0.4687 
 
1 224 174 0.5628 
2 108 104 0.5094 
 
2 91 83 0.5230 
3 45 59 0.4327 
 
3 44 39 0.5301 
4 23 36 0.3898 
 
4 26 13 0.6667 
5 20 16 0.5556 
 
5 6 7 0.4615 
6 9 7 0.5625 
 
6 3 4 0.4286 
7 3 4 0.4286 
 
7 2 2 0.5000 
8 1 3 0.2500 
 
8 1 1 0.5000 
9 1 2 0.3333 
 
9 0 1 0.0000 
10 1 1 0.5000 
 
10 1 0 1.0000 
11 1 0 1.0000 
 
        
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.1041 0.2500 0.6772 
 
Ƚ 0.2336 0.28298 0.4091 Ⱦ -0.0092 0.2287 0.9681 
 
Ⱦ -0.0692 0.26816 0.7965 
LR statistic 0.0064 p-value 0.9364 
 
LR statistic 0.2501 p-value 0.6170 
Table 37 The results of duration dependence test: S&P500 and the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
LR statistics show that the value of Ⱦ is not statistically different from 0. That is, 
there was not a price bubble in S&P500 index between 1979 and 2008. Also, 
there is no indication of the existence of negative bubbles, which can be defined 
as negative duration dependence in negative runs. The other forms of duration 
dependence are not observed in both types of runs.  
The results are comparable with the constant return model on the same dataset 
in the next table (Table 38). Although they share the same mean model, some 
differences are observed. The number of counted runs is slightly different and 
the value of Ⱦ in positive runs becomes positive, but yet not statistically 
different from zero. Thus, the conclusion about the existence of bubbles does 
not change although LR statistics are slightly higher under the constant return 
model.    
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Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 189 213 0.4701 
 
1 226 175 0.5636 
2 111 102 0.5211 
 
2 90 85 0.5143 
3 47 55 0.4608 
 
3 45 40 0.5294 
4 21 34 0.3818 
 
4 26 14 0.6500 
5 19 15 0.5588 
 
5 7 7 0.5000 
6 9 6 0.6000 
 
6 3 4 0.4286 
7 3 3 0.5000 
 
7 2 2 0.5000 
8 1 2 0.3333 
 
8 1 1 0.5000 
9 0 2 0.0000 
 
9 0 1 0.0000 
10 1 1 0.5000 
 
10 1 0 1.0000 
11 1 0 1.0000 
 
        
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0882 0.1998 0.6591 
 
Ƚ 0.2304 0.2847 0.4185 Ⱦ 0.0259 0.1940 0.8936 
 
Ⱦ -0.0735 0.2780 0.7914 
LR statistic 0.0487 p-value 0.8254 
 
LR statistic 0.2874 p-value 0.5919 
Table 38 The results of duration dependence test: S&P500 and the constant return model 
US NASDAQ stock index is expected to bring similar results since the sample 
period is similar to US S&P500 and the price patterns resemble each other. In 
the results of the test in Table 39, Ⱦ is not statistically significant although it is 
negative in both types of runs. The duration of both positive and negative runs 
is not related to the hazard rates. That is, there is no sign of positive or negative 
price bubbles.    
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Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 165 176 0.4839 
 
1 183 157 0.5382 
2 94 82 0.5341 
 
2 74 83 0.4713 
3 34 48 0.4146 
 
3 44 39 0.5301 
4 20 28 0.4167 
 
4 24 15 0.6154 
5 8 20 0.2857 
 
5 8 7 0.5333 
6 12 8 0.6000 
 
6 2 5 0.2857 
7 6 2 0.7500 
 
7 3 2 0.6000 
8 0 2 0.0000 
 
8 2 0 1.0000 
9 1 1 0.5000 
     
10 1 0 1.0000 
 
        
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0300 0.1726 0.8620 
 
Ƚ 0.1035 0.1856 0.5769 Ⱦ -0.0799 0.1602 0.6182 
 
Ⱦ -0.0100 0.2226 0.9643 
LR statistic 0.4071 p-value 0.5235 
 
LR statistic 0.0048 p-value 0.9445 
Table 39 The results of duration dependence test: NASDAQ100 and the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
The results of the constant return model on the same NASDAQ100 (Table 40) 
bring a similar conclusion with only slightly higher LR statistics. That is 
comparable with the results on the S&P500 index in Table 37 and Table 38. 
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 163 177 0.4794 
 
1 184 155 0.5428 
2 94 83 0.5311 
 
2 73 82 0.4710 
3 34 49 0.4096 
 
3 44 38 0.5366 
4 19 30 0.3878 
 
4 24 14 0.6316 
5 9 21 0.3000 
 
5 7 7 0.5000 
6 12 9 0.5714 
 
6 2 5 0.2857 
7 7 2 0.7778 
 
7 3 2 0.6000 
8 0 2 0.0000 
 
8 2 0 1.0000 
9 1 1 0.5000 
     
10 1 0 1.0000 
 
        
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0474 0.1662 0.7755 
 
Ƚ 0.1211 0.1807 0.5028 Ⱦ -0.0865 0.1545 0.5758 
 
Ⱦ -0.0190 0.2125 0.9288 
LR statistic 0.4886 p-value 0.4845 
 
LR statistic 0.0174 p-value 0.8952 
Table 40 The results of duration dependence test: NASDAQ100 and the constant return model 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the US stock market may not contain price 
bubbles in the sample periods or, at least in two market indices during 
1983-2008.  
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Next, turning to the UK stock market which is geographically different but with 
a similar level of development, the UK FTSE100 index (Table 41) does not show 
the evidence for a price bubble since Ⱦ is not statistically significant. 
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 162 176 0.4793 
 
1 181 156 0.5371 
2 84 92 0.4773 
 
2 77 79 0.4936 
3 41 51 0.4457 
 
3 40 39 0.5063 
4 23 28 0.4510 
 
4 22 17 0.5641 
5 12 16 0.4286 
 
5 10 7 0.5882 
6 9 7 0.5625 
 
6 3 4 0.4286 
7 2 5 0.2857 
 
7 2 2 0.5000 
8 4 1 0.8000 
 
8 2 0 1.0000 
9 0 1 0.0000 
     
10 1 0 1.0000 
 
        
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0909 0.7877 0.9081 
 
Ȝ 0.1110 0.2633 0.6733 Ⱦ -0.0330 0.4895 0.9463 
 
ȝ -0.0170 0.3209 0.9577 
LR statistic 0.0693 p-value 0.7923 
 
LR statistic 0.0140 p-value 0.9058 
Table 41 The results of duration dependence test: FTSE100 and the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
The test results with the constant return model are also presented in the 
following table. Little discrepancy is spotted in terms of counted duration and 
the significance of the coefficients. In both test results, the price bubbles in the 
UK stock index are not discovered.  
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Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 162 174 0.4821 
 
1 179 156 0.5343 
2 80 94 0.4598 
 
2 78 78 0.5000 
3 42 52 0.4468 
 
3 39 39 0.5000 
4 22 30 0.4231 
 
4 23 16 0.5897 
5 14 16 0.4667 
 
5 9 7 0.5625 
6 8 8 0.5000 
 
6 3 4 0.4286 
7 2 6 0.2500 
 
7 2 2 0.5000 
8 4 2 0.6667 
 
8 2 0 1.0000 
9 1 1 0.5000 
     
10 1 0 1.0000 
 
        
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0895 0.5796 0.8772 
 
Ƚ 0.1045 0.2985 0.7263 Ⱦ -0.0731 0.3806 0.8477 
 
Ⱦ -0.0016 0.3209 0.9960 
LR statistic 0.3534 p-value 0.5522 
 
LR statistic 0.0001 p-value 0.9911 
Table 42 The results of duration dependence test: FTSE100 and the constant return model 
On the other hand, the duration dependence test on the Indian market (BSE100) 
does show the existence of positive price bubbles in the data, between 1987 and 
2008. The coefficient value of Ⱦ is negative and significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level. In other words, the duration of abnormal runs has a negative 
relationship with the hazard rates, or if positive runs of abnormal returns 
continued in the Indian stock market, they were less likely to end. Then, it can 
be said price bubbles emerged.  
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Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 137 138 0.4982 
 
1 129 145 0.4708 
2 52 86 0.3768 
 
2 68 77 0.4690 
3 36 50 0.4186 
 
3 39 38 0.5065 
4 17 33 0.3400 
 
4 19 19 0.5000 
5 9 24 0.2727 
 
5 13 6 0.6842 
6 9 15 0.3750 
 
6 2 4 0.3333 
7 7 8 0.4667 
 
7 3 1 0.7500 
8 4 4 0.5000 
 
8 1 0 1.0000 
9 3 1 0.7500 
     
10 0 1 0.0000 
     
11 1 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ȝ -0.0890 0.1461 0.5423 
 
Ƚ -0.1546 0.3091 0.6170 ȝ -0.2799** 0.1534 0.0681 
 
Ⱦ 0.1908 0.2849 0.5030 
LR statistic 5.2836 p-value 0.0215 
 
LR statistic 1.5931 p-value 0.2069 
Table 43 The results of duration dependence test: BSE100 and the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
The constant return model also contains the evidence for the existence of 
bubbles, but to a slightly lower degree. The p-value of Ⱦ is just over 0.05. 
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 137 139 0.4964 
 
1 130 145 0.4727 
2 53 86 0.3813 
 
2 67 78 0.4621 
3 36 50 0.4186 
 
3 39 39 0.5000 
4 16 34 0.3200 
 
4 20 19 0.5128 
5 11 23 0.3235 
 
5 13 6 0.6842 
6 9 14 0.3913 
 
6 2 4 0.3333 
7 7 7 0.5000 
 
7 3 1 0.7500 
8 4 3 0.5714 
 
8 1 0 1.0000 
9 3 0 1.0000   
 
      
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.1011 0.1402 0.4706 
 
Ƚ -0.1542 0.2603 0.5537 Ⱦ -0.2424* 0.1474 0.1001 
 
Ⱦ 0.1830 0.2633 0.4871 
LR statistic 3.8166 p-value 0.0507 
 
LR statistic 1.4770 p-value 0.2242 
Table 44 The results of duration dependence test: BSE100 and the constant return model 
Last, the Korean stock market index (KOSPI200) with the GJR-GARCH model 
does not display any possible existence of a price bubble as Ⱦ is not significant 
although the LR statistic is higher than those of the US and the UK indices. 
Meanwhile, the Korean data shows positive duration dependence in negative 
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runs. That is, as negative runs lengthen, they are more likely to end. However, it 
does not match with either concept of positive or negative bubbles.   
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 113 111 0.5045 
 
1 90 135 0.4000 
2 50 61 0.4505 
 
2 54 81 0.4000 
3 23 38 0.3770 
 
3 43 38 0.5309 
4 17 21 0.4474 
 
4 20 18 0.5263 
5 11 10 0.5238 
 
5 10 8 0.5556 
6 5 5 0.5000 
 
6 4 4 0.5000 
7 2 3 0.4000 
 
7 2 2 0.5000 
8 0 3 0.0000 
 
8 1 1 0.5000 
9 1 2 0.3333 
 
9 1 0 1.0000 
10 1 1 0.5000 
     
11 1 0 1.0000           
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0178 0.4128 0.9657 
 
Ƚ -0.4544 0.3076 0.1396 Ⱦ -0.1938 0.3351 0.5631 
 
Ⱦ 0.3652** 0.3957 0.3561 
LR statistic 1.7434 p-value 0.1867 
 
LR statistic 5.5431 p-value 0.0186 
Table 45 The results of duration dependence test: KOSPI200 and the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model 
The test results using the constant return model (Table 46) do not differ from 
the above results. Positive duration dependence is discovered but a price bubble 
does not reside in the dataset that ranges from 1990 to 2008.  
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Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 110 113 0.4933 
 
1 94 130 0.4196 
2 49 64 0.4336 
 
2 51 79 0.3923 
3 23 41 0.3594 
 
3 42 37 0.5316 
4 18 23 0.4390 
 
4 19 18 0.5135 
5 13 10 0.5652 
 
5 10 8 0.5556 
6 5 5 0.5000 
 
6 4 4 0.5000 
7 2 3 0.4000 
 
7 2 2 0.5000 
8 0 3 0.0000 
 
8 1 1 0.5000 
9 1 2 0.3333 
 
9 1 0 1.0000 
10 1 1 0.5000 
     
11 1 0 1.0000   
 
      
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0774 0.3003 0.7966 
 
Ƚ -0.3864 0.2522 0.1255 Ⱦ -0.1610 0.2513 0.5218 
 
Ⱦ 0.2914* 0.3369 0.3872 
LR statistic 1.2292 p-value 0.2676 
 
LR statistic 3.5103 p-value 0.0610 
Table 46 The results of duration dependence test: KOSPI200 and the constant return model 
The next five tables present the results of the duration dependence tests on 
each of the same five market indices but using monthly data instead of weekly 
data. This is a robustness test for the discovered duration dependence. Only 
simpler constant return models are used for the tests this time.  
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 49 47 0.5104 
 
1 54 42 0.5625 
2 22 25 0.4681 
 
2 21 21 0.5000 
3 17 8 0.6800 
 
3 10 11 0.4762 
4 5 3 0.6250 
 
4 8 3 0.7273 
5 2 1 0.6667 
 
5 1 2 0.3333 
6 0 1 0.0000 
 
6 1 1 0.5000 
7 1 0 1.0000 
 
7 0 1 0.0000 
     
8 0 1 0.0000 
     
9 0 1 0.0000 
          10 1 0 1.0000 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.0171 0.5227 0.9738 
 
Ƚ 0.2388 1.2291 0.8459 Ⱦ 0.3177 0.6285 0.6132 
 
Ⱦ -0.1972 0.8730 0.8213 
LR statistic 1.1870 p-value 0.2759 
 
LR statistic 0.5742 p-value 0.4486 
Table 47 The results of duration dependence test: monthly S&P500 and the constant return model 
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Monthly S&P500 index does not show any sign of bubble or duration 
dependence. The following NASDAQ100 and FTSE100 indices produce the same 
conclusions. 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 37 39 0.4868 
 
1 39 36 0.5200 
2 13 26 0.3333 
 
2 15 21 0.4167 
3 15 11 0.5769 
 
3 13 8 0.6190 
4 5 6 0.4545 
 
4 3 5 0.3750 
5 4 2 0.6667 
 
5 3 2 0.6000 
6 0 2 0.0000 
 
6 2 0 1.0000 
7 0 2 0.0000 
     
8 1 1 0.5000 
     
9 1 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.1459 0.3585 0.6840 
 
Ȝ -0.0105 0.4513 0.9814 Ⱦ -0.0210 0.3881 0.9568 
 
ȝ 0.1068 0.5175 0.8366 
LR statistic 0.0066 p-value 0.9352 
 
LR statistic 0.1233 p-value 0.7255 
Table 48 The results of duration dependence test: monthly NASDAQ100 and the constant return 
model 
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 36 40 0.4737 
 
1 36 39 0.4800 
2 19 21 0.4750 
 
2 17 22 0.4359 
3 10 11 0.4762 
 
3 14 8 0.6364 
4 3 8 0.2727 
 
4 5 3 0.6250 
5 4 4 0.5000 
 
5 1 2 0.3333 
6 2 2 0.5000 
 
6 1 1 0.5000 
7 2 0 1.0000 
 
7 1 0 1.0000 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.1242 1.9224 0.9485 
 
Ȝ -0.1394 0.6271 0.8241 Ⱦ 0.0011 1.2900 0.9993 
 
ȝ 0.2882 0.7172 0.6878 
LR statistic 0.0000 p-value 0.9968 
 
LR statistic 0.8966 p-value 0.3437 
Table 49 The results of duration dependence test: monthly FTSE100 and the constant return model 
The next table contains the results from the BSE monthly index. Similar to the 
weekly data, monthly data also provides the evidence for a price bubble in the 
sample period. Negative runs do not have any duration dependence.  
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Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 32 31 0.5079 
 
1 30 33 0.4762 
2 16 15 0.5161 
 
2 14 19 0.4242 
3 6 9 0.4000 
 
3 6 13 0.3158 
4 4 5 0.4444 
 
4 9 4 0.6923 
5 0 5 0.0000 
 
5 2 2 0.5000 
6 1 4 0.2000 
 
6 1 1 0.5000 
7 1 3 0.2500 
 
7 1 0 1.0000 
8 1 2 0.3333 
     
9 1 1 0.5000 
     
10 0 1 0.0000 
     
11 0 1 0.0000 
     
12 0 1 0.0000 
     
13 1 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ 0.1114 0.5333 0.8345 
 
Ƚ -0.1993 0.5418 0.7130 Ⱦ -0.4934* 0.4255 0.2462 
 
Ⱦ 0.1202 0.4882 0.8055 
LR statistic 4.3226 p-value 0.0376 
 
LR statistic 0.1585 p-value 0.6906 
Table 50 The results of duration dependence test: monthly BSE100 and the constant return model 
In the Korean market index, previously discovered negative duration 
dependence disappears, and there is no sign of bubble and duration dependence 
in both types of runs. 
  
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
1 20 33 0.3774 
 
1 28 26 0.5185 
2 18 15 0.5455 
 
2 13 13 0.5000 
3 7 8 0.4667 
 
3 5 8 0.3846 
4 3 5 0.3750 
 
4 3 5 0.3750 
5 1 4 0.2000 
 
5 3 2 0.6000 
6 3 1 0.7500 
 
6 2 0 1.0000 
7 0 1 0.0000 
     
8 1 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.3793 0.4510 0.4004 
 
Ƚ 0.0256 1.2807 0.9841 Ⱦ 0.2475 0.4482 0.5807 
 
Ⱦ -0.0502 0.9596 0.9583 
LR statistic 0.6467 p-value 0.4213 
 
LR statistic 0.0220 p-value 0.8822 
Table 51 The results of duration dependence test: monthly KOSPI200 and the constant return 
model 
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The next table (Table 52) summarises all the findings from the duration 
dependence tests on the five weekly stock indices in the above section. Ǯ*ǯ 
attached to p-values indicates statistical significance at the 10% level and Ǯ**ǯ 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
  
Positive runs Negative runs 
Index   GJR-GARCH 
 
constant return GJR-GARCH 
 
constant return 
US Ƚ -0.1041 
 
-0.0882 
 
0.2336 
 
0.2304 
 
S&P500 Ⱦ -0.0092 
 
0.0259 
 
-0.0692 
 
-0.0735 
 
 
LR 0.0064 
 
0.0487 
 
0.2501 
 
0.2874 
 
  p-value 0.9364  0.8254  0.6170  0.5919  
US Ƚ -0.0300 
 
-0.0474 
 
0.1035 
 
0.1211 
 
NASDAQ Ⱦ -0.0799 
 
-0.0865 
 
-0.0100 
 
-0.0190 
 
100 LR 0.4071 
 
0.4886 
 
0.0048 
 
0.0174 
 
  p-value 0.5235  0.4845  0.9445  0.8952  
UK Ƚ -0.0909 
 
-0.0895 
 
0.1110 
 
0.1045 
 
FTSE100 Ⱦ -0.0330 
 
-0.0731 
 
-0.0170 
 
-0.0016 
 
 
LR 0.0693 
 
0.3534 
 
0.0140 
 
0.0001 
 
  p-value 0.7923  0.5522  0.9058  0.9911  
INDIA Ƚ -0.0890 
 
-0.1011 
 
-0.1546 
 
-0.1542 
 
BSE100 Ⱦ -0.2799 ** -0.2424 * 0.1908 
 
0.1830 
 
 
LR 5.2836 
 
3.8166 
 
1.5931 
 
1.4770 
 
  p-value 0.0215 
 
0.0507 
 
0.2069  0.2242  
KOREA Ƚ -0.0178 
 
-0.0774 
 
-0.4544 
 
-0.3864 
 
KOSPI200 Ⱦ -0.1938 
 
-0.1610 
 
0.3652 ** 0.2914 * 
 
LR 1.7434 
 
1.2292 
 
5.5431 
 
3.5103 
 
  p-value 0.1867  0.2676  0.0186 
 
0.0610 
 
Table 52 Summary: the duration dependence tests on the weekly market indices 
As another robustness test, the BDS independence tests (reviewed in Section 
3.1.2), which are also used as bubble tests, are conducted on the residuals from 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) models on the same dataset using 1 to 6 histories (or 
embedding dimension). 
 
US  
S&P500 
US 
NASDAQ100 
UK  
FTSE100 
INDIA 
BSE100 
KOREA 
KOSPI100 
Non bubble 
rejected 
Non bubble 
rejected 
Non bubble 
rejected 
Non bubble 
rejected 
Non bubble 
rejected 
Table 53 BDS independence test for price bubbles 
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All the null hypotheses of non bubble all rejected. This could mean the existence 
of bubbles even after controlling GARCH effects. However, since the null 
hypothesis is technically independent and with identical distribution of errors, 
the rejection can simply indicate some degree of remaining non-linearity in 
residuals.  
The summary table of the duration dependence tests on monthly returns are 
presented below.  
 
Index   Positive runs Negative runs 
US Ȝ -0.0171 
 
0.2388 
 
S&P500 ȝ 0.3177 
 
-0.1972 
 
 
LR 1.1870 
 
0.5742 
 
  p-value 0.2759   0.4486   
US Ƚ -0.1459 
 
-0.0105 
 
NASDAQ100 Ⱦ -0.0210 
 
0.1068 
 
 
LR 0.0066 
 
0.1233 
 
  p-value 0.9352   0.7255   
UK Ƚ -0.1242 
 
-0.1394 
 
FTSE100 Ⱦ 0.0011 
 
0.2882 
 
 
LR 0.0000 
 
0.8966 
 
  p-value 0.9968   0.3437   
INDIA Ƚ 0.1114 
 
-0.1993 
 
BSE100 Ⱦ -0.4934 ** 0.1202 
 
 
LR 4.3226 
 
0.1585 
 
  p-value 0.0376 
 
0.6906   
KOREA Ƚ -0.3793 
 
0.0256 
 
KOSPI200 Ⱦ 0.2475 
 
-0.0502 
 
 
LR 0.6467 
 
0.0220 
 
  p-value 0.4213   0.8822   
Table 54 Summary: the duration dependence tests on the monthly market indices 
3.2.6. Discussion  
The main discovery from the results of the duration dependence tests was that 
the Indian market in the sample period between 1987 and 2008 had price 
bubbles, which tend to grow further as their duration increases. This is in 
contrast to the research by Bhaduri (2009) who did not discover the bubbles on 
the data between 1990 and 2007. The main differences are the choice of normal 
return model and the market index used. He adopted a AR(4) specification 
without considering GARCH effects and used the BSE SENSEX index which is 
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constructed from the share price of 30 large firms on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange. It may be because the GJR-GARCH model on the BSE100 index in this 
study revealed the bubbles which may have resided in the other regional Indian 
markets. It is also possible that the inclusion of the data from 2008 when a 
sub-prime crisis severely hit the market made an impact on the results.  
Another reason for this bubble may be the Indian market being 
under-developed and thus it has stronger irrationality than developed markets 
like in the US and the UK. All three indices from the US and the UK in this section 
did not contain bubbles or other types of duration dependence. In addition, as 
seen in the research on the US data (Maheu and McCurdy, 2000, Lunde and 
Timmermann, 2004), excluding the decades of historical price data at the early 
stage of market development, previously-discovered bubbles disappeared. 
Moreover, even in the same geographical region, price bubbles were not 
discovered in the developed countries like Japan and Hong Kong (Chen and 
Shen, 2007), but appeared in developing markets such as Malaysia and China 
(Mokhtar et al., 2006, Zhang, 2008). However, using only recent data revealed 
the bubbles in the index in the developed market in the US S&P500 between 
2000 and 2007 (Yuhn et al., 2010). This shows that the recent sub-prime crisis 
was indeed a crash of a strong bubble.  
Irrationality or inefficiency may remain in the developed markets as well, 
although not in terms of (positive) price bubbles but regarding recoverability 
from the downturns in the stock markets. Positive duration dependence in 
negative runs could be evidence of it. It was discovered in a relatively developed 
market like the Korean stock market in this section, and also in the US and other 
Asian developed markets in the previous literature (Lunde and Timmermann, 
2004, Chen and Shen, 2007). Positive duration dependence in these cases means 
that negative runs tend to end earlier as their duration lengthens. This may 
represent irrationally quick recovery from market underperformance.  
On the other hand, negative duration dependence may not only be generated by 
irrationality. It can arise from rational bubbles as theoretically supported in 
Section 3.2.1. Thus, it may be difficult to make a conclusion about rationality or 
irrationality of the markets using the duration dependence tests. This is because 
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the tests are designed to detect specific characteristics of the price patterns that 
may or may not depend on rational expectation of investors despite the 
theoretical origins of the tests.   
In terms of the choice of return models, it seems that the constant return model 
and the constant mean GJR-GARCH model produced a slight difference in the 
number of durations counted and the values of the LR statistics although the 
concusion about duration dependence did not differ. Thus, the choice between  
different volatility models if they are similar in specification may not be critical. 
However, it is expected that different mean models provide relatively different 
results as it may affect more strongly on counted duration. Also, Harman and 
Zuelke (2004) pointed out that the choices of data frequency or the functional 
forms of hazard rates like between log logistic and Weibull functions may be 
able to affect the outcomes. 
The summary table of the results of weekly indices (Table 54) can provide some 
implications for the choice of frequency. The difference between weekly and 
monthly data (Table 54) in the dataset is marginal in this section. The price 
bubble in the Indian market was discovered in both cases and no bubble was 
found in three US and UK indices. The main difference is that negative duration 
dependence did not reside in the Korean monthly index. 
Another issue in using the duration dependence test is the loss of information 
during the process of converting abnormal returns into positive and negative 
runs. This is because the converting process is technically an approximation 
although it is what other pricing models similarly do. To be precise, some of the 
information in prices or returns is lost such as how strong the price or return 
movement in each run is and how those runs are connected with each other. 
They may be part of the time series structure of price movement or, more 
generally, any type of true information or structure about price determination, 
if any. What remain after the conversion are the lengths and the type of runs.   
Also, it should be noted that this study checked only one type of price bubbles 
which is based on the transition probabilities between positive and negative 
runs. That is, the duration dependence test is able to discover a bubble that 
grows with a decreaing rate of collapsing given a sample period. However, it 
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may be possible that the market was influenced by another type of bubble. As 
reviewed in the previous chapter, a bubble can be defined as deviation from the 
fundamentals like a dividend stream. If it grows without affecting the 
probabilities of collapsing, the duration dependence test cannot detect it. 
Conversely, it is also possible that the detected bubbles by the duration 
dependence test may be not a bubble in terms of other definitions. For instance, 
it may be possibly a wrong interpretation of historical price pattern.   
3.3. The detection of the changes in transition probability using the 
structural break based duration dependence test 
This section extends the duration dependence test for price bubbles in the 
previous section by incorporating structural breaks instead of market upturns 
and downturns. This newly devised Ǯstructural break based duration 
dependence testǯ essentially shows how the probability that the current data 
generating process (or its parameter values) persists changes as it lasts longer. 
If a specific market (dis)equilibrium is represented by a set of parameter values, 
a change in those values can be interpreted as a Ǯtransitionǯ between the market 
(dis)equilibrium. Then, Ǯtransition probabilityǯ can be the probability of the 
change in paramenter values or equivalently that of a new structural break. 
Subsequently, Ǯthe changes in transition probabilityǯ can be tested using 
duration dependence of a current set of parameter values. Also, this test can be 
a supplementary test to the original duration dependence test. In this context, 
the transition probability is a hazard rate in the duration dependence tests. 
The original test was designed to detect price bubbles and other types of 
duration dependence while assuming no change of a data generating process 
(i.e. the underlying process of returns) and its parameter values. It shows how 
the probability that the market turns the tide changes when the market stays in 
the bull or the bear markets longer. 
Permanent shocks to a data generating process can affect its parameter values. 
They are defined as Ǯstructural breaksǯ (Verbeek, 2004). In terms of the 
transitions in market dynamics, the structural breaks can roughly mean any of 
three changes: the equilibrium to the disequilibrium, the disequilibrium to the 
equilibrium and the disequilibrium to a different type of disequilibrium. This is 
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a simplification of the dynamic market equilibrium without specifying the 
models of the equilibrium price. It is an ad hoc approach for the interpretation 
of the test results only. Structural breaks technically mean the changes in the 
parameter values of a data generating process or its specification, which may 
exactly correspond to three types of transition between the (dis)equilibrium. 
The reason for this use is that structural breaks are easier to detect than the 
fundamentally unobservable equilibrium prices and they can approximate (the 
changes in price processes). However, a price process still needs to be estimated 
for empirical analysis. 
One of the simple methods to detect structural breaks is to find the significant 
changes in the coefficients in time series models. This is possible because pre- 
and post structural break periods are probably governed by different dynamics 
and can be empirically detected as different parameter values of a data 
generating processes or a new process. Then, Ǯrunsǯ can be re-defined as sample 
observations between those breaks, which share the same parameter values of 
the data generating process. ǮDurationǯ is still the time length of a run. 
Subsequently, the techniques of duration dependence tests using structural 
breaks can be applied to find the duration dependence of the probability of 
those changes in parameter values.  
If structural breaks randomly happen e.g. following binomial distribution of 
occurrence, the sample would not show any type of duration dependence given 
the probability that duration follows geometric distribution that leads to no 
duration dependence. However, if the occurrences of structural breaks are 
significantly and systematically affected by market forces, it may generate 
duration dependence and the distribution of duration deviates from geometric 
distribution.  
The interpretation of the significant duration dependence should be different 
from that in the original duration dependence test. Negative duration 
dependence now means that as a run continues there is less likelihood of a new 
structural break (i.e. new set of parameter values or new process). In other 
words, the transition probability between the market (dis)equilibrium reduces 
as the market stays longer in (dis)equilibrium. Unlike the original test, the 
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discovery of negative duration dependence is not directly or clearly linked to a 
price bubble. On the other hand, positive duration dependence implies that 
structural breaks are more likely to come in as a run lengthens. That is, the 
market is more likely to transit to new (dis)equilibrium as it stays longer in 
(dis)equilibrium.  
Little research has been done on examining duration data constructed from 
structural breaks for the duration dependence tests although many models are 
suggested as duration models (Tsay, 2005). Traditional research on a structural 
break focuses on statistically revealing unknown dates of breakpoints, as 
reviewed later. A similar empirical approach is the regime-switching model 
(Hamilton, 1989). It estimates the probability of switching among the limited 
number of regimes. In this context, this structural breaks based duration 
dependence test examines whether the changes in the probability that a regime 
(i.e. a run) ends is related to the duration of the regime. In this test, the number 
of regimes is not limited, but cannot specify which regime comes next.  
In the following parts of this section, it is investigated how to empirically find 
multiple structural breaks (and thus runs) and how to convert them into the 
series of duration data. Specifically, the findings of structural break literature 
are reviewed to develop the method of retrieving price runs from a primary 
time series of prices using linear piecewise regression. Then, new data of 
alternatively-defined durations are calculated and adopted for the structural 
break based duration dependence tests. Also, the forecasting ability of duration 
and related variables are tested.  
3.3.1. Structural breaks 
A Ǯstructural breakǯ is defined as the permanent change in the parameter values 
in the time series model (Verbeek, 2004) or broadly the change in mean value, 
volatility, or the autoregressive relation (Brooks, 2008). It may be due to the 
effects of microeconomic events, economic policies or other market forces, but 
randomness can create such breaks. Unlike a regime switch (or shift), a 
structural break is permanent and not reverting (Brooks, 2008). In summary, a 
permanent change in a parameter vector is a structural break (Clements et al., 
2006). As introduced, this section focuses on the changes in the parameter 
  
150 
 
values of a mean model, which are caused by non-reverting permanent shocks 
to a price process.  
If the date of a structural break is known a priori, a Chow breakpoint test (Chow, 
1960), a type of F test, can be conducted to investigate its significance over two 
sub-samples (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). If the date is unknown, the F statistics 
of all possible break dates can be used to date and test for a structural break 
(Verbeek, 2004). In addition, Andrews (1993) provided several test methods for 
one unknown break based on Wald, Lagrange and likelihood tests by Quandt 
(1960).    
Bai and Perron (1998) generalised dating and testing methods for multiple 
unknown breakpoints. Their setup of a pure structural change model in terms of 
price (P) is: 
฀t t j tP = x ȕ +İ  
where xt is a vector of explanatory variables, and Ⱦ and ɂ are the vectors of the 
coefficients and the error terms, respectively.  
Then, suppose T1ǡǥǡm are the breakpoints in T total observations and j is the 
index of structural segments or runs     ȋ é ?ǡǥǡ ? ?ȌǤ 	
each m, the locations of breakpoints are estimated by the following algorithm: 
1
1 1
...
,..., arg min[ ( ,..., )]
m
m mT T
T T RSS T T฀  
where arg min is the argument of minimum and RSS is the residual sum of 
squares of the above regression model. Optimal number and locations of m are 
obtained at the lowest value of the information criteria (Bai and Perron, 2003).  
Their method provides the algorithm to pick the number and locations of 
multiple structural breaks. Also, it is a more parsimonious approach to analyse a 
univariate time series of mean values than the other later methods. Moreover, 
the method itself contains a test for a break. It will be further detailed in the 
relevant section. 
On the other hand, more sophisticated test methods were also suggested. Bai 
and Perron (1998) presented a sup F test for no structural break against m 
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breaks and a likelihood ratio test for l breaks against l+1 breaks. This was 
further developed by allowing stochastic parameters of trend and structural 
changes in systems like VAR models (Hansen, 2000, Hansen, 2003, Hungnes, 
2010). Elliott (2003) suggested a statistic that allows for random, serially 
correlated or clustered breaks.  
CUSUM (cumulative sum) tests were originally designed to test the specification 
of linear models using accumulated errors (Brown et al., 1975). They are also 
available for a test for structural change (Stock, 1994). For example, Kramer 
(1988) showed they are valid in an autoregressive model, although it did not 
contain power against zero-mean regressors (Clements et al., 2006). Meanwhile, 
Kuan (1995)ǯ   
interpreting increasing fluctuation as evidence.  
3.3.2. Duration dependence tests based on structural breaks 
As introduced, a new applied duration dependence test is devised to find 
whether the transition probability between the market (dis)equilibrium 
depends on the time length of the market staying in (dis)equilibrium. It uses 
structural breaks as breakpoints to separate price runs for duration dependence 
tests instead of using the changes in the sign of abnormal returns from a mean 
model. In this sense, the new test may be an alternative to the original duration 
dependence tests since structural breaks, which were empirically observed in 
many previous studies e.g. Rapach and Wohar (2006), may invalidate the 
original test.  
The method of detecting structural breaks employed in this section is a simple 
version of Bai and Perronǯ (1998) method since it is the parsimonious 
approach depending on simple linear piecewise regression of prices. This 
assumes that a data generating process is linear in time which can roughly 
approximate any non-linear process. Subsequently, the durations are calculated 
and used for the duration dependence test. 
The basis of Bai and Perronǯs method is a piecewise regression model that splits 
data at pre-defined break dates and regresses a linear time trend model on each 
sub-sample (Brooks, 2008). For example, assuming two breaks of the original 
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process occur at time 30 and 60 of the whole sample period (t=0 to 90), the 
piecewise regression models of price (P) on time (t) for each sub-sample are: 
0)9t(60 
0)6t(30 
30)t(0  
,333
,222
,111
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Since each sub-sample now has fewer observations, there is a loss of 
information (Brooks, 2008). However, when sub-sample size is large enough to 
provide a regression model of good fit, it is not of great concern although some 
more sophisticated model may provide better in-sample fitness. Meanwhile, 
each linear price segment is able to represent a corresponding time trend in 
that particular time period. Thus, one time variable is enough to characterize 
each trend (Zeileis et al., 2002). It is also a popular method of fitting 
non-linearity (Campbell et al., 1997) as the model can represent a non-linear 
behaviour of data while each sub-model maintains linearity. 
In most of the cases, the breakpoints where structural breaks occur are 
unknown. Therefore, the matter of where to break the price series must be first 
dealt with (Campbell et al., 1997). For this, the aim of Bai and Perron (1998)ǯs 
method is to find the global minimisers of the objective function as explained 
above: 
)],...,([minarg,..., 1
...
1
`
mTTm
TTRSSTT
m
฀
 
This minimisation can be accomplished using a grid search. First of all, using 
one breakpoint (m=1), piecewise linear regressions are repeated on all possible 
sets of sub-samples. At each repetition, a different position of the breakpoints is 
chosen. For example, if the pre-specified minimum length of a segment is 20 in a 
sample of 200 observations, observation 20 is first chosen as a potential 
breakpoint and a piecewise regression is conducted for two sub-samples: 1-20 
and 21-200. Then, the next potential breakpoint, observation 21 is chosen, and 
two sub-samples, 1-21 and 22-200, are regressed based on the same model. 
Then, it continues until observation 180 is used.  
This whole procedure is repeated for all possible breakpoints, e.g. from one 
(m=1) to the maximum number of breakpoints (m=9), until the best locations of 
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breakpoints for each number of breakpoints are finally identified. The case of no 
break is also estimated. The number of operations required is of order O(Tm) 
which is the number of ordered list of Tm items. 
Finally, the best set of number and locations of breakpoints (Ǯoptimal 
breakpointsǯ) is selected by comparing information criteria like Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) as in Bai and Perron (1998). Information criteria are 
employed because it is possible to minimise RSS by simply adding more breaks. 
Optimal price runs are linear price segments between those retrieved optimal 
breakpoints.  
The burden of calculation can be minimised by the dynamic programming 
algorithm (Bai and Perron, 2003, Zeileis et al., 2003). The optimal breakpoints 
are obtained by solving the recursive problem: 
)],1()([min)(
,1, TiRSSTRSSTRSS imkTimkTm ฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀  
where RSS(Tm,T) is the residual sum of squares with optimal m breakpoints 
using T observations, RSS(i+1,T) is the residual sum of squares obtained by 
applying least-squares to a price run (i+1 to T), and i is the last breakpoint. The 
idea is to find the optimal previous partner for each breakpoint i (Zeileis et al., 
2003).  
Additionally, the minimum length of a price run can be restricted as in the 
example. It is commonly specified as the minimum proportion (h) of the sample 
size (T) e.g. h=2%. Then, the maximum number of breaks (k) is also decided by 
k=(T/hT)-1. For example, when the minimum size is 2% of a total 1000 
observations, the maximum number of breaks is 49 excluding the first and last 
observations.  
The decision of the minimum duration (h) of a price run for the algorithm of 
finding optimal breakpoints is also important although h is arbitrarily chosen 
for meaningful economic reasons. If the length is not correctly chosen, some of 
the breakpoints will be missed out or appear at wrong locations. The minimum 
duration of a run should be chosen to be smaller than the reasonably shortest 
distance between two breaks of true price processes. Otherwise, the duration 
data and the following duration dependence test may provide less reliable 
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results. However, true price generating processes or even exact locations of 
breaks are usually unknown in economics or finance data. The simple solution 
would be to choose as small a length as possible, but at the same time, it must be 
meaningfully long in terms of economic implications and to reduce computation 
burden. For example, one week gap between two breaks is not only of no 
importance in long-term weekly price data but also drastically increases 
analysis time.  
Once identifying the structural breakpoints, the durations of runs between the 
identified structural breaks can be easily counted. The original duration 
dependence tests for the bubble were required to separate runs into the groups 
of positive and negative runs. The same can be done by checking the sign of the 
slope of each price run.  
One methodological difference of this approach from the original test is that run 
data is able to include continual runs with the same sign. For example, it 
incorporates the possibility of a stronger positive run being followed by a 
weaker positive run while they are counted as separate runs. That is consistent 
with the objective of investigating probabilities regarding the transitions 
between the market (dis)equilibrium.  
3.3.3. Empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis of the actual market data is conducted as follows. The 
data for the empirical analysis used in this section is identical to the weekly 
price data used in Section 3.2.2. That is, 5 market indices from 4 different 
markets. The data is transformed into the logarithm. US S&P500 weekly index 
between 1979 and 2008 (1,566 observations) will be first examined and the 
other four indices are subsequently investigated. 8 weeks are selected as the 
minimum duration (h) in detecting structural breaks. This expects the 
maximum of around 6 structural breaks a year in weekly data. In the sample of 
1,566 observations, 195 breaks are possible at most. The R statistical package is 
employed for the analysis of structural breaks, and then Eviews is used 
thereafter.  
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The normal market movement of the price needs to be controlled similar to the 
original duration dependence test where a normal return model is adopted to 
calculate the runs of abnormal returns. This section utilises a constant return 
model over the whole sample period for its simplicity. The constant return 
model generated almost identical results to other GARCH-based models in the 
previous duration dependence tests. Equivalently, for the linear piecewise 
regression models of price in this section, price data is de-trended. It is possible 
that a de-trending method may have an impact on the detection of breakpoints. 
However, the study by Canova (1999) confirmed the robustness of the 
identified breaking points in the sample regardless of a de-trending method. As 
long as one method is used as the only de-trending rule, it does not affect the 
discovered breakpoints.  
The next task is to find out the optimal breakpoints and their positions as 
explained in the relevant section above. In the samples of S&P500, the 
maximum possible number of breaks is 195. The best positions of breakpoints 
for each case of 0 to 195 breaks were first detected based on the lowest RSS. 
Then, out of 196 sets of the best locations for each possible number of breaks, 
one set of breakpoints with the lowest BIC is picked up. As a result, optimal 
breakpoints and their locations are identified in the data. Figure 9 shows the 
values of BICs and RSSs under 70 breakpoints where the x axis is the number of 
observations. 
Table 55 detailed the values between 61 and 70. As the BIC is the lowest at 68, 
the number of optimal breakpoints in the US S&P500 data is 68. That also 
means that the price series can be best approximated by 69 linear price runs.  
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Figure 9 BIC and RSS at all optimal breakpoints under 70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 55 BIC and RSS between 61 to 70 breakpoints 
Finally, the duration of run data is obtained from structural breaks (Table 56). 
The maximum duration is 70 and the average duration is 22.70 which are 
longer than the original duration data. It reflects the nature of the much rarer 
occurrence of structural breaks than the reversion of the sign of abnormal 
returns. This is also partly due to the restriction on the minimum length of 
duration (8). The duration data is positively skewed, platykurtic and 
non-normal as expected from geometric distribution. 
m BIC RSS 
61 
62 
63        
64        
65        
66        
67        
68        
69 
70 
-6813.3403 
-6814.8244 
-6816.3256 
-6817.4590 
-6818.0505 
-6818.4628 
-6818.3955 
-6818.5014 
-6818.3442 
-6817.6990 
0.4935    
0.4862     
0.4790     
0.4719     
0.4651     
0.4585     
0.4521     
0.4457     
0.4395 
0.4336 
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Mean 22.6957 
Median 18 
S.D 13.6730 
Skewness 1.1777 
Kurtosis 1.0017 
Observations 1566 
Runs 69 
Table 56 Descriptive statistics of the duration data from structural breaks 
The duration data is relatively more dispersed than the original duration data, 
so it needs to be grouped before conducting the duration dependence test. The 
size of interval (i.e. bin) for grouping is 7; that is intended for the second bin to 
contain the mean similar to the case of the original duration dependence test. 
The duration data is also categorised into two sub-groups according to the sign 
of slope.  
The procedure for the duration dependence test is identical to Section 3.2.5. 
Both types of the counts of runs (Ni and Mi) are recorded and their sample 
hazard rates are calculated. The details of the procedure were explained in the 
same section. The test results of the duration data of US S&P 500 index is in the 
following Table 57: 
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
8 Ȃ 14 13 31 0.2955 
 
8 Ȃ 14 15 10 0.6000 
15 Ȃ 21 6 25 0.1935 
 
15 Ȃ 21 5 5 0.5000 
22 Ȃ 28 9 16 0.3600 
 
22 Ȃ 28 4 5 0.4444 
29 Ȃ 35 4 12 0.2500 
 
29 Ȃ 35 0 1 0.0000 
36 Ȃ 42 5 7 0.4167 
 
36 Ȃ 42 0 1 0.0000 
43 Ȃ 49 5 2 0.7143 
 
43 - 49 1 0 1.0000 
50 Ȃ 56 1 1 0.5000 
     
57 Ȃ 63 0 1 0.0000 
     
64 Ȃ 70 1 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -1.1475 0.3312 0.0005 
 
Ƚ 0.3841 6.50292 0.9529 Ⱦ 0.4532 0.3118 0.1460 
 
Ⱦ -0.5544 3.93172 0.8879 
LR statistic 2.5033 p-value 0.1136 
 
LR statistic 0.2616 p-value 0.6090 
Table 57 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: S&P500 
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In S&P500 index data, there is no evidence of negative or positive duration 
dependence in both positive run and negative run data. This also supports that 
it is likely that the structural breaks in S&P500 randomly occurred. No 
discovery of duration dependence is compatible with the original results, but 
the interpretation is that there is no relationship between the duration of the 
market staying in one (dis)equilibrium and the probability that it transits to the 
new (dis)equilibrium. Simply, it means that the length of a run is not related to 
the occurrence of the next structural break.   
Now, the analysis is extended to cover the rest of the market indices. First, 
NASDAQ index (Table 58) is revealed to have 56 structural breaks. The duration 
data shows no indication of negative duration dependence, but it contains the 
evidence of positive dependence duration in positive runs, which was not 
discovered in the early duration data. As price runs are extended, they have 
higher probability of ending the positive runs i.e. meeting a new structural 
break and moving to other (dis)equilibrium. It may be because market forces 
rather than randomness strongly worked in the market. The result is supported 
by the fact that the non-monotonic sample distribution of duration fairly 
deviates away from geometric distribution.  
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
8 - 14 4 25 0.1379 
 
8 - 14 9 19 0.3214 
15 - 21 9 16 0.3600 
 
15 - 21 7 12 0.3684 
22 - 28 4 12 0.2500 
 
22 - 28 8 11 0.4211 
29 - 35 4 8 0.3333 
 
29 - 35 3 1 0.7500 
36 - 42 3 5 0.3750 
 
36 - 42 1 0 1.0000 
43 - 49 2 3 0.4000 
     
50 - 56 2 1 0.6667 
     
57 - 63 1 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -1.6349 0.7419 0.0275 
 
Ƚ -0.8674 1.2147 0.4752 Ⱦ 0.8463** 0.7870 0.2822 
 
Ⱦ 0.7305 1.1502 0.5253 
LR statistic 5.5894 p-value 0.0181 
 
LR statistic 2.2897 p-value 0.1302 
Table 58 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: NASDAQ100 
In the UK FTSE100 index data, 77 breaks were identified. It does not display 
negative and positive durations in both positive and negative runs (Table 59). 
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The same conclusion was reached in the analysis of the original duration data. It 
supports no relationship between duration and structural breaks (or the 
transition between the (dis)equilibrium). 
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
8 - 14 18 29 0.3830 
 
8 - 14 11 11 0.5000 
15 - 21 10 19 0.3448 
 
15 - 21 5 6 0.4545 
22 - 28 8 11 0.4211 
 
22 - 28 2 5 0.2857 
29 - 35 6 5 0.5455 
 
29 - 35 4 0 1.0000 
36 - 42 3 2 0.6000 
     
43 - 49 1 1 0.5000 
     
50 - 56 1 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.6114 0.5865 0.2972 
 
Ƚ -0.1282 1.2253 0.9167 Ⱦ 0.4119 0.7554 0.5856 
 
Ⱦ 0.2706 1.0415 0.7950 
LR statistic 1.5726 p-value 0.2098 
 
LR statistic 0.2103 p-value 0.6465 
Table 59 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: FTSE100 
The Indian market index (BSE100) shows 62 breaks in the sample period and 
the significant positive duration dependence is discovered in positive runs 
(Table 60). This evidence is different from the early findings of price bubbles, 
and implies the increasing transition probability between the (dis)equilibrium 
when the market stays longer in (dis)equilibrium in bull markets. There is also 
seemingly strong deviation from geometric distribution in positive runs. 
Negative runs do not contain duration dependence.  
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
8 - 14 9 26 0.2571 
 
8 - 14 18 10 0.6429 
15 - 21 8 18 0.3077 
 
15 - 21 3 7 0.3000 
22 - 28 12 6 0.6667 
 
22 - 28 2 7 0.2222 
29 - 35 4 2 0.6667 
 
29 - 35 2 3 0.4000 
36 - 42 2 0 1.0000 
 
36 - 42 3 0 1.0000 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -1.2877 0.5974 0.0311 
 
Ƚ 0.3456 0.5274 0.5122 Ⱦ 1.4821*** 0.8020 0.0646 
 
Ⱦ -0.5962 0.4846 0.2186 
LR statistic 10.9241 p-value 0.0009 
 
LR statistic 1.5806 p-value 0.2087 
Table 60 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: BSE100 
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Last, KOSPI200 has 53 breaks and shows positive duration dependence only in 
negative runs. Positive runs do not contain any type of duration dependence. 
Both are the same result as the original tests. It seems that the probability of a 
structural break occurring becomes higher as a bear market lasts longer. The 
distribution of negative runs shows fair deviation from geometric distribution. 
 
Positive runs 
 
Negative runs 
Duration Ni Mi hi  
Duration Ni Mi hi 
8 - 14 9 16 0.3600 
 
8 - 14 8 20 0.2857 
15 - 21 8 8 0.5000 
 
15 - 21 13 7 0.6500 
22 - 28 3 5 0.3750 
 
22 Ȃ 28 3 7 0.3000 
29 - 35 3 2 0.6000 
 
29 Ȃ 35 4 0 1.0000 
36 - 42 2 0 1.0000 
     
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value 
 
Coefficient Estimate S.D p-value Ƚ -0.6076 2.6527 0.8188 
 
Ȝ -0.7919 0.7929 0.3180 Ⱦ 0.7203 2.2252 0.7462 
 
ȝ 1.1950** 0.8159 0.1430 
LR statistic 2.0088 p-value 0.1564 
 
LR statistic 4.8321 p-value 0.0279 
Table 61 The results of structural break based duration dependence tests: KOSPI200 
The summary of the above duration dependence tests are presented in the next 
table (Table 62). Note the value of Ƚ does not have an impact on either type of 
duration dependence. The differences from the results of the original duration 
dependence tests are that more positive duration dependence was discovered 
while no negative duration dependence was found. To be precise, NASDAQ and 
Indian indices have positive duration dependence in positive runs that were not 
discovered in the original durations. Meanwhile, the Korean market Index has 
positive duration dependence in negative runs which was found in the previous 
tests. S&P500 and FTSE100 also brought the same results of no duration 
dependence as before.  
Additional tests are conducted with pooled data of a total of 320 durations 
which combined all runs in five market indices into two duration series, one 
positive run and the other negative runs. This is to investigate the general 
tendency in the data set using more observations, and the results are presented 
in the same table. The pooled data shows the existence of positive duration 
dependence in positive runs and no such dependence in negative runs. In 
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general, extending positive runs may bring the next structural break as a 
transition between (dis)equilibrium earlier. 
  
Index   Positive runs Negative runs 
US Ƚ -1.1475 
 
0.3841 
 
S&P500 Ⱦ 0.4532 
 
-0.5544 
 
 
LR 2.5033 
 
0.2616 
 
  p-value 0.1136   0.6090   
US Ƚ -1.6349 
 
-0.8674 
 
NASDAQ100 Ⱦ 0.8463 ** 0.7305 
 
 
LR 5.5894 
 
2.2897 
 
  p-value 0.0181   0.1302   
UK Ƚ -0.6114 
 
-0.1282 
 
FTSE100 Ⱦ 0.4119 
 
0.2706 
 
 
LR 1.5726 
 
0.2103 
 
  p-value 0.2098   0.6465   
INDIA Ƚ -1.2877 
 
0.3456 
 
BSE100 Ⱦ 1.4821 *** -0.5962 
 
 
LR 10.9241 
 
1.5806 
 
  p-value 0.0009   0.2087   
KOREA Ƚ -0.6076 
 
-0.7919 
 
KOSPI200 Ⱦ 0.7203 
 
1.1950 ** 
 
LR 2.0088 
 
4.8321 
 
  p-value 0.1564   0.0279   
Pooled Ƚ -3.2413 
 
-2.3801 
 
 
Ⱦ 0.2178 *** 0.0797 
 
 
LR 7.3904 
 
0.6682 
 
  p-value 0.0066   0.4137   
Table 62 The summary of structural break based duration dependence tests 
In conclusion, it was discovered that as price runs extend in some of the sample 
markets, they are more likely to be faced with structural breaks that are 
represented by the changes in parameter values. In other words, an extending 
run leads to the higher transition probability between the market 
(dis)equilibrium. This is particularly dominant in positive runs.  
3.3.4. Forecasting duration and direction 
On the other hand, the test can tell how likely it is for the market to be met by 
the next structural break as the run extends. However, unlike the original 
duration dependence tests, the test in this section cannot tell what will happen 
after a structural break as many types of runs with different parameter values 
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may follow. This sub-section investigates whether it is possible to predict the 
changes in the duration of runs and the direction of price movement. The 
autoregressive model of duration and the price change and duration model 
(PCD) are examined. 
The brief inspection of the duration (d) series of S&P500 index data shows that 
it may be possible to build a time series model of duration for the purpose of at 
least predicting the length of the next run. The ACF and PACF of duration series 
show strong autocorrelation and partial auto correlation in small lags (Table 63) 
where Ǯ^ǯ indicates 5% level significance and Ǯ^^ǯ indicates autocorrelation 
higher than 0.2. Their patterns suggest a certain ARMA structure like AR(1). In 
the mean time, the existence of a unit root is rejected by the ADF test with no lag. 
The null hypothesis of the variance ratio test is rejected at the 5% significance 
level with the max|z| statistic of 2.8348.  
 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  ACF   PACF  Q-Stat  p-value 
       
       
        |^^           |^^    1 0.365 0.365 9.6063 0.002 
        |^^            |     2 0.251 0.136 14.230 0.001 
        |            |      3 0.102 -0.032 15.000 0.002 
        |             |      4 -0.054 -0.131 15.219 0.004 
        |            |      5 -0.110 -0.078 16.150 0.006 
        |            |      6 -0.044 0.062 16.301 0.012 
        |            |      7 -0.189 -0.171 19.118 0.008 
        |            |      8 -0.064 0.047 19.451 0.013 
        |            |      9 -0.180 -0.158 22.086 0.009 
        |            |      10 -0.132 -0.025 23.538 0.009 
        |            |      11 -0.059 0.028 23.835 0.013 
        |            |      12 0.000 0.028 23.835 0.021 
Table 63 The ACF and PACF of duration: S&P500 
Grid search for the ARMA structure based on SIC up to 5th lag found that the 
AR(1) process has the lowest value of SIC.  
Equation 13 
1t t td d฀ ฀ ฀฀฀ ฀ ฀ 
where Ƚ and Ⱦ are the coefficients. The estimation result is: 
1
Ö 22.1865 0.3681
      (2.4421)   (0.1131)
t td d ฀฀  ฀  
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R2 is 0.1382, Adjusted R2 is 0.1251, DW is 2.0418 and SIC is 8.0170. The 
standard errors of the coefficients are in brackets and the standard error of 
regression is 12.7105.The AR term is significant at the 5% level.  
The ACF and PACF of the residual series do not contain autocorrelation (Table 
64) and the BDS test cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level, but the 
variance ratio test shows there is still remaining predictability in the series with 
the max|z| statistic of 3.6961 and the normality is also rejected with a JB 
statistic of 17.3127. That is, there is a certain amount of predictability in terms 
of general departure from random walk. In the RESET test, adding the squared 
fitted values of the AR(1) model is significant with the t statistic of the fitted 
variable of 2.59 at the 5% level.  
 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
       |             | 1 -0.030 -0.030 0.0646 0.799 
       |             |     2 0.159 0.158 1.8882 0.389 
       |             |    3 0.024 0.034 1.9310 0.587 
       |             |    4 -0.042 -0.067 2.0627 0.724 
       |             |     5 -0.117 -0.134 3.0971 0.685 
       |             |     6 0.085 0.099 3.6580 0.723 
       |             |     7 -0.188 -0.146 6.4252 0.491 
       |             |     8 0.069 0.040 6.7992 0.558 
       |             |     9 -0.136 -0.109 8.2874 0.505 
       |             |     10 -0.087 -0.104 8.9025 0.541 
       |             |     11 -0.063 -0.037 9.2367 0.600 
       |             |     12 0.063 0.068 9.5731 0.653 
Table 64 The ACF and PACF of the residuals from AR(1) of duration: S&P500 
The following figure is the actual (red) and the forecasted (blue) values based 
on the dynamic forecasting using the last 10 observations as out-of-sample. This 
method uses the forecasted values for the subsequent forecasted values.  
It seems that the trend of duration is fairly well predicted. However, R2 is low 
(0.1382) and the standard error of regression is high (12.7105), but its Theil 
inequality coefficient, or U statistic, (0.2516) is lower than that of the 
benchmark constant duration model (0.2958). That is, the AR(1) model is a 
better fit in terms of forecasting. Also, root mean squared errors (RMSE) and 
mean absolute errors (MAE) are smaller in the AR(1) model of duration than the 
benchmark (12.5018 vs. 14.4153 and 10.9294 vs. 12.2391). 
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Figure 10 The actual duration (red) vs. forecasted duration (blue): S&P500 
The used measures of the accuracy of forecasts are (Brooks, 2008): 
Equation 14 Root mean squared error (RMSE) 
2
1
( ) /
T h
t
t T
y y h
฀
฀  ฀ 
฀฀  
Equation 15 Mean absolute error (MAE) 
1
| | /
T h
t
t T
y y h
฀
฀  ฀ 
฀฀  
Equation 16 Theil inequality coefficient 
2 2 2
1 1 1
( ) / / /
T h T h T h
t t
t T t T t T
y y h y h y h
฀ ฀ ฀
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀
฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
where h  is the number of out-of-sample observations and T is the number of  
in-sample observations. y is actual values and y is forecasted values.  
On the other hand, the estimation and forecasting procedure is repeated for the 
log series of duration since it can give information about the percentage changes 
for the percentage changes between the current and past duration. As expected 
from the nature of log transformation, the informal test of the ACF and PACF 
and the formal grid search using the SIC indicates the AR(1) model for log 
duration.  
1ln lnt t td d฀ ฀ ฀฀฀ ฀ ฀ 
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1ln 2.9382 0.3524ln
          (0.1002)  (0.1139)
t td d ฀฀  ฀  
R2 is 0.1266, Adjusted R2 is 0.1134, DW is 2.0326 and SIC is 1.6793. The 
standard error of regression is 0.5345. The AR term is significant at the 5% 
level.  
 
Figure 11 The actual log duration (red) vs. forecasted log duration (blue): S&P500 
The MSE, MAE and Theil inequality coefficient are 0.5573, 0.5087 and 0.0939. 
As a benchmark, the constant log duration model is estimated and forecasted 
using the same method. The values of the aggregated measures of forecast 
errors are: 0.6152 0.5562 and 0.1042. It indicates that the AR(1) model 
performed better.  
The above results indicate that there is to some degree forecasting power of the 
autoregressive (log) duration models where duration data is obtained using 
structural breaks. However, the duration data is integer data in nature, and is 
not synchronous with time and its population distribution may be geometric. 
Therefore, a different approach can be considered to raise the explaining and 
forecasting power of a duration based time series model. For example, there are 
discrete variate time series models (McKenzie, 2003), autoregressive 
conditional duration (ACD) models (Engle and Russell, 1998, Tsay, 2005) or 
limited dependent variable models like ordered probit models (Brooks, 2008).  
A price change and duration (PCD) model was originally devised to estimate the 
duration between trades and price changes in intraday transactions data by 
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McCulloch (2001). It models the price changes over irregular time intervals 
(Tsay, 2005): 
For the ith price change, 
1i i i iP P direct S฀฀ ฀ ฀ 
where direct is 1 for positive price changes and -1 for negative changes and S is 
the size (or height) of the price change as multiples of tick. Since there are 
trades with no price change in transactions data, duration data is calculated 
between trades with price changes. This is fairly equivalent to the calculation of 
duration between structural breaks in the long-term data.  
Then, McCulloch (2001) argued that the log duration can be estimated using the 
following model by a multiple linear regression: 
1 1 2 1ln lnt t t td d S฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ 
This specification can be employed for the duration model in this chapter. The 
difference is that this model additionally contains the size (S) data. It can be 
calculated by multiplying the value of the slope coefficient of a run between 
structural breaks by the corresponding duration.    
The estimation results are: 
1 1
Öln 2.0102 0.3459ln 0.0150
          (0.3647)  (0.1143)          (0.0167)
t t td d S฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀  
R2 is 0.1372, Adjusted R2 is 0.1107, DW is 1.9997 and SIC is 1.7291. The 
standard error of regression is 0.5353.  
The AR term is significant at the 5% level, but the size term is not significant. 
Although an additional term is added, this model does not explain the variation 
of log duration better than the model without size term. This is comparable with 
the result by Tsay (2005) where he used the model on the 1 day intraday 
transactions data of one firm. The size term was not significant.  
However, in terms of forecasting accuracy, it is slightly better: RMSE is 0.5310, 
MAE is 0.4759 and Theil inequality coefficient is 0.0891.  
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Figure 12 The actual log duration (red) vs. forecasted log duration (blue) with added size variable: 
S&P500 
The structural break based duration dependence model cannot independently 
predict the next price movement. On the other hand, the PCD model can provide 
the method of estimating the direction of price movement from the data of 
duration and direction (McCulloch and Tsay, 2001). Their method can be 
employed to predict which price movement follows after a structural break. To 
check the forecasting ability of the PCD, the following model for the direction of 
price movement is constructed using their specification: 
( )i i idirect sign z฀  ฀ ฀  ฀  
where z is a random variable that follows N(0,1), Ɋ is the mean of direct and ɐ is 
its standard deviation, and sign is the sign of the equation in brackets.  
It can be said that the direction of price movement in the PCD model is governed 
by a normal random variable (Tsay, 2005). The model specifications for the 
mean and standard deviation are: 
1 1 2[ ] lni i i iE direct direct d฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
3 1 2 3 4ln( ) | |i i i i idirect direct direct direct฀  ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
Generalised linear regressions are used to estimate the parameter values for 
two models. The use of 4 lags can mitigate the impact from the frequent 
reversions of directions. The direction data is obtained by checking the sign of 
the slope coefficients of price runs in the dataset in this chapter.  
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The estimation results of the mean model of direction: 
 
Variable Coefficient S.E  p-value   
Constant -1.8858 0.5921  0.0014 
directi-1 -0.1059 0.1181  0.3698 
lndi 0.7403 0.2003  0.0002 
Mean dependent variable 0.2647    S.D. of dependent variable 0.9715 
Sum squared residuals 52.2501    Log likelihood -87.5642 
AIC 2.6637    SIC 2.7616 
Deviance statistic 0.8038    Deviance 52.2502 
LR statistic 13.6657    Restricted deviance 63.2353 
Pearson SSR 52.2502    Prob(LR statistic) 0.0011 
Dispersion 0.8038    Pearson statistic 0.8038 
Table 65 The estimation results of the mean equation of direction (direct): S&P500 
 
Figure 13 Residual, actual and fitted values of the PCD model of direction  
Log duration is significant, but the autoregressive term of direction is not 
significant. It seems that this model does not have strong explanation power. 
Then, the fitted values are calculated by converting the fitted mean values to 
binary direction data (Figure 14). 55% of fitted directions match with the actual 
directions. Using a binomial test for significance in Section 3.2.4 its z statistic is 
0.7034 and p-value is 0.2266. That is, this probability is not statistically 
different from 0.5 (50%). The forecasting ability is limited and it may be due to 
a small sample size.    
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Figure 14 Actual (red) and fitted (blue) values of direction: S&P500 
Finally, the forecasted values are plotted along with the actual values in Figure 
15. Only 5 directions are correctly forecasted. However, with only 10 
observations of binary data as out-of-sample, it may be difficult to distinguish 
the forecasting power. The PCD model may be a more suitable approach with 
high-frequency data. Tsayǯs (2005) model with 194 observations provides a 
marginally significant past direction term.  
 
Figure 15 Actual (red) and forecasted (blue) values of direction: S&P500 
The log standard deviation equation is also estimated for completion: 
1 2 3 4ln( ) 0.1489 | |
              (0.0392)
i i i i idirect direct direct direct฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ฀  
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 Coefficient S.E  p-value   Ⱦ3 -0.1489 0.0392  0.0001 
Mean dependent variable -0.4273    S.D. dependent variable 0.7237 
Sum squared residuals 37.048    Log likelihood -73.9647 
AIC 2.3066    SIC 2.3401 
Deviance statistic 0.5789    Deviance 37.0485 
Pearson statistic 0.5789    Pearson SSR 37.0485 
Dispersion 0.5789  
Table 66 The estimation results of the standard deviation equation 
In summary, the forecasting abilities of the autoregressive duration models are 
based on structural breaks. Although the standard errors of regression seem 
rather high, it may be possible to predict the next duration after a structural 
break to some degree. Other duration models like the ACD models (Engle and 
Russell, 1998) could be tested as alternatives for forecasting.  
The PCD model was tested for its forecasting ability for both duration and 
direction data. Although the results with duration data were slightly better than 
the autoregressive duration models in terms of forecasting accuracy, the results 
with direction data are rather disappointing. This is because it basically 
attempts to predict a binary series with a linear regression method. Similar 
weakness to the linear probability models may happen in the PCD models such 
as unbounded prediction (Brooks, 2008). Moreover, only the contemporaneous 
duration term was significant not the lagged duration variable. However, the 
validity of the PCD model cannot be easily defied just because of weak 
predictability of direction. The PCD model contains other regression models for 
the number of trades with no price change, those with price change and the size 
of the changes. They can be jointly estimated.  
However, in terms of forecasting the direction of the next run, it may be wiser to 
rely on other limited dependent (or binary) variable models if the concern is 
only the direction. Otherwise, such forecasting can be dependent on other 
non-duration based time series models.  
3.3.5. Discussion  
This section developed an applied duration dependence test based on structural 
breaks that aims to find the changes in the probability that a run ends by a 
structural break as the run extends. It was discovered that as a price run is 
extended, there was positive duration dependence in positive or negative runs 
  
171 
 
in some market indices as in Table 62. In other words, in those markets, the 
transition probability to another type of market (dis)equilibrium becomes 
higher as the market stays in (dis)equilibrium longer. In terms of structural 
breaks, the probability of a new structural break that comes with a new set of 
parameter values increases as a run with the same parameter values continues.   
An advantage of the structural break based duration dependence test can 
fundamentally accommodate the changes in the parameter values of data 
generating processes or the processes themselves because of linear 
approximation. However, it creates another disadvantage in that the test relies 
on the legitimacy of discovered structural breaks. For example, a structural 
break can be incorrectly detected if a true price process contains long term 
swings. To mitigate this issue, it may be possible that instead of a simple 
constant return model, an autoregressive model is used. In this case, a different 
detecting method e.g. Stock (1994), may be required. Another caveat is that this 
test cannot tell whether the market transits from the equilibrium to the 
disequiblirum or the other way round, or simply it transits between different 
types of market disequilibrium. It is able to only tell how it is likely to see 
another transition and how this probability changes. For future research, a new 
method needs to be added to distinguish different types of structural breaks. 
For example, by specifying the market equilibrium by stationary price 
movement. It may become feasible to see if a particular structural break means 
a transition from or to the market equilbirum.  
On the other hand, the autoregressive duration models and the PCD models 
were tested for the forecasting ability of the next duration or direction of runs. 
Both the former and the latter models for duration provided some moderatly 
significant results. However, the latter model for direction may be not a 
reasonable choice with the duration data from structural breaks in long-term 
data.   
The structural break based duration dependence test can give more insights 
about long term market dynamics when combined with the results of the 
original duration dependence test. The new test assumes that data generating 
processes (or their parameter values) change at structural breaks and 
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approximates them in the longer-term. Run data are essentially the 
approximated price processes. On the other hand, the original duration 
dependence test supposes that a data generating process does not change and 
uses the residuals from the process to generate runs. Its runs are shorter-term 
based. The difference can be seen in that the length of a run in this section is 
about 20 weeks on average, but that of the original series is around 2 weeks.  
Then, the combined interpretation of the results from two tests can be done. For 
example, using the same data set, price bubbles (i.e. negative duration 
dependence in positive runs of abnormal returns) were discovered in the Indian 
market, and at the same time positive duration dependence in positive runs 
between structural breaks was revealed. These results can be interpreted as: a 
run of abnormal returns from a price process was extended with lower 
probability of ending, but such a price generating process that produced 
negative duration dependence was more likely to be broken in the long-term as 
the run of the same price generating process continues. In other words, it can be 
said that the long-run sustainability of periodic bubble epidemics was weak in 
the Indian market. Similarly in the Korean market, positive duration 
dependence was discovered in both the negative runs of abnormal returns and 
the spells between structural breaks. Then, it can mean that the fast recovery of 
the Korean market from bear markets was not persistent in the long term. 
However, it should be noted that a structural break may invalidate the findings 
using one price generating process. 
3.4. Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter investigated stock price bubble theories and the detection of them 
as one type of long-term market disequilibrium. It adopted the duration 
dependence test for price bubbles and used it to detect bubbles and other types 
of duration dependence of price runs in the market data that were not 
thoroughly investigated by the literature that used the same method. Then, the 
unconditional probability that a price run continues or ends was estimated. In 
addition, the changes in the probability that a price process meets the next 
structural break were investigated. That can be interpreted as the change in the 
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transition probability between the market (dis)equilibrium. A new duration 
dependence test was devised for this.  
The findings are summarised as follows. The empirical analysis used the 
datasets of 5 market indices from various regions. The evidence of bubbles and 
other duration dependences were discovered in the Indian and the Korean stock 
indices. The probabilities that a price run continues or ends were estimated 
based on geometric and binomial distributions. They are significantly different 
from 0.5. Positive runs of abnormal returns tended to last slightly longer except 
in the Korean market. Then, the rule of thumb for price bubbles was developed 
and applied to empirical data to show that some markets are highly prone to 
develop positive price bubbles than negative ones. Then, structural breaks were 
introduced to retrieve another type of price run and its duration dependence. 
Positive duration dependence was discovered in the NASDAQ, the Indian and 
the Korean stock markets. That can tell that the market was more likely to be 
faced with a structural break when a price process (or its parameter values) 
persists longer in the sample data. In other words, it may be more likely to cause 
a transition to another market (dis)equilibrium.  
On the other hand, this chapter applied several statistical tests designed for 
different financial theories to the same dataset. One issue is that significance 
results in a separate statistical test may support a different financial theory. 
Technically, this is because each test adopts a different set of the null and 
alternative hypotheses from the other tests. For example, Section 3.2 used two 
tests. One estimated unconditional transition probabilities between positive and 
negative runs using the geometric distribution of duration while the other 
estimated conditional probabilities using a logistic hazard function of duration 
depedence. The significance results in the latter test are able to defy the results 
of the former tests. From the same perspective, if structural breaks are 
significantly discovered, it is able to deny the statistical results that do not 
assume the existence of structural breaks. In this study, the results in Section 
3.3 can be evidence agaist the findings in the earlier section. However, statistical 
tests in nature contain the possibility of commiting errors represented by 
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significance level, so it may be better to present all the results although they are 
based on different statistical hypotheses and financial theories.   
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Conclusions 
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4. Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated the topic of market disequilibrium from two 
different perspectives. This conclusion chapter summarises all the theoretical 
and empirical findings in each of the main chapters and briefly explains how 
they contribute to academics and professionals. Final remarks are added at the 
end of this chapter.  
Chapter 2 aimed to compare two hypotheses about the impact of multiple 
market makers on intraday price; increased resilience and improved efficiency. 
It first reviewed past literature about how the impact of multiple market makers 
was theoretically investigated and what empirical evidence was found. Then, it 
presented the simple neoclassical market making model that provided more 
insights into how the market making model can be connected to two empirical 
hypotheses. The empirical decision criteria were set in Table 1.  
In the empirical analysis, the comparison was made between a single market 
maker system of the NYSE (Group A of the sample firms) and a multiple market 
maker system of the NASDAQ (Group B). 5-minute intraday price and return 
series of the firms in S&P SmallCap600 indices were used. Then, the statistical 
and econometrical characteristics of real market intraday data were examined. 
In particular, descriptive statistics, non-stationarity of price as the existence of 
unit roots, the predictability based on variance ratio tests in different gaps,  
autocorrelations, time series structure and non-linear dependence in mean and 
variance including GARCH specification are analysed. Also, where appropriate, it 
examined the empirical evidence for inventory control models and adverse 
information models.  
The empirical analysis revealed that non-stationarity in price was lower and 
predictability in return was higher with multiple market makers than a single 
market maker. The differences were statistically significant. These findings 
support the increased resilience hypothesis. However, both intraday return 
series showed its distribution was leptokurtic and non-normal. Other 
descriptive statistics including return volatility did not support either 
hypothesis. The investigation of autocorrelation, and mean and volatility models 
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did not reveal any significant difference between two market making systems 
and two empirical hypotheses. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that multiple market makers increase the market 
disequilibrium. That is, they are stronger than a single market maker in terms of 
their ability to hold the prices against potential adverse information and to keep 
the disequilibrium prices until more information is revealed. At the same time, 
their strategic interactions may actually constrain instant price adjustment to 
the adverse information. 
Empirical evidence for market making models was not relatively strong. Only 
generally strong non-stationarity supports the adverse information models. The 
sign of autocorrelation, which characterises the difference between adverse 
information and inventory control models, was mixed at different lags. That is, 
at 1st lag, the significant positive autocorrelation was found possibly due to 
adverse information, but the relatively weaker but significant negative 
autocorrelation was discovered in the following lags because of probably 
inventory control. On the other hand, the autocorrelation of returns of firms 
under a single market maker system was significantly higher at lag 4 (the 
largest lag investigated). It is likely that a single market maker takes longer in 
inventory control than multiple market makers. It may show the weaker power 
of a single market maker, which actually somehow supports the increased 
resilience hypothesis.  
Common empirical findings in all groups of firms are as follows. Most price 
series contained unit roots i.e. they are non-stationary, but the variance ratios 
confirmed the overall predictability of the return series discovered in price 
series. That is, the intraday price series are non-stationary but not random 
walks. The ACFs and PACFs of the return series revealed significant 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation over several lags. The identified 
time series structure of the return series was, on average, ARMA(1,1).  
Volatility was modelled and tested to find the difference of two market making 
systems and to verify the earlier empirical findings in the previous literature. 
The ARMA(1,1) - GARCH(1,1) model of absolute returns was constructed along 
with several dummy variables. They represent well-known leverage effects in 
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volatility and intraday seasonality in both mean and volatility processes. 
Another new dummy was added to represent a market makerǯs over and 
under-estimation of shocks. A seasonally adjusted ARMA(1,1) was used to 
specify a market makerǯs estimation. The findings were that the ARMA structure 
in the GARCH model was not present but the GARCH terms were all significant. 
Unlike the earlier literature, the leverage effects were not found. Instead, the 
new dummy was significant and that may show a market makerǯs overreaction 
to higher-than-estimated returns.  
This chapter provides new evidence for the increased resilience hypothesis 
which can contribute to the market microstructure literature regarding the 
price impact of multiple market makers. It is that more market makers can 
actually increase the market disequilibrium. In addition, new evidence that a 
market makerǯs under-estimation may increase volatility was provided. Also, 
the significance of seasonality in mean and volatility were confirmed, but the 
presence of leverage effects was denied. On the other hand, it provided many 
findings about various empirical properties about intraday day price and return 
data. In addition, it presented the summary characteristics of the identified 
structures of mean return and volatility models under two different market 
making systems. They can be used as references for future research.   
Chapter 3 first investigated the detecting method of a price bubble as a 
long-term disequilibrium at the financial market level. It adopted the duration 
dependence tests as the main method. The duration dependence is observed 
when the length of a run (duration) of abnormal returns has a positive or 
negative relationship with the probability that the run ends. Negative duration 
dependence is consistent with the common concept of stock bubbles and the 
probabilistic rational bubble model. Meanwhile, positive duration dependence 
may represent the faster breaks of a price run.  
The data used for empirical analysis was 5 different stock index data of the 
recent 19-30 years. The GJR-GARCH model with constant mean return was 
identified as the better fit than other simple models, but the leverage effect was 
not discovered in the Indian stock market. The duration dependence tests on 
the residuals from this model revealed negative duration dependence in 
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positive runs (i.e. price bubbles) for the Indian market index between 1987 and 
2008 and positive duration dependence in negative runs in the Korean market 
index between 1990 and 2008. 
If the probability distribution of duration is supposed to follow a geometric 
distribution, the unconditional probability that a run continues and ends can be 
estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation method. The probability of 
a positive run continuing ranged between 0.52 and 0.57 and that of a negative 
run was between 0.45 and 0.56. Most of the probabilities are significantly 
different from 0.5. The estimated duration of both types of run was 
approximately 2. Then, using this and its standard deviations, the simple rule of 
thumb was devised to detect historical bubbles. Around twice as many positive 
bubbles were detected than negative bubbles in the sample markets except 
Korea.  
The concept of structural break was combined with the duration dependence 
test as a new method of modelling the relationship between the probability that 
a data generating process or its parameter values significantly change (i.e. 
structural break) and the duration of the process (i.e. the length of a run). This 
test is able to accommodate those changes rather easily due to its nature of 
linear approximation. It can also incorporate non-linearity.  
If a price run is roughly interpreted as deviation from or restoration of the 
equilibrium or the transition between the disequilibrium, the test results may 
be interpreted regarding the changes in the transition probability between the 
market (dis)equilibrium. For example, positive duration dependence of price 
runs shows the probability that the market (dis)equilibrium transits to other 
market (dis)equilibrium becomes larger as the duration gets longer. The 
empirical analysis revealed that the NASDAQ and the Indian markets have 
positive duration dependence in positive runs and the Korean market had it in 
negative runs. However, the test results cannot be properly used as a tool for 
prediction although the empirical analysis showed that the series of duration 
contained a univariate time series structure.  
Chapter 3 provided several new methods of investigating market disequilibrium 
and bubbles and new evidence regarding them. The estimation method of 
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unconditional probability that a price run of abnormal returns continues was 
obtained. The duration dependence test was extended in the context of 
structural breaks.  
On the other hand, the new evidence of price bubbles and duration dependence 
was revealed based on the original duration dependence tests. The bubbles in 
the Indian market were not discovered before and the positive duration 
dependence in negative runs (i.e. faster recoverability from continuing bear 
markets) in Korea was also found. Also, structural break based tests discovered 
several cases of positive duration dependence. These new approaches and 
evidence can contribute to academics and financial authorities as 
supplementary tools to analyse price bubbles and market disequilibrium in 
general. 
In conclusion, this thesis has explored a field of market disequilibrium by 
focusing on two main topics: modelling market disequilibrium at the market 
microstructure level, and detecting long-run market disequilibrium in the 
context of stock bubbles and estimating transition probability using duration 
dependence. A range of concepts, theories and analytic skills were applied to 
develop models and analyse empirical evidence: market making theories, time 
series modelling, and asset pricing; duration dependence, structural breaks and 
macroeconomic mechanisms; probability theory among many others. Despite 
the use of them, the findings in the thesis probably did not give complete 
answers. However, they were able to provide new evidence and alternative 
ways of investigating the topics about market disequilibrium in the stock 
market. In the meantime, the author will continue to research on those topics in 
depth in the future. 
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